•  673
    Perceiving Intentions
    In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
  •  153
    Bolzano’s Analytic Revisited
    The Monist 64 (2): 214-230. 1981.
    What I propose is to reconsider the interpretation of Bolzano’s concept of analytic propositions which was offered thirty years ago by Bar-Hillel. The claim of Bar-Hillel was that, in a late addition to his book, The Theory of Science, Bolzano actually had been radically improving his concept of analyticity, thus creating some inconsistencies with the previous, uncorrected version. This allows us to equate the new Bolzanian definition of analytic with what was to be defined, a century later, as …Read more
  •  160
    Overlooking metacognitive experience
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 158-159. 2009.
    Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences
  • Metacognition and animal rationality
    In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  213
    Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency
  •  167
    Les conditions de la connaissance de soi
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 161-186. 2000.
    La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier et de second ordre ; cel…Read more
  •  425
    Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients
    with E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery, and Marc Jeannerod
    Cognition 65 (1): 71-86. 1997.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty…Read more
  • Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 712-713. 1989.
  •  220
    The book under review offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of agency. This review tries to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as acting that is questionable
  •  34
    Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques
  •  26
    Experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting dissociation; these patients demonstrate that one can have a thought or perform an action consciously without being conscious of thinking or acting as the motivated agent, author of that thought or of that action. This chapter examines several interesting accounts of this dissociation, and aims at showing how they can be generalized to thought insertion phenomena. It is argued that control theory allows such a generaliza…Read more
  •  233
    Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animals
    Erkenntnis 51 (1): 545-562. 1999.
    This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, …Read more
  •  121
    A propos de 'Evolution et Rationalité' de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
  •  126
    Source unreliability decreases but does not cancel the impact of social information on metacognitive evaluations
    with Amélie Jacquot, Terry Eskenazi, Edith Sales-Wuillemin, Benoît Montalan, Julie Grèzes, and Laurence Conty
    Frontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.