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33Le donné, l'intuition et la présence dans la perceptionLes Etudes Philosophiques 103 (4): 481. 2012.Résumé La notion de Mythe du Donné, due initialement à Wilfrid Sellars, a été conçue comme un repoussoir pour une théorie adéquate de la perception et de son rapport au jugement (ou à la croyance). Dans cet essai, j’examine la reformulation du Mythe du Donné proposée récemment par John McDowell. La seule manière d’échapper au Mythe, selon McDowell, est de considérer le contenu de l’expérience perceptive comme étant à la fois conceptuel et intuitionnel, alors que le contenu du jugement est concep…Read more
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33The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves pr…Read more
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182Felt Reality and the Opacity of PerceptionTopoi 36 (2): 299-309. 2017.We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from …Read more
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87Simulation and Knowledge of Action (edited book)John Benjamins. 2002.CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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64Common Sense and Metaperception: A Practical ModelRes Philosophica 91 (2): 241-259. 2014.Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directl…Read more
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82Qui a peur des qualia corporels?Philosophiques 27 (1): 77-98. 2000.Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain 'inside' and perceiving …Read more
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28L’interprétation ordinaire, entre simulation et méta-représentationPhilosophiques 32 (1): 19-37. 2005.In this essay, I examine some aspects of the debate between a perceptual model of communication, according to which testimony is a source of knowledge about the communicated fact, and an inferential model of communication, according to which testimony requires from the hearer an inference from the used signs, the speaker’s mental states, and other features of the context. From a reflection on the nature of the capacity for metarepresentation, and its dependence on the capacities of social percep…Read more
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108Une théorie réflexive du souvenir épisodiqueDialogue 36 (3): 527-554. 1997.Cet article porte sur une distinction familière entre deux formes de souvenirs: les souvenirs factuels ('Je me souviens que p', où 'p' est une proposition) et les souvenirs épisodiques ('Je me souviens de x', où x est une entité particulière). Les souvenirs épisodiques ont, contrairement aux souvenirs factuels, un rapport immédiat et interne à une expérience particulière que le sujet a eue dans le passé. Les souvenirs épisodique et factuel sont des souvenirs explicites au sens de la psychologie …Read more
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63Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflageSynthese 194 (5): 1531-1539. 2017.I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of c…Read more
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60The dynamics of deictic thoughtsPhilosophical Studies 82 (2). 1996.Defense of a non-psychological dynamics of demonstrative thoughts.
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14Reply to Pierre JacobIn Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--111. 2002.
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69It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the phil…Read more
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L’identification De Soi, Entre Savoir-faire Et IntrospectionCahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 40 45. 2003.
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168Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic MemoryReview of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3): 413-426. 2014.Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing.…Read more
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2Situation theorists such as John Barwise, John Etchemendy, John Perry and François Recanati have put forward the hypothesis that linguistic representations are situated in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations which are not explicitly represented as such. Following Recanati's lead, I explore this hypothesis with respect to mental representations. First, I introduce the notion of unarticulated constituent, due to John Perry. I suggest that the question of wheth…Read more
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8Compétence sémantique et psychologie du raisonnementRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (2). 1997.
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6La perception interne et la critique du langage privéRevue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 130. 1998.Dans cet article, je me demande ce qui distingue la conscience 'externe' du monde (par exemple, la perception visuelle) et la conscience 'interne' du corps propre (par exemple, l'expérience de la douleur). Je rejette les théories analytiques récentes qui assimilent l'expérience de la douleur à une forme de perception externe, à savoir la perception d'un dommage physique relatif au corps du sujet. Mais je ne souscris pas pour autant à la thèse phénoménologique selon laquelle il y a un 'espace dou…Read more
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46Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophreniaConsciousness and Cognition 30 (C): 62-72. 2014.
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21L’esprit et le monde . Quelques réflexions sur L’esprit et le monde de John McDowellPhilosophiques 36 (1): 205-214. 2009.
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34The framework of perceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 347-356. 2015.
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European Review of Philosophy, 2: Cognitive Dynamics (edited book)Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 1996.
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Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
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23Athanasios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer , Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 300 pp., £62 , ISBN 9780521198776 (review)Dialectica 69 (1): 134-138. 2015.
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135Pictures in the Flesh Presence and Appearance in Pictorial ExperienceBritish Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4): 391-405. 2012.This essay explores the prospects of grounding an account of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’ on a theory of presence in ordinary perception. Even though worldly objects can be perceptually recognized in a picture, they do not feel present as when they are perceived face to face. I defend a dual view of perceptual phenomenology according to which the sense of presence is dissociated from the contents of perception. On the one hand, the sense of presence is best conceived as a non-sensory feel…Read more