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107IV—Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect ViewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1): 69-88. 2016.
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240The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and ContentErkenntnis 48 (2-3): 153-169. 1998.The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), wh…Read more
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132Disjunctivism, Hallucination and MetacognitionWIREs Cognitive Science 3 533-543. 2012.Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perce…Read more
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166Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognitionIn Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--321. 2012.
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29Qu'est-ce que la perception?Librairie Philosophique Vrin. 2004.J. Dokic s'interroge sur le concept de perception : en quoi consiste-t-elle? comment fonctionne-t-elle?, etc. Cette analyse est suivie de deux textes commentés, l'un de George Berkeley "Les idées du haut et du bas", et "Le contenu non conceptuel" de John McDowell.
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298Margin for error and the transparency of knowledgeSynthese 166 (1): 1-20. 2009.In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them i…Read more
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Le corps en mouvement: les relations entre l'action, l'intention et le mouvement corporelRevue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 124 (3): 249-270. 1992.
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167Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing?Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 117-125. 2013.Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and reject the perceptual interp…Read more
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149From linguistic contextualism to situated cognition: The case of ad hoc conceptsPhilosophical Psychology 19 (3). 2006.Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated par…Read more
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123Too much ado about beliefPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
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5European Review of Philosophy: Volume 2, Cognitive Dynamics: Cognitive DynamicsCenter for the Study of Language and Information Publications. 1997.The European Review of Philosophy aims at restoring the tradition of rigorous philosophical discussion by bringing together new philosophers from various parts of Europe and by making their works on a wide range of topics available to the philosophical community. The theme of this volume is cognitive dynamics, a term coined by David Kaplan in his classical work 'Demonstratives'. The contributors touch on important requirements in the theory of cognitive dynamics such as the presence of change of…Read more
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347Shades and conceptsAnalysis 61 (3): 193-202. 2001.In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual
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51Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presenceIn Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 33. 2010.
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La musique, le bruit, le silence. Quelques réflexions à propos de John CageCahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme. 1996.
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211Is memory purely preservative?In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory, Oxford University Press. pp. 213--232. 2001.
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4The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and actionIn Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.
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35Situated representations and ad hoc conceptsIn María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. 2007.Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental representations are ‘situated' in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I explore some aspects of Recanati's own account. I focus on situated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and ad…Read more
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Ruth K. Millikan, "White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice" (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (2): 373. 1995.
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33Le donné, l'intuition et la présence dans la perceptionLes Etudes Philosophiques 103 (4): 481. 2012.Résumé La notion de Mythe du Donné, due initialement à Wilfrid Sellars, a été conçue comme un repoussoir pour une théorie adéquate de la perception et de son rapport au jugement (ou à la croyance). Dans cet essai, j’examine la reformulation du Mythe du Donné proposée récemment par John McDowell. La seule manière d’échapper au Mythe, selon McDowell, est de considérer le contenu de l’expérience perceptive comme étant à la fois conceptuel et intuitionnel, alors que le contenu du jugement est concep…Read more
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33The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves pr…Read more
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182Felt Reality and the Opacity of PerceptionTopoi 36 (2): 299-309. 2017.We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from …Read more
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64Common Sense and Metaperception: A Practical ModelRes Philosophica 91 (2): 241-259. 2014.Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directl…Read more
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87Simulation and Knowledge of Action (edited book)John Benjamins. 2002.CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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82Qui a peur des qualia corporels?Philosophiques 27 (1): 77-98. 2000.Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain 'inside' and perceiving …Read more
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28L’interprétation ordinaire, entre simulation et méta-représentationPhilosophiques 32 (1): 19-37. 2005.In this essay, I examine some aspects of the debate between a perceptual model of communication, according to which testimony is a source of knowledge about the communicated fact, and an inferential model of communication, according to which testimony requires from the hearer an inference from the used signs, the speaker’s mental states, and other features of the context. From a reflection on the nature of the capacity for metarepresentation, and its dependence on the capacities of social percep…Read more
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63Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflageSynthese 194 (5): 1531-1539. 2017.I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of c…Read more