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28L’interprétation ordinaire, entre simulation et méta-représentationPhilosophiques 32 (1): 19-37. 2005.In this essay, I examine some aspects of the debate between a perceptual model of communication, according to which testimony is a source of knowledge about the communicated fact, and an inferential model of communication, according to which testimony requires from the hearer an inference from the used signs, the speaker’s mental states, and other features of the context. From a reflection on the nature of the capacity for metarepresentation, and its dependence on the capacities of social percep…Read more
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63Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflageSynthese 194 (5): 1531-1539. 2017.I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of c…Read more
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108Une théorie réflexive du souvenir épisodiqueDialogue 36 (3): 527-554. 1997.Cet article porte sur une distinction familière entre deux formes de souvenirs: les souvenirs factuels ('Je me souviens que p', où 'p' est une proposition) et les souvenirs épisodiques ('Je me souviens de x', où x est une entité particulière). Les souvenirs épisodiques ont, contrairement aux souvenirs factuels, un rapport immédiat et interne à une expérience particulière que le sujet a eue dans le passé. Les souvenirs épisodique et factuel sont des souvenirs explicites au sens de la psychologie …Read more
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60The dynamics of deictic thoughtsPhilosophical Studies 82 (2). 1996.Defense of a non-psychological dynamics of demonstrative thoughts.
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14Reply to Pierre JacobIn Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--111. 2002.
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69It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the phil…Read more
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L’identification De Soi, Entre Savoir-faire Et IntrospectionCahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 40 45. 2003.
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169Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic MemoryReview of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3): 413-426. 2014.Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing.…Read more
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8Compétence sémantique et psychologie du raisonnementRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (2). 1997.
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2Situation theorists such as John Barwise, John Etchemendy, John Perry and François Recanati have put forward the hypothesis that linguistic representations are situated in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations which are not explicitly represented as such. Following Recanati's lead, I explore this hypothesis with respect to mental representations. First, I introduce the notion of unarticulated constituent, due to John Perry. I suggest that the question of wheth…Read more
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6La perception interne et la critique du langage privéRevue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 130. 1998.Dans cet article, je me demande ce qui distingue la conscience 'externe' du monde (par exemple, la perception visuelle) et la conscience 'interne' du corps propre (par exemple, l'expérience de la douleur). Je rejette les théories analytiques récentes qui assimilent l'expérience de la douleur à une forme de perception externe, à savoir la perception d'un dommage physique relatif au corps du sujet. Mais je ne souscris pas pour autant à la thèse phénoménologique selon laquelle il y a un 'espace dou…Read more
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21L’esprit et le monde . Quelques réflexions sur L’esprit et le monde de John McDowellPhilosophiques 36 (1): 205-214. 2009.
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46Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophreniaConsciousness and Cognition 30 (C): 62-72. 2014.
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European Review of Philosophy, 2: Cognitive Dynamics (edited book)Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 1996.
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34The framework of perceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 347-356. 2015.
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23Athanasios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer , Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 300 pp., £62 , ISBN 9780521198776 (review)Dialectica 69 (1): 134-138. 2015.
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Reply to 'the scope and limit of mental simulation'In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.