Jeffrey McDonough

This essay explores Émilie Du Châtelet’s neglected understanding of divine eternity and its relation to the views of Christian Wolff and G.W. Leibniz. It is divided into four parts. The first part sets the stage by distinguishing three views on divine eternity: atemporal, sempiternal, and permanent. The second part highlights an apparent tension in Du Châtelet’s discussion of divine eternity and argues that that tension points towards Du Châtelet’s acceptance of a permanent view of divine eternity. The third part argues that Wolff holds a position similar to Du Châtelet’s while the fourth part argues that the mature Leibniz holds an atemporal view. The essay concludes by suggesting that while Du Châtelet’s views on divine eternity may indeed be considered Leibnizian insofar as she rejects Newton’s and Clarke’s sempiternalism, her overall position with respect to divine eternity is closer to the views of Wolff than to those of Leibniz himself.

Berkeley ’s commentators have been highly critical of his account of human agency. In this essay I argue that there is a rather straightforward reading of his view that is historically sensitive, philosophically well-motivated, and fits squarely with his texts. The paper falls into four main sections. The first section briefly revisits three options concerning the relationship between human and divine agency available to theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early modern eras. The second argues that of those three views only the position of concurrentism is consistent with Berkeley’s texts. The third section explores Berkeley’s reasons for adopting concurrentism, especially as opposed to occasionalism, by highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system. Finally the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley’s understanding of human activity by looking at how we might understand his claim that we move our legs ourselves in light of his commitments to idealism and concurrentism.

This collection of essays contributes to the important task of understanding the relationship between Du Châtelet’s philosophy and the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. Was Du Châtelet a devoted follower of Leibniz and Wolff? Or perhaps only of Leibniz? Or perhaps only of Wolff? Alternatively, was Du Châtelet a synthetic, but nonetheless original thinker, and, if so, what exactly did she synthesize and how? Did she primarily reconceptualize Newtonian physics on Leibnizian and Wolffian grounds, or did she weave together a new philosophy of her own? If she did weave together a new philosophy of her own, what were its most important threads? Were they drawn from Leibniz and Wolff or from a wider range of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke and Newtonian commentators? Or, finally, was Du Châtelet a more thoroughly original thinker than even synthetic interpretations suggest? Would it be more accurate to describe Du Châtelet as using Leibniz and Wolff as springboards for her own ideas and views? Did she stand—as she suggests—like a giant on the shoulders of giants, seeing entirely new things, offering entirely new arguments? The aim of this volume is above all to encourage further attention to the rich, still underexplored, seam where Du Châtelet’s philosophy joins with the philosophies of her contemporaries, and especially with the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff.

This essay explores Émilie Du Châtelet’s neglected understanding of divine eternity and its relation to the views of Christian Wolff and G.W. Leibniz. It is divided into four parts. The first part sets the stage by distinguishing three views on divine eternity: atemporal, sempiternal, and permanent. The second part highlights an apparent tension in Du Châtelet’s discussion of divine eternity and argues that that tension points towards Du Châtelet’s acceptance of a permanent view of divine eternity. The third part argues that Wolff holds a position similar to Du Châtelet’s while the fourth part argues that the mature Leibniz holds an atemporal view. The essay concludes by suggesting that while Du Châtelet’s views on divine eternity may indeed be considered Leibnizian insofar as she rejects Newton’s and Clarke’s sempiternalism, her overall position with respect to divine eternity is closer to the views of Wolff than to those of Leibniz himself.

This essay offers an account of the core of Du Châtelet’s understanding of time and attempts to situate it with respect to more familiar views of her era. The essay is divided into three sections. The first section argues that Du Châtelet holds that we have a foundational idea of successive being and defends a particular interpretation of her understanding of that crucial concept. The second section argues that time for Du Châtelet is the order of successive beings insofar as they succeed each other and fleshes out that suggestion in part by drawing comparisons between Du Châtelet’s relationism and Leibniz’s relationism. The third section explicates Du Châtelet’s reasons for thinking that substantial views of time are natural and useful but also false and dangerous. The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Du Châtelet’s views on time and her views on space.

This chapter offers a novel account of how to understand Leibniz’s views on compossibility when applied to infinite worlds constituted by unextended, immaterial substances or ‘monads’. The first section sets the stage by taking up some essential questions about the relationship between monads and space. The second section argues that—with a better understanding of that relationship—it is possible to see how the so-called ‘packing strategy’ can be applied quite directly, even intuitively, to monadic worlds and substances. The third section argues that thinking through the application of the packing strategy to monadic worlds highlights an important, neglected Leibnizian commitment and reveals surprising affinities between the packing strategy and recent cosmological interpretations.

This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.

It is often maintained that teleology was undermined in the early modern era by the scientific revolution. Hoping to correct this misperception, this essay looks at three areas in which teleology was upheld and developed by three pioneers of early modern science. The first main section argues that teleological reasoning is woven into the very fabric of William Harvey’s revolutionary work in biology. The second main section takes up Robert Boyle’s explicit and systematic defense of teleology and especially his effort to reconcile the methods and views of the new science with a deep-seated commitment to divine teleology. Finally, the last main section explores Pierre Maupertuis’s bold attempt to find a place for teleology in the heart of modern, mathematical physics.

The core idea of teleology is intuitive enough: some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. Cats have claws for the sake of grasping their prey. Birds have wings for the sake of escaping predators. Cats stalk birds in order to catch them. Birds fly away in order to escape cats. This introduction first highlights various philosophical questions that arise as we dig deeper into the concept of teleology. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic? Does it involve intentionality? What is its scope? Is it explanatory? The chapter then provides brief overviews of how these and other questions are taken up by the volume’s authors as they trace the development of the concept of teleology through the ages in a wide variety of traditions and contexts.

This collection of essays contributes to the important task of understanding the relationship between Du Châtelet’s philosophy and the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. Was Du Châtelet a devoted follower of Leibniz and Wolff? Or perhaps only of Leibniz? Or perhaps only of Wolff? Alternatively, was Du Châtelet a synthetic, but nonetheless original thinker, and, if so, what exactly did she synthesize and how? Did she primarily reconceptualize Newtonian physics on Leibnizian and Wolffian grounds, or did she weave together a new philosophy of her own? If she did weave together a new philosophy of her own, what were its most important threads? Were they drawn from Leibniz and Wolff or from a wider range of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke and Newtonian commentators? Or, finally, was Du Châtelet a more thoroughly original thinker than even synthetic interpretations suggest? Would it be more accurate to describe Du Châtelet as using Leibniz and Wolff as springboards for her own ideas and views? Did she stand—as she suggests—like a giant on the shoulders of giants, seeing entirely new things, offering entirely new arguments? The aim of this volume is above all to encourage further attention to the rich, still underexplored, seam where Du Châtelet’s philosophy joins with the philosophies of her contemporaries, and especially with the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff.

This essay explores Émilie Du Châtelet’s neglected understanding of divine eternity and its relation to the views of Christian Wolff and G.W. Leibniz. It is divided into four parts. The first part sets the stage by distinguishing three views on divine eternity: atemporal, sempiternal, and permanent. The second part highlights an apparent tension in Du Châtelet’s discussion of divine eternity and argues that that tension points towards Du Châtelet’s acceptance of a permanent view of divine eternity. The third part argues that Wolff holds a position similar to Du Châtelet’s while the fourth part argues that the mature Leibniz holds an atemporal view. The essay concludes by suggesting that while Du Châtelet’s views on divine eternity may indeed be considered Leibnizian insofar as she rejects Newton’s and Clarke’s sempiternalism, her overall position with respect to divine eternity is closer to the views of Wolff than to those of Leibniz himself.

The Dioptrique, often translated as the Optics or, more literally, as the Dioptrics is one of Descartes’ earliest works. Likely begun in the mid to late 1620’s, Descartes refers to it by name in a letter to Mersenne of 25 November 1630 III, 29). Its subject matter partially overlaps with Descartes’ more foundational project The World or Treatise on Light in which he offers a general mechanistic account of the universe including the formation, transmission, and reception of light. Although Galileo’s condemnation by the Church prompted Descartes to abandon, in 1633, his plans for publishing The World, he continued in the ensuing years to vigorously pursue a number of scientific projects, including projects related to his work in optics. He was eventually persuaded to publish three essays highlighting some of his discoveries together with an introductory essay concerning “the method for rightly directing one’s reason and searching for truth in the sciences” . As one of those essays, Descartes’ Dioptrics finally appeared in print together with the Discourse on Method, the Meteorology and the Geometry in the summer of 1637 in a French language edition. It was republished in a Latin edition in 1644. The subject matter of the Dioptrics may be thought of as covering three main topics and is formally divided by Descartes into ten chapters or “discourses”. The first main topic concerns the nature of light and the laws of optics. In the first discourse, Descartes invites his readers to.

This book offers a historical introduction to fundamental questions in the philosophy of religion. It is divided into twenty-five chapters. The first chapter discusses the nature of piety drawing on Plato's Euthyphro. The next three chapters discuss the nature of evil, free will, foreknowledge, and sin in the context of Augustine's On Free Choice of Will. Chapter Five discusses Anslem's "ontological" argument for the existence of God. Chapter Six explores Ibn Sina's account of the nature of the soul and immortality. The next two chapters explore the foundations of religious belief and mysticism in the company of al-Ghazali's The Rescuer from Error. Chapters nine through eleven discuss Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God as well as his account of God's impersonal and personal attributes. The twelfth chapter explores Marguerite Porete's account of mystical ascent as well as the doctrines of heaven and hell. Chapter Thirteen discusses Pascal's pragmatic argument for belief in the existence of God. Chapters Fourteen through Sixteen discuss Spinoza's understanding of God, our relationship to God, and the foundations of morality. Chapters Seventeen through Nineteen explore the argument from design, the existence of God, deism, and the problem of evil. Chapter Twenty investigates Mary Shepherd's defense of belief in miracles, while Chapter Twenty-One explores Mill's views on the utility of religion. Finally, chapters Twenty-Three through Twenty-Five explore the origins of modern morality and the relationship between religion and nihilism in the company of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality.

"This book introduces Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Principle of Optimality and argues that it plays a central role his physics and philosophy, with profound implications for both. Each chapter begins with an introduction to one of Leibniz's ground-breaking studies in natural philosophy, paying special attention to the role of optimal form in those investigations. Each chapter then goes on to explore the philosophical implications of optimal form for Leibniz's broader philosophical system. Individual chapters include discussions of Leibniz's understanding of teleology, the nature of bodies, laws of nature, and free will. The final chapter explores the legacy of Leibniz's physics in light of his work on optimal form"--

Śrīgupta, a Buddhist philosopher in the Middle Way tradition, was born in Bengal in present-day India in the seventh century. He is best known for his Introduction to Reality with its accompanying auto-commentary,1 in which he presents the first Middle Way iteration of the influential "neither-one-nor-many argument."2 This antifoundationalist line of reasoning sets out to prove that nothing enjoys ontologically independent being.Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born some one thousand years later, in the city of Leipzig, situated on the outskirts of European learning and thought. He is best known today for having co-invented the infinitesimal calculus, for his...

This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz is onto something deep and important – a tangle of issues that wouldn’t be sorted out properly for centuries to come, and then only by some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. The first two sections place Leibniz’s theory in its proper historical context and draw a distinction between Leibniz’s logical and meta-logical discoveries. The third section argues that Leibniz’s logical insights initially make his “infinite analysis” theory of contingency more rather than less perplexing. The last two sections argue that Leibniz’s meta-logical insights, however, point the way towards a better appreciation of (what we should regard as) his formal theory of contingency, and its correlative, his formal theory of necessity.

This paper offers a non-traditional account of what was really at stake in debates over the legitimacy of teleology and teleological explanations in the later medieval and early modern periods. It is divided into four main sections. The first section highlights two defining features of ancient and early medieval views on teleology, namely, that teleological explanations are on a par (or better) with efficient causal explanations, and that the objective goodness of outcomes may explain their coming about. The second section argues that it was the first thesis – the thesis of explanatory parity –that came under attack by mainstream philosophers in the later medieval and early modern traditions, rather than teleology per se. The third section argues similarly that it was the second thesis – the thesis of explanatory goodness – that was the object of Spinoza’s critique of final causes, rather than teleology itself. Finally, the fourth section argues that Leibniz’s claim to be a champion of traditional teleology rests on his willingness to defend both the theses of explanatory parity and goodness against the very charges that led to their demise. The essay concludes by contrasting the narrative offered here with Don Garrett’s recent account according to which “it is not Leibniz but Spinoza who holds the position on teleology and teleological explanation nearest to that of Aristotle” (312).

In writing papers, students confront two obstacles. First, they may not know what philosophical writing is, mistaking an extended statement of their opinion for a philosophy paper. Second, some students lack certain key writing skills and so have difficulty organizing and conveying their view on a philosophical issue. In addition to reading good philosophical works, students need practice writing, editing, and revising their work and so rough drafts become a key component in teaching philosophical writing. This paper outlines the traditional procedure for rough drafts, highlights some difficulties with this approach, and then details an alternative approach that is advantageous in several ways. In addition, an example classroom handout is provided that introduces this alternative procedure.

This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz's defense of teleology within the order of nature. The first section explores Leibniz's contributions to the study of geometrical optics, and argues that his "Most Determined Path Principle" or "MDPP" allows him to bring to the fore philosophical issues concerning the legitimacy of teleological explanations by addressing two technical objections raised by Cartesians to non-mechanistic derivations of the laws of optics. The second section argues that, by drawing on laws such as the MDPP, Leibniz is able to introduce a thin notion of teleology that gives him the resources to respond to the most pressing charges of his day against teleological explanations within natural philosophy. Finally, the third section argues that contemporary philosophers have been overly hasty in their dismissal of Leibniz's account of natural teleology, and indeed that their own generally thin conceptions of teleology have left them with few well-motivated resources for resisting his elegant position

This essay explores Leibniz's defense of teleology and teleological explanations in the domain of physics in general, and the roles that teleology plays in his studies of optics in particular. I argue first that Leibniz draws upon Plato's defense of final causes to introduce a novel research program intended to steer a middle course, on the one hand, between Aristotelian-Scholasticism and the new mechanical philosophy, and, on the other hand, between Cartesian rationalism and Gassendist empiricism. The implementation of this program leads Leibniz to significant conceptual innovations, as he attempts to reconcile teleological and efficient explanatory frameworks, and important discoveries, as he tries to show how final causes can be used to achieve results in the study of the natural world. ;Having situated Leibniz's defense of final causes in the broader context of his general philosophy of physics, I turn to a more detailed investigation of the roles that teleology plays in his work in geometrical optics. Interest in final causes leads Leibniz to introduce his "Most Determined Path Principle" from which both of the central laws of geometrical optics may be derived. I argue that Leibniz uses the discovery of such principles to introduce a thin notion of final causation within the order of nature based on teleological laws that link prior events to subsequent events via the likely or expected outcomes of those events, and defend this view against objections made both by Leibniz's contemporaries and our own. I also argue that Leibniz uses the discovery of principles like Most Determined Path Principle to provide a novel connection within his system between considerations of divine perfection and the laws of nature. I defend the internal consistency of this connection, and explore its relations to Leibniz's mature physics, and to his view that the world is governed by two sets of equipotent laws, one teleological and one mechanical

In his rich and engaging essay, Professor Garber asks most centrally, “…what was the relation between Leibniz’s metaphysical project as set out in the so-called ‘Monadologie’ and the more theological project in the Essais de Théodicée?” His answer is, in short, that there isn’t much of a relationship between these two great works. Furthermore, he takes this result to be evidence of Leibniz’s not being a systematic philosopher in the spirit of Descartes or Spinoza. In these brief comments, I revisit Garber’s two central questions in turn and offer some moderating resistance to both of his conclusions.

entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) This entry will attempt to provide a broad overview of the central themes of Leibniz’s philosophy of physics, as well as an introduction to some of the principal arguments and argumentative strategies he used to defend his positions. It tentatively includes sections entitled, The Historical Development of Leibniz’s Physics, Leibniz on Matter, Leibniz’s Dynamics, Leibniz on the Laws of Motion, Leibniz on Space and Time. A bibliography arranged by topic is also included. A working draft is available here (comments, as always welcome): draft.

This essay attempts to provide a sympathetic reading of Hume’s often tangled discussion of memory in the Treatise. It divides into three main sections. The first section isolates three puzzles in Hume’s account of memory. The second section attempts to show how those puzzles arise as a result of Hume’s understandable failure to recognize a necessary connection between memory and causation. Finally, the third section looks at how the reading of Hume’s account of memory offered in the first two sections fits into the larger context of his work by considering the roles he assigns to memory in his famous account of personal identity.