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26Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's PerspectiveIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 51--72. 1999.
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285Perceiving IntentionsIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
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60Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 203-232. 1999.Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'…Read more
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105Overlooking metacognitive experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 158-159. 2009.Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences
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122The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self- awarenessOxford University Press. 2013.Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency
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Metacognition and animal rationalityIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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24Review of John Searle, Consciousness and Language (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (5). 2003.
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20Examining implicit metacognition in 3.5-year-old children: an eye-tracking and pupillometric studyFrontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
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4La connaissance philosophique: essais sur l'œuvre de Gilles-Gaston GrangerPresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1995.
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14Free Will : A Neurophilosophical ViewpointArchives de Philosophie du Droit 55 79-95. 2012.Le déterminisme implique que le libre arbitre n’existe pas, que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement ; réciproquement, avoir la possibilité de faire autrement implique que le déterminisme ne s’applique pas à l’instant, s’il existe, où on l’exerce. Cependant, la question de la responsabilité rend difficile d’accepter que les agents ne puissent pas faire autrement et motive fortement à rendre compatibles déterminisme et libre arbitre ou à soutenir, dans une veine « incompatibiliste », que le cervea…Read more
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Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à CarnapTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 712-713. 1989.
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14De la Nécessité d’un système de concepts. Quelques réflexions sur L'Aufbau der Welt de Rudolf CamapPhilosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2 930-935. 1988.
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34Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et DisputatioPhilosophiques 0-00. 2008.Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |