

Thomas Kelly

Department of Philosophy
Princeton University
212 1879 Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544

tkelly@princeton.edu

Employment

Princeton University, 2004-Present.

Current:

- Professor of Philosophy, 2012-Present
- Associated Faculty, University Center for Human Values, 2006-Present.
- Associated Faculty, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, 2018-Present.

Past:

- Associate Professor of Philosophy, Princeton, 2007-2012
- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Princeton, 2004-2007
- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 2003-2004.
- Junior Fellow, Harvard Society of Fellows, 2000-2003.

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Harvard University, 2001.

Dissertation: *Rationality and the Ethics of Belief*

Committee: Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, James Pryor.

B.A. in Philosophy, *summa cum laude*, University of Notre Dame, 1994.

Areas of Specialization

Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Rationality, Social Philosophy.

Areas of Competence

History of Analytic Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion.

Publications

Book

Bias: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press, UK 2022/US 2023).
288+x pp. 125,000+ words.

- *Philosopher Meets Critics* book symposium with critics Sinan Dogramaci, Brian Hedden, and Sophie Horowitz, hosted by CONCEPT at the University of Cologne: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00K_QDTE6V4
- Author Meets Critics symposium at the 2024 Central APA, with critics Louise Antony and Roger White.
- Book symposium at Princeton University, with critics Selim Berker, Daniel Greco, and Gabrielle Johnson, May 2024.
- Author meets critics session at 2023 Southeastern Epistemology Conference, with critics Jonathan Matheson, Brett Sherman, and Mike Veber.
- Reviews in *The Times Literary Supplement*, *Choice*, *Public Discourse*, *Ethics*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, with more on the way.
- Featured in *New Philosophical Books in Philosophy* podcast series, with Robert Talisse: <https://newbooksnetwork.com/thomas-kelly-bias-a-philosophical-study-oxford-up-2023>

Papers (Google scholar count noted for papers w/50+ citations as of 1/15/25)

- (1) “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes”, *Philosophical Studies* 110 (2002): 163-196.
 - 275 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (2) “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol. LXVI, No.3, May (2003): 612-640.
 - 566 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (3) “Sunk Costs, Rationality and Acting for the Sake of the Past” *Nous* 38:1 (2004): 60-85.
 - 81 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (4) “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. In John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler-Szabo (eds.) *Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Vol I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 167-196.
 - 958 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
 - Anthologized in Jeremy Fantl, Matt McGrath, and Ernest Sosa (eds.) *Contemporary Epistemology: An Anthology* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2019) pp.249-264.

- (5) “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?” *Philosophical Perspectives* 19 (Blackwell Publishers, 2005): 179-209.
- Translated into French as “Faits mooréens et révision des croyances, ou le sceptique peut-il gagner?” by Benoit Guilielmo for *Klesis* 57 (2024).
 - 91 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (6) “The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays?” *Philosophical Studies*, vol.131, no.3, December 2006: 695-712.
- Published along with a reply by Laurence Bonjour.
- (7) “Evidence”, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.) <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/evidence/>>.
- ??? Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (8) “Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Volume 75, Issue 2, September 2007: 465-474.
- 91 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (9) “Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization”. *The Journal of Philosophy* Volume CV (2008), no.10 Oct. 2008, pp.611-633.
- 233 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (10) “Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception”, *Philosophy Compass* vol.3 (5), (Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp.933-955.
- 142 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (11) “Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism”. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. XXXII: ‘Truth and Its Deformities’ (Blackwell Publishers, 2008): 53-78.
- 82 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (12) “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, in Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), *Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 111-174.
- 805 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
 - Lightly abridged version anthologized in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 183-217.

- (13) "Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?" (with Sarah McGrath). *Philosophical Perspectives* 24 (Blackwell Publishers 2010): 325-359.
- 157 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (14) "Hume, Norton and Induction Without Rules". *Philosophy of Science* 77 (December 2010): 754-764.
- (15) "Consensus Gentium: Twenty First Century Reflections on the 'Common Consent' Argument for the Existence of God." In Kelly Clark and Raymond Van Arragon (eds.) *Evidence and Religious Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 135-156.
- 51 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25
 - Translated into Polish as: "Consensus Gentium: Refleksje Na Temat Argumentu X, 'Powszechnej Zgody' Za Istnieniem Boga" in Gutowski and Iwanicki (eds.) *Teizm, Ateizm, i Religia* (Lublin 2019): 377-403.
- (16) "Following the Argument Where It Leads". *Philosophical Studies* Volume 154, Number 1, (2011): 105-124.
- (17) "Taking Things for Granted". *Philosophical Studies* Volume 156, Number 1 (2011): 141-147.
- Published along with a reply by Gilbert Harman and Brett Sherman, "Knowledge and Assumptions."
- (18) "Evidence Can Be Permissive." (My side of a debate with Roger White, MIT.) In Mathias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Blackwell Publishers, 2nd edition, 2013): 298-313.
- 267 Google scholar citation as of 1/15/25.
- (19) "Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment". In David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.) *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays* (Oxford University Press, 2013): 31-53.
- 126 Google scholar citations as of 1/15/25.
- (20) "Evidence", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward Zalta (ed.) URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/>.
- (21) "Quine and Epistemology". In Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Quine* (Blackwell 2014): 17-37.
- (22) "Believers as Thermometers." In Jonathan Matheson and Rico Viz (eds.) *The Ethics of Belief* (Oxford University Press 2014): 301-314.

- (23) “Soames and Moore on Method in Ethics and Epistemology” (co-authored with Sarah McGrath). *Philosophical Studies* Volume 172, Issue 6 (2015): 1661-1670.
- Published along with a reply by Scott Soames.
- (24) “Disagreement in Philosophy: Its Epistemic Significance.” In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology* (Oxford University Press 2016): 374-394.
- (25) “Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology.” In Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) *Goldman and His Critics* (Blackwell Publishers 2016): 43-65.
- Published along with a reply by Alvin Goldman.
- (26) “Are There Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?” (co-authored with Sarah McGrath). In John Keller (ed.) *Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen* (Oxford University Press 2017): 324-339.
- Published along with a reply by Peter van Inwagen.
- (27) “Religious Diversity and the Epistemology of Theology” (co-authored with Nathan King). In William Abraham and Fred Aquino (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook to the Epistemology of Theology* (Oxford University Press 2017): 309-324.
- (28) “Bias: Some Conceptual Geography.” (co-authored with Sarah McGrath). In Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning (eds.) *Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology* (Oxford University Press 2022): 11-34.
- (29) “Cancel Culture on Campus: A Critical Analysis.” *Journal of Free Speech Law*. Volume 2, Issue 1 (2023): 1-25.
- (30) “Bias, Norms, Introspection, and the Bias Blind Spot.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Volume 108, Issue 1 (2023/2024): 1-25/81-105
<https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12953>
- (31) “Can Prejudiced Beliefs Be Rational?” *Inquiry*. Published online Nov. 2023. DOI: [10.1080/0020174X.2023.2287482](https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2287482)
- (32) “There are No ‘Practical Reasons for Belief’” (with Stewart Cohen). *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, vol.3 (Wiley-Blackwell 2024): 81-93.
- (33) “Bias and Disagreement.” Forthcoming in Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (34) “Peer Disagreement, Steadfastness, and Conciliationism. In Carter, Baghramian, and

- Rowland (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Disagreement* (Routledge, 2024): 171-184.
- (35) “The New Evil Demon Problem and the Nature of Evidence.” Forthcoming in *Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen*, edited by Juan Comesana and Matt McGrath.
- (36) “Some Philosophical Questions are *Sublime*”: Memories of Derek Parfit.” Forthcoming in Jeff McMahan (ed.) *Derek Parfit: His Life and Thought* (Oxford University Press).
- (37) “Précis of *Bias: A Philosophical Study*”, forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.
- (38) “In Defense of Bias: Replies to Berker, Greco, and Johnson.” Forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.
- (39) “Bias, Knowledge, Skepticism, and Disagreement: Précis of Part III of *Bias: A Philosophical Study*.” *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* vol.14 no.3 (2024): 181-189.
- (40) “*Bias Defended*.” *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* vol.14 no.3 (2024): 234-258.
- (41) “*Faits mooréens et révision des croyances, ou le sceptique peut-il gagner?*” French translation of “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision...” by Benoit Guilielmo for *Klesis* 57 (2024).
- (42) “Varieties of Evidentialism.” Forthcoming in Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain (eds.) *Evidentialism* (Routledge).

Book Reviews

- (1) Review of David Schmidt (ed.) *Robert Nozick: Contemporary Philosophers in Focus*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 7/16/2002.
- (2) Review of Robert Nozick’s *Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World*. *The Review of Politics*, Fall 2002:761-763.
- (3) Review of Robert Fogelin, *Walking the Tightrope of Reason*, in *Mind*, vol.113, no.452, October 2004: 750-753.
- (4) Review of Anthony Appiah, *As If: Idealization and Ideals*, in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 4/01/2018.

Invited Talks and Presentations (“**” denotes an endowed lecture; “*” denotes a keynote address; “#” denotes a series of lectures).

2024

“*Bias: A Philosophical Study*: Author meets Reviewer session” (pilot session at Eastern APA), with Bruce Russell. 1/16/2024

“Bias, Rationality, and Perspective.” Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. 1/23/24

“Author meets critics symposium on *Bias: A Philosophical Study*.” APA Central Division meetings, with critics Louise Antony and Roger White. 2/23/24

“Reflections on Intellectual Humility.” Princeton University. 3/6/24

“Reflections on Intellectual Humility.” Arizona State University. 3/8/24.

“Comments on Zoe Jenkin, “Reasoning without Control””. University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, 3/25/24.

“Telling the Story of Derek Parfit’s Life.” With David Edmonds, author of *Parfit: A Philosophy and His Mission to Save Morality*. Princeton University, 3/29/24.

“Some Surprising Truths About Bias.” Colloquium talk at the University of Arkansas, 4/4/24.

**“Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse if People Are Reasonable.” The 2024 Kraemer Lecture at the University of Arkansas, 4/5/24.

“Symposium on *Bias: A Philosophical Study*.” At Princeton University, with critics Selim Berker, Daniel Greco, and Gabrielle Johnson. 4/19/24.

“Some Surprising Truths About Bias.” At the University of Barcelona, 6/5/24.

“Varieties of Evidentialism.” At St. Thomas University (Canada), 6/20/24.

*“Some Surprising Truths About Bias.” Keynote address for the 59th annual meetings for the Alabama Philosophical Society, 9/24

“Bias: Some Surprising Truths.” Princeton University, 9/25.

“Bias: Some Surprising Truths.” Colloquium talk at the University of Colorado @ Boulder, 10/5.

“Some Surprising Truths About Bias.” Colloquium talk at the University of Washington at St. Louis, 10/17.

“Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse if People are Reasonable.” University of Washington @ St. Louis, 10/18.

“Some Surprising Truths About Bias.” Yale Center for Law and Philosophy, Yale Law School, 10/28.

“Bias: Some Surprising Truths.” Colloquium talk at UCLA, 11/24.

“The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement: Some Retrospective Remarks,” *Agora Reading Group*, St. Andrews-Sterling (over Zoom), 12/11/24.

2023

“Bias, Perspective, and Introspection.” Colloquium talk at Texas Tech University 1/20/23

“Bias,” Abilene Christian University, 2/17/23.

“Alex Worsnip’s *Fitting Things Together*”. My contribution to an Author-Meets-Critics session @ the APA Central Division Meetings, 2/23.

“Evil Demons in Epistemology,” Princeton University, 4/26/23.

“Bias, Norms, and Normativity,” Northeast Normativity Workshop, May 13th.

“Bias: Some Conceptual Fundamentals,” Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, 5/24/23.

“Gilbert Harman’s contributions to epistemology.” Conference at Princeton University, 9/30/23.

Symposium on *Bias: A Philosophical Study*. Southeastern Epistemology Conference, w/Jon Matheson, Brett Sherman, and Mike Veber as critics. 10/2023.

Symposium on *Bias: A Philosophical Study*. Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition. W/Brian Hedden, Sophie Horowitz, and Sinan Dogramaci as critics. 10/6/23.

2022

“Bias, Norms, and the Perspectival Character of Bias Attributions.” Eastern APA, 1/18/22.

“Cancel Culture on Campus: Towards A Critical Analysis.” Contribution to “Non-Governmental Restraints on Free Speech.” Symposium at Arizona State Law School, 3/19/22

“Bias and the Bias Blind Spot.” University of Rochester, 4/2/22.

“Bias, Norms, and the Perspectival Character of Bias Attributions.” Rutgers Epistemology Conference, 4/29/22.

*“The Biases of Introspection and the Bias Blind Spot.” Keynote address, University of Calgary Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 5/5/22.

“Bias: What Is It?” Princeton High School. 5/9/22.

“Begby’s Prejudice.” Contribution to a book symposium on Endre Begby’s *Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology*. University of Cologne (online), 10/14/22.

“Bias, Norms, and the Bias Blind Spot.” Colloquium talk at Bowling Green State University, 10/21/22.

“There Are No ‘Practical Reasons for Belief’.” Princeton University (faculty lunchtime talks) 10/26/22.

“Racial Preferences in College Admissions: Comments on the Supreme Court Cases”. Princeton University, 10/28/22.

“Belief Polarization.” Contribution to a symposium at the Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Pittsburgh, PA. 11/11/22.

“Bias, Perspective, and Introspection.” Colloquium talk at the University of South Carolina, 11/18/22.

2021

“Bias and Norms.” Human Values Forum, Princeton University, 2/1/21.

“Bias and Rationality.” Invited talk at the workshop, “Social Biases and in Machine Learning and Human Nature: What Social Scientists and Computer Scientists Can Learn from One Another.” Princeton University (virtual), 4/9/2021.

“Doubts About ‘Epistemic Value’”. Epistemic Normativity Workshop, Sussex University (virtual) 5/14/2021.

“Bias Attributions, the Bias Blind Spot, and the Unreliability of Introspection.” Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of Alabama, 10/12/2021.

2020

“Common Sense.” University of California at Irvine, 6/15/2020 (via zoom).

2019

*“Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse if People Are Reasonable.” Keynote address, Creighton Club @ Syracuse University.

#“Polarization and Bias.” Two talks delivered at the University of Notre Dame as part of its PREP (Philosophy and Religion Engaged with the Public) series.

- “Belief Polarization” (6/7/19).
- “Bias and Disagreement” (6/8/19).

“Bias and Disagreement”. Invited Symposium on the Epistemology of Disagreement, Pacific APA, Vancouver.

“Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse if People are Reasonable.” Invited contribution to the conference “Polarization and Civil Disagreement: Combatting America’s Civic Crisis.” Arizona State Law School.

“Why Political Polarization Will Get Worse if People are Reasonable.” Princeton University Alumni Day Lecture.

“Reflective Equilibrium Reconsidered” Australian National University.

2018

“Bias: Some Conceptual Geography.” Conference in honor of Alvin Goldman, Rutgers University.

“Is it Rational to Vote When It’s Irrational to Think that Your Vote Will Make the Difference?” *Human Values Forum*, Princeton University.

“Reflections on Inference to the Best Explanation.” Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop.

“The University: Left to Right.” Princeton University.

“Bias: Some Conceptual Geography” (w/Sarah McGrath). Brown-Princeton Moral Epistemology Workshop.

2017

“Epistemic Rationality, Practical Rationality, and the Value of Truth.” Barcelona Conference on *Epistemic Rationality: Conceptions and Challenges*.

“Bias: Some Conceptual Geography,” Union College philosophy colloquium.

“Progress in Philosophy?” Symposium contribution to the 11th Annual Humanities Colloquium: “Is There Progress in the Humanities?” Princeton University Humanities Council, September 2017.

“Disagreement Revisited.” Rutgers University, Sosa seminar.

“The Value of Heterodoxy.” Contribution to the symposium, “Forged in Fire: How Academic Diversity Makes Everyone Stronger, Princeton University, March 2017.

“Derek Parfit: Some Personal Memories and Reflections.” Remarks delivered at the Derek Parfit Remembrance Day, Princeton University, February 2017.

2016

#“Rationality, Objectivity, and Disagreement.” Series of 6 lectures delivered at the University of Cologne, Germany.

- “Philosophy and ‘Common Sense’” (7/25/16).
- “Should We Believe What Will Make Us Happy?” (7/26/16).
- “Cognitive Norms and the Varieties of Rationality” (7/27/16).
- “Equilibrium in Ethics and Epistemology” (7/28/16).
- “Disagreement and Rational Permissiveness” (7/29/16).
- “Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology” (7/30/16).

“Bias: Some Conceptual Geography.” Fordham University.

#St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology.

- “Reflections on Pascal’s Wager.”
- “The Epistemology and Psychology of Agnosticism.”
- “Religious Disagreement.”

“Believing Controversial Things.” Mercer House, Princeton University.

2015

*“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology”. Keynote address at the Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), St. Louis, Missouri.

*“Disagreement in Philosophy”. Keynote address at the UPenn/Rutgers/Princeton Social Epistemology Workshop.

“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology”. University of Miami philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology”. Rutgers University, Marc Sanders Graduate Seminar in Epistemology.

“Intellectual Humility, Disagreement, and Dogmatism”. Intellectual Humility Capstone Conference, Catalina, CA.

“Disagreement in Philosophy”. Intellectual Humility Summer Seminar, Pasadena, CA.

2014

“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology”. University of Texas at Austin Philosophy Dept. colloquium.

“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology” University of Pittsburgh Philosophy Dept. colloquium.

*“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories of Epistemic Justification”. University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference.

“Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories of Epistemic Justification”, Chambers Conference, University of Nebraska at Lincoln.

2013

*“Equilibrium in Ethics and Epistemology”. 4th Annual Northwestern-Notre Dame Epistemology Conference.

“Equilibrium in Ethics and Epistemology” (with Sarah McGrath). CRNAP Moral Epistemology Workshop, Princeton University.

2012

“Believers as Thermometers”, UCLA Philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Believers as Thermometers”. Arctic Epistemology Conference, Lofoten Islands, Norway.

“Believers as Thermometers”. University of Massachusetts (Amherst) philosophy dept. colloquium.

“The Uniqueness Thesis” My contribution to an invited symposium at the Central APA. (The other symposiasts were Roger White and E.J. Coffman.)

“Moorean Facts and Greater Certainty Principles”. Fordham University.

*“Disagreement and Religious Belief?”. Keynote address at St. Norbert Conference on Disagreement and Religion.

“Pascal’s Wager”. 2012 St. Thomas Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology.

2011

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Brown University philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Believers as Thermometers”, Vassar College philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Believers as Thermometers”. University of North Florida.

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, University of Tennessee.

“Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment”, California State (Fullerton).

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Princeton Theological Seminary.

2010

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Stanford University philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment”, New York Institute of Philosophy (NYU).

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”. The Ohio State University philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Bellingham Philosophy Conference.

“Dogmatism and Independence”, The Pontificia Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, University of Houston philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”. Colloquium presentation at Eastern APA.

“Philosophy of Religion and the Epistemology of Disagreement”. With Roger White (MIT), at the 2010 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology.

“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Princeton University Paper Tigers.

*“Following the Argument Where It Leads”, Conference on Epistemic Normativity at Fordham University.

“Taking Things for Granted: Comments on Harman and Sherman”. Oberlin philosophy

colloquium.

2009

“On Following the Argument Where It Leads”. University of Nevada-Las Vegas philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Common Sense and Confidence”. *Arche* conference on philosophical methodology, St. Andrews, Spring 2009.

“Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology”, National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on Quine and Davidson, Princeton University.

2008

“Confidence and Belief Revision”, Columbia University philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Hume and Induction Without Rules”, Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Pittsburgh. This was my contribution to the symposium “Induction Without Rules”; the other symposiasts were Peter Achinstein (Johns Hopkins), John Norton (Pittsburgh HPS), and John Worrall (LSE).

“Common Sense as Evidence”, the University of Notre Dame philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, Brown University seminar presentation.

“The Common Consent Argument: A Reconsideration”, Princeton/Rutgers conference on religious disagreement.

2007

“Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization”, University of Michigan philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, NYU Mind and Language Seminar.

“Rationality and Peer Disagreement”, University of California at Irvine philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, Rutgers University.

“Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, MIT.

“Comments on Pryor’s ‘Reasons and That-Clauses’”, SOFIA XVII conference in Cancun.

2006

“Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization”, Dartmouth College philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Confidence and Belief Revision”, University of Rochester philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Comments on White’s ‘A New Look at the Old Problem of Induction’”, Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.

2005

“Moorean Facts and Belief Revision”, MIT philosophy colloquium.

“Moorean Facts and Belief Revision”, Brandeis philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Evidence, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization”. My contribution to an invited symposium on “Evidence” for the Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

“Comments on White, ‘Epistemic Permissiveness’”. APA Eastern Division Meetings.

2004

“Reasonable Disagreements”, SOFIA XV, Pontificia Universidade de Rio Grande, Porto Alegre.

“Moorean Facts and Belief Revision”, Princeton University philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Moorean Facts and Belief Revision”, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee philosophy dept. colloquium.

“Moorean Facts”, Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

“The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays?”, Inland Philosophy Conference.

Prior to 2004

“The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Spring 2002.

“The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, University of Pittsburgh, Spring 2002.

“The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, University of Notre Dame, Fall 2001.

“The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Harvard Department of Philosophy, Fall 2001

“Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting For the Sake of the Past”, Harvard Society of Fellows, Spring 2001.

Academic Honors, Awards, and Major Grants.

Named the Philip Quinn Memorial Lecturer for 2025, University of Notre Dame.

Delivered the Kraemer Lecture at the University of Arkansas, Spring 2024.

John Templeton Foundation grant, “Intellectual Humility, Disagreement and Dogmatism” 2014-2015 (100K).

Named a Behrman Fellow in the Humanities, Princeton University, 2007-2009.

Named the George H. and Mildred F. Whitfield University Preceptor in the Humanities, Princeton University, Spring 2006.

Elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows, Fall 1999.

Whiting Fellowship in the Humanities, 1999-2000.

Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities, 1994-1995.

Dockweiler Memorial Prize, 1994 (presented for the outstanding senior thesis in philosophy at Notre Dame).

National Endowment for the Humanities Younger Scholar Award, Summer 1993 (to do research on the idea of toleration as it developed in the liberal tradition).

Courses Given (* denotes graduate level course)

Princeton University

At the undergraduate level:

- Philosophy 203/Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology (Fall 2023). With Gideon Rosen
- Philosophy 209/The Demands of Rationality. (Spring 2023). With Sebastian Liu.
- Philosophy 313/Theory of Knowledge (many times)
- Philosophy 338/History of Analytic Philosophy (many times)
- Seminar: Intellectual Foundations of Modern Conservatism (Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Fall 2019, Fall 2020, Spring 2022, Fall 2022, Spring 2024)
- Seminar: Rationality and Irrationality (4x, Fall 2016, Fall 2019)
- Seminar: Disagreement (Fall 2009)
- Seminar: Philosophical Methodology (Fall 2009)

- Seminar: The Problem of Induction (Fall 2004)

At the graduate level (all seminars):

Bias and Reasons (joint PU/Rugers seminar).	With Ernest Sosa, Rutgers.
First Year Seminar: Norms (Fall 2020, Fall 2022).	
Bias and Objectivity (Spring 2020).	
Epistemology After the Modal Turn (Spring 2019).	
Anti-Cartesianism and Self-Knowledge (Fall 2017).	With Adam Elga.
Rationality and Irrationality (Fall 2016)	
Classics of Analytic Philosophy (Fall 2015)	
Bias and Objectivity (Spring 2016).	With Sarah McGrath.
Dissertation Seminar (Fall 2013)	
Theory of Knowledge (Spring 2013).	With John Hawthorne.
Classics of Analytic Philosophy (Fall 2012).	
Epistemology and Metaphilosophy (Fall 2011).	
First Year Seminar (Fall 2011).	With Daniel Garber.
Moral Epistemology (Spring 2010).	With Sarah McGrath.
Classics of Analytic Philosophy (Fall 2009).	With Delia Fara.
Classics of Analytic Philosophy (Fall 2008).	With Delia Fara.
Themes from Recent Epistemology (Spring 2009, Fall 2023).	
Theory of Knowledge: Evidence (Spring 2008).	With Bas van Fraassen.
Dissertation Seminar (Spring 2008).	
Rationality and Objectivity (Spring 2006).	
Common Sense and Philosophical Revisionism (Spring 2005).	

The University of Notre Dame

At the undergraduate level:

Philosophy 101/Introduction to Philosophy (twice).
University Seminar in Philosophy.

At the graduate level:

Epistemology (Spring 2004). With Marian David.

Harvard University

At the undergraduate level, instructor with sole responsibility:

The Concept of Explanation
The Problem of Induction

Professional Service

I have served as an external referee for the following institutions in appointment or promotion cases:

- (1) MIT (six times)
- (2) New York University (five times)
- (3) Harvard University (twice)
- (4) USC (twice)
- (5) University of California at Berkeley (twice)
- (6) Yale University (twice)
- (7) Yale Divinity School
- (8) Arizona State University (twice)
- (9) Australian National University (ANU)
- (10) Oxford University
- (11) University of Pennsylvania
- (12) University of Sydney
- (13) Boston College
- (14) Brandeis University
- (15) Carleton College
- (16) Fordham University
- (17) Southern Methodist University
- (18) The Ohio State University
- (19) University of Arizona (Tucson)
- (20) University of Massachusetts at Amherst
- (21) University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)
- (22) University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
- (23) University of Nebraska (Lincoln)
- (24) University of North Florida
- (25) University of Notre Dame
- (26) University of Pittsburgh
- (27) University of Calgary
- (28) Western Washington University
- (29) University of Texas (Austin)
- (30) Princeton University Society of Fellows (multiple times)
- (31) The John Templeton Foundation (multiple times).
- (32) The Marc Sanders Foundation.

I have also served as a referee for Oxford University Press, the *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*, the Bellingham summer philosophy conference, and for the following journals, most of them at least several times: *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Episteme*, *Faith and Philosophy*; *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*; *The Journal of the History of Philosophy, Knowledge, Rationality, and Action*; *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Philosophers Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Mind*, *Nous*, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, *Synthese*, and the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*; and as a judge for the Young Epistemologist Prize.

In addition, I am a member of the editorial board of *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, a nominating editor for the *Philosophers Annual*, and an evaluator for the *Philosophical Gourmet Report*.