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4882Tracking RepresentationalismIn Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235. 2014.This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism.
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4576Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality TheoriesPhilosophy Compass 9 (5): 325-337. 2014.This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that natura…Read more
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1174Intensional Perceptual AscriptionsErkenntnis 82 (3): 513-530. 2017.This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
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London, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
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