Amit Hagar

It is occasionally claimed that the important work of philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians in the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries made Kant’s critical philosophy of geometry look somewhat unattractive. Indeed, from the wider perspective of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the replacement of Newtonian physics with Einstein’s theories of relativity, and the rise of quantificational logic, Kant’s philosophy seems “quaint at best and silly at worst”.1 While there is no doubt that Kant’s transcendental project involves his own conceptions of Newtonian physics, Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic, the issue at stake is whether the replacement of these conceptions collapses Kant’s philosophy into an unfortunate embarrassment.2 Thus, in evaluating the debate over the contemporary relevance of Kant’s philosophical project one is faced with the following two questions: (1) Are there any contradictions between the scientific developments of our era and Kant’s philosophy? (2) What is left from the Kantian legacy in light of our modern conceptions of logic, geometry and physics? Within this broad context, this paper aims to evaluate the Kantian project vis à vis the discovery and application of non-Euclidean geometries. Many important philosophers have evaluated Kant’s philosophy of geometry throughout the last century,3 but opinions with regard to the impact of non-Euclidean geometries on it diverge. In the beginning of the century there was a consensus that the Euclidean character of space should be considered as a consequence of the Kantian project, i.e., of the metaphysical view of space and of the synthetic a priori character of geometry. The impact of non-Euclidean geometries was then thought as undermining the Kantian project since it implied, according to positivists such..

For many among the scientifically informed public, and even among physicists, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle epitomizes quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, more than 86 years after its inception, there is no consensus over the interpretation, scope, and validity of this principle. The aim of this chapter is to offer one such interpretation, the traces of which may be found already in Heisenberg's letters to Pauli from 1926, and in Dirac's anticipation of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations from 1927, that stems form the hypothesis of finite nature. Instead of a mere mathematical theorem of quantum theory, or a manifestation of "wave-particle duality", the uncertainty relations turn out to be a result of a more fundamental premise, namely, the inherent limitation on spatial resolution that follows from the bound on physical resources. The implication of this view are far reaching: it depicts the Hilbert space formalism as a phenomenological, "effective", formalism that approximates an underlying discrete structure; it supports a novel interpretation of probability in statistical physics that sees probabilities as deterministic, dynamical transition probabilities which arise from objective and inherent measurement errors; and it helps to clarify several puzzles in the foundations of statistical physics, such as the status of the "disturbance" view of measurement in quantum theory, or the tension between ontology and epistemology in the attempts to describe nature with physical theories whose formalisms include subjective probabilities. Finally, this view also renders obsolete the entire class of interpretations of quantum theory that adhere to "the reality of the wave function".