Department Members
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Also at Rutgers University - Newark
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Katalin Balog, Phenomenal ConceptsIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312. 2006.
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Katalin Balog, Ontological novelty, emergence, and the mind-body problemIn Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. pp. 371-399. 2006.
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Ken Aizawa, Understanding the embodiment of perceptionAPA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3): 5-25. 2006.
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Ken Aizawa and Fred Adams, Defending non-derived contentPhilosophical Psychology 18 (6): 661-669. 2005.
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Ken Aizawa and Fred Adams, Defending Non-Derived ContentPhilosophical Psychology 18 (6): 661-669. 2005.
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Ken Aizawa, Cognitive architecture: The structure of cognitive representationsIn Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 172--189. 2003.
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Ken Aizawa, Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive RepresentationsIn Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.
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Ken Aizawa, Cognitive architectureIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2002.
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Katalin Balog, Commentary on Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to EthicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3). 2001.
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Ken Aizawa, Manfred Spitzer, the mind within the net. Models of learning, thinking, and actingMinds and Machines 11 (3): 445-448. 2001.
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Sven Walter, The Bounds of CognitionPhilosophical Psychology 14 (2): 43-64. 2001.
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Katalin Balog, Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments” (review)Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 215-219. 2000.
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Katalin Balog, Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Review 108 (4): 497-528. 1999.
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Katalin Balog and Jennifer Hornsby, Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.</article-title>< cont (review)Philosophical Review 108 (4): 562-565. 1999.
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Ken Aizawa, Jeffrey L. Elman, Elizabeth A. Bates, mark H. Johnson, Annette karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett, (eds.), Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development, neural network modeling and connectionism series and Kim Plunkett and Jeffrey L. Elman, exercises in rethinking innateness: A handbook for connectionist simulations (review)Minds and Machines 9 (3): 447-456. 1999.
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Ken Aizawa, Terence Horgan and John Tienson, connectionism and the philosophy of psychologyMinds and Machines 9 (2): 270-273. 1999.
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Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal ProjectionsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 433-437. 1997.
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Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Rock beats scissors: Historicalism fights backAnalysis 57 (4): 273-81. 1997.
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Ken Aizawa, Exhibiting verses explaining systematicity: A reply to Hadley and Hayward (review)Minds and Machines 7 (1): 39-55. 1997.
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Ken Aizawa, The role of the systematicity argument in classicism and connectionismIn S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind, John Benjamins. 1997.
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Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Rock beats scissors: historicalism fights backAnalysis 57 (4): 273-281. 1997.
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Frederick Adams and Ken Aizawa, Fodorian SemanticsIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader, Blackwell. 1994.
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Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, 'X' means X: Fodor/warfield semantics (review)Minds and Machines 4 (2): 215-31. 1994.
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Ken Aizawa, Representations without Rules, Connectionism and the Syntactic ArgumentSynthese 101 (3). 1994.
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Ken Aizawa, Representations without rules, connectionism and the syntactic argumentSynthese 101 (3): 465-92. 1994.
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Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, "X" means X: Fodor/Warfield semanticsMinds and Machines 4 (2): 215-231. 1994.