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Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à CarnapTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 712-713. 1989.
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14De la Nécessité d’un système de concepts. Quelques réflexions sur L'Aufbau der Welt de Rudolf CamapPhilosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2 930-935. 1988.
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34Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et DisputatioPhilosophiques 0-00. 2008.Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques
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11Bolzano's theory of representation /La théorie de la représentation chez BolzanoRevue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3): 363-384. 1999.
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178Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animalsErkenntnis 51 (1): 545-562. 1999.This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, …Read more
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203Epistemic agency and metacognition: An externalist viewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brai…Read more
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59Le langage forme-t-il une condition nécessaire de la rationalité?Dialogue 46 (1): 165-172. 2007.A propos de 'Evolution et Rationalité' de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
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Time and conscious experienceIn C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994.
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64Indexes for actionRevue Internationale de Philosophie 1999 (3): 321-345. 1999.This articles examines three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic representations of a single action can be tightened up in order to remedy the puzzle of deviant causation. A first move consists in making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A second step brings in the action-effect principle, emphasizing the teleological relation of each pragmatic representat…Read more
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18Ruth Barcan Marcus on Believing Without a LanguageIn Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas, De Gruyter. pp. 111-128. 2015.
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35Source unreliability decreases but does not cancel the impact of social information on metacognitive evaluationsFrontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
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41Epistemic normativity from the reasoner's viewpointBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5): 265-265. 2011.Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks
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48Précis of The Philosophy of MetacognitionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3): 703-709. 2014.
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2Mental acts as natural kindsIn Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 262-282. 2013.This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and …Read more
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81Criticial Review of: When self-consciousness breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. GrahamPhilosophical Psychology 15 (4): 543-550. 2002.The book under review offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of agency. This review tries to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as acting that is questionable
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398A plea for mental actsSynthese 129 (1): 105-128. 2001.A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalr…Read more
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377Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? (review)Synthese 159 (2). 2007.Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity an…Read more
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11The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposalIn Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 165--183. 2009.
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34Replies to Langland‐Hassan, Nagel, and SmithPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3): 736-755. 2014.
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29This book chapter aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional causation, may still qualify such a behavior as voluntary.
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50Questions of Form: Logic and Analytic Proposition From Kant to CarnapUniv of Minnesota Press. 1989.Hence, this book's provocative claim: today's so-called logical empiricism owes much more to Kant's notion of science than to Hume's.
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135Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3): 352-352. 2003.Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |