Maciej Witek

Celem artykułu jest obrona tezy o izolacji informacyjnej systemu wczesnego widzenia przed zarzutami odwołującymi się do eksperymentów świadczących rzekomo o wpływie przekonań o typowych barwach przedmiotów na budowę płytkich reprezentacji wzrokowych. Przez płytkie reprezentacje wzrokowe rozumiem doznania percepcyjne reprezentujące bodźce zewnętrzne wyłącznie za pomocą takich własności, jak kształt, wielkość, położenie i barwa. Twierdzę, że doniesienia eksperymentalne przytaczane przez przeciwników tezy o izolacji informacyjnej można wyjaśnić za pomocą hipotezy, w myśl której system wczesnego widzenia tworzy płytkie reprezentacje wzrokowe korzystając z lokalnej bazy informacji o typowych barwach określonych kształtów, przy czym baza ta ma postać modyfikowanej przez doświadczenie sieci związków asocjacyjnych. Opisuję też eksperymenty, za pomocą których można by powyższą hipotezę testować.

Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions embraces papers focused on the performative dimension of language. While all texts in the volume recognize speech primarily as a type of action, the collection is indicative of the multifaceted nature of J.L. Austin’s original reflection, which invited many varied research programmes. The problems addressed in the volume are discussed with reference to data culled from natural conversation, mediated political discourse, law, and literary language, and include normativity, e.g. types of norms operative in speech acts, speaker’s intentions and commitments, speaker-addressee coordination, but also speech actions in discursive practice, in literal and non-literal language, performance of irony, presupposition, and meaningful significant silence. Contributors are: Brian Ball, Cristina Corredor, Anita Fetzer, Milada Hirschová, Dennis Kurzon, Marcin Matczak, Marina Sbisà, Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Maciej Witek, and Mateusz Włodarczyk.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the author examines Mitchell Green’s account of the expressive power and score-changing function of speech acts; second, he develops an alternative, though also evolutionist approach to explaining these two hallmarks of verbal interaction. After discussing the central tenets of Green’s model, the author draws two distinctions – between externalist and internalist aspects of veracity, and between perlocutionary and illocutionary credibility – and argues that they constitute a natural refinement of Green’s original conceptual framework. Finally, the author uses the refined framework to develop an alternative account of expressing thoughts with words. In particular, he argues that in theorising about expressing thoughts with words – as well as about using language to change context – we should adopt a Millikanian view on what can be called, following Green, acts of communication and an Austinian approach to speech or illocutionary acts.

The aim of this paper is to justify the claim that relativism assumes a deflationary account of truth. In the first section the author articulates some terminological conventions regarding the use of the terms "relativism" and "deflationism". It is assumed that relativism advocates two theses. The first one is the thesis of relativity. It says that opinions adopted by members of some community depend on social or cultural factors determining their cognitive point of view. The second one is the thesis of symmetry. It claims that the idea of the absolute and objective correctness has no sense. In other words, the choice of a cognitive point of view cannot be objectively justified. Nevertheless, it can be explained by describing its social causes. Next, the author analyses the most popular deflationary views on truth. It is assumed that the most reliable form of deflationism is the so-called disquotational conception. According to the conception in question the meaning of a concept of truth is entirely captured by instances of the disquotational scheme: "S" is true if and only if s. It is stressed that the instances of the scheme define the immanent notion of truth. The point is that the notion so defined can be predicated only on sentences one understands. In the second section the author develops the main argument of this paper. A few relativistic accounts of truth are analysed. It is argued that relativists have no alternative but to accept the deflationary account of truth. The main idea of the argument is that rejecting the notion of transcendent truth relativism makes the notion of truth empty and strictly immanent. In other words, it makes the notion deflationary. The third section contains some remarks on possible ways of arguing against relativism

The aim of the paper is to present the theory of reflexive truth conditions with particular reference to the literalist account of communicative competence it offers. Like contextualist conceptions, the theory allows for the phenomenon of linguistic underdeterminacy. Unlike most popular accounts of communicative competence, however, it takes the phenomenon to be a property of the semantic, rather than the cognitive correlate of an utterance; it is claimed, namely, that the semantic correlate of an utterance is to be identified with the state of affairs the utterance signifies, whereas its cognitive correlate is best understood as the conventionally determined, token-reflexive description of the signified state. The paper consists of four parts. In the first section the author offers a few terminological conventions. The second section provides a synthetic presentation of the dominant view on the nature and causes of linguistic underdeterminacy. In the third section, following Manuel García-Carpintero, John Perry and Kepa Korta, the author develops his own version of the reflexive truth conditions theory and points out that the resulting conception offers an original account of linguistic underdeterminacy. The paper ends with general conclusions regarding the nature of linguistic underdetermination and the structure of the literalism/contextualism debate

My aim in this paper is to defend the view that the processes underlying early vision are informationally encapsulated. Following Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) I take early vision to be a cognitive process that takes sensory information as its input and produces the so-called primal sketches or shallow visual outputs: informational states that represent visual objects in terms of their shape, location, size, colour and luminosity. Recently, some researchers (Schirillo 1999, Macpherson 2012) have attempted to undermine the idea of the informational encapsulation of early vision by referring to experiments that seem to show that colour recognition is affected by the subject's beliefs about the typical colour of objects. In my view, however, one can reconcile the results of these experiments with the position that early vision is informationally encapsulated. Namely, I put fort a hypothesis according to which the early vision system has access to a local database that I call the mental palette and define as a network of associative links whose nodes stands for shapes and colours. The function of the palette is to facilitate colour recognition without employing central processes. I also describe two experiments by which the mental palette hypothesis can be tested.

In this paper, I develop a speech-act based account of presumptions. Using a score-keeping model of illocutionary games, I argue that presumptions construed as speech acts can be grouped into three illocutionary act types defined by reference to how they affect the state of a conversation. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first one, I present the score-keeping model of speech act dynamics; in particular, I distinguish between two types of mechanisms—the direct mechanism of illocution and the indirect one of accommodation—that underlie the functioning of illocutionary acts. In the second part, I use the presented model to distinguish between the unilateral act of individual presumption, the point of which is to shift the burden of proof by making the hearer committed to justifying his refusal to endorse the proposition communicated by the speaker, whenever he refuses to endorse it, the bilateral act of joint presumption—‘bilateral’ in that it is performed jointly by at least two conversing agents—the function of which is to confer on the proposition endorsed by the speaker the normative status of jointly recognized though tentative acceptability, and the indirect or back-door act of collective presumption, the purpose of which is to sustain rules and practices to which the conversing agents defer the felicity of their conversational moves.

The paper develops a non-Gricean account of accommodation: a contextadjusting process guided by the assumption that the speaker’s utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move. The paper is organized into three parts. The first one reconstructs the basic tenets of Lepore and Stone's non-Gricean model of meaningmaking, which results from integrating direct intentionalism and extended semantics. The second part discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in conversational practice. The third part uses the tenets of the non-Gricean model of meaning-making to account for the discursive mechanisms underlying accommodation; the proposed account relies on a distinction between the rules of appropriateness, which form part of extendedgrammar, and the Maxim of Appropriateness, which functions as a discursive norm guiding our conversational practice.

The author offers a critical analysis of so called deflationary conception of truth. According to the conception in question an adequate theory of truth contains nothing more than instances of a schema: „p” is true iff p. In short, truth is a disquotation. After giving a brief presentation of main deflationary ideas, the author argues that deflationism conflicts with normative epistemology. In other words, being a form of naturalism it leads to elimination of so called normative element from the philosophy of science. For example deflationary conception of truth is not able to account for constitutive connections between normative ideas of truth and reliability

The paper aims to develop an interactional account of illocutionary practice, which results from integrating elements of Millikan's biological model of language within the framework of Austin's theory of speech acts. The proposed account rests on the assumption that the force of an act depends on what counts as its interactional effect or, in other words, on the response that it conventionally invites or attempts to elicit. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first one reconsiders Austin's and Millikan's contributions to the study of linguistic practice. The second part presents the main tenets of the interactional account. In particular, it draws a distinction between primary and secondary conventional patterns of interaction and argues that they make up coherent systems representing different language games or activity types; it is also argued that the proposed account is not subject to the massive ambiguity problem.