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10Editorial: On the philosophical foundations of situated representingDialectica 57 (4): 353-355. 2003.
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6La perception interne et la critique du langage privéRevue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 130. 1998.Dans cet article, je me demande ce qui distingue la conscience 'externe' du monde (par exemple, la perception visuelle) et la conscience 'interne' du corps propre (par exemple, l'expérience de la douleur). Je rejette les théories analytiques récentes qui assimilent l'expérience de la douleur à une forme de perception externe, à savoir la perception d'un dommage physique relatif au corps du sujet. Mais je ne souscris pas pour autant à la thèse phénoménologique selon laquelle il y a un 'espace dou…Read more
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47Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophreniaConsciousness and Cognition 30 (C): 62-72. 2014.
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21L’esprit et le monde . Quelques réflexions sur L’esprit et le monde de John McDowellPhilosophiques 36 (1): 205-214. 2009.
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34The framework of perceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 347-356. 2015.
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European Review of Philosophy, 2: Cognitive Dynamics (edited book)Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 1996.
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26Athanasios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer , Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 300 pp., £62 , ISBN 9780521198776 (review)Dialectica 69 (1): 134-138. 2015.
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Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
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136Pictures in the Flesh Presence and Appearance in Pictorial ExperienceBritish Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4): 391-405. 2012.This essay explores the prospects of grounding an account of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’ on a theory of presence in ordinary perception. Even though worldly objects can be perceptually recognized in a picture, they do not feel present as when they are perceived face to face. I defend a dual view of perceptual phenomenology according to which the sense of presence is dissociated from the contents of perception. On the one hand, the sense of presence is best conceived as a non-sensory feel…Read more
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8L'esprit en Mouvement: Essai Sur la Dynamique CognitiveCenter for the Study of Language and Information Publica Tion. 2001.
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240The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and ContentErkenntnis 48 (2-3): 153-169. 1998.The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), wh…Read more
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110IV—Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect ViewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1): 69-88. 2016.
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167Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognitionIn Michael J. Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--321. 2012.
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132Disjunctivism, Hallucination and MetacognitionWIREs Cognitive Science 3 533-543. 2012.Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perce…Read more
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31Qu'est-ce que la perception?Librairie Philosophique Vrin. 2004.J. Dokic s'interroge sur le concept de perception : en quoi consiste-t-elle? comment fonctionne-t-elle?, etc. Cette analyse est suivie de deux textes commentés, l'un de George Berkeley "Les idées du haut et du bas", et "Le contenu non conceptuel" de John McDowell.
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299Margin for error and the transparency of knowledgeSynthese 166 (1): 1-20. 2009.In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them i…Read more
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167Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing?Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 117-125. 2013.Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and reject the perceptual interp…Read more
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Le corps en mouvement: les relations entre l'action, l'intention et le mouvement corporelRevue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 124 (3): 249-270. 1992.
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127Too much ado about beliefPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
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150From linguistic contextualism to situated cognition: The case of ad hoc conceptsPhilosophical Psychology 19 (3). 2006.Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated par…Read more
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5European Review of Philosophy: Volume 2, Cognitive Dynamics: Cognitive DynamicsCenter for the Study of Language and Information Publications. 1997.The European Review of Philosophy aims at restoring the tradition of rigorous philosophical discussion by bringing together new philosophers from various parts of Europe and by making their works on a wide range of topics available to the philosophical community. The theme of this volume is cognitive dynamics, a term coined by David Kaplan in his classical work 'Demonstratives'. The contributors touch on important requirements in the theory of cognitive dynamics such as the presence of change of…Read more
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349Shades and conceptsAnalysis 61 (3): 193-202. 2001.In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual
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52Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presenceIn Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 33. 2010.
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La musique, le bruit, le silence. Quelques réflexions à propos de John CageCahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme. 1996.
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4The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and actionIn Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.
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219Is memory purely preservative?In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 213--232. 2001.
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35Situated representations and ad hoc conceptsIn María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. 2007.Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental representations are ‘situated' in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I explore some aspects of Recanati's own account. I focus on situated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and ad…Read more
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Ruth K. Millikan, "White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice" (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (2): 373. 1995.