Joëlle Proust

La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier et de second ordre ; celle de la reconnaissance de l'attitude ayant ce contenu intentionnel pour objet, et enfin la reconnaissance que ce qui est pensé l'est par le sujet qui pense. Le présent article se propose de montrer que la troisième difficulté résiste à une approche fondée sur l'expérience ou sur la signification cognitive de [P], et avance l'idée que la notion d'action mentale permet d'éclairer les conditions d'identité du penseur de [P] et du sujet de l'auto-attribution de l'attitude propositionnelle 'Y que P'.Self-knowledge requires the capacity to think true thoughts of the form 'I Y that P', where 'Y' refers to a propositional attitude, 'P' to a propositional content, and 'I' to the thinker of the thought of content P. The question that this requirement raises is to know what, in the occurrent mental content [P] , justifies the self-attribution of this thought. This problem, called the transition problem, includes three difficulties : how is intentional content stable across first- and second-order thoughts ? How is the attitude with this intentional content identified by the thinker ? And how is the thinker of the second-order thought able to claim truly that he himself is the thinker of the first-order thought ? The present paper's aim is to show that the third difficulty cannot be solved through an examination of the experience of having [P] or on the basis of the cognitive significance of P, and suggests that an analysis of mental actions in which propositional attitudes play a causal and feedback role give a better grasp on the conditions of identity of the thinker of [P] with the thinker of the propositional attitude 'Y that P'

Experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting dissociation; these patients demonstrate that one can have a thought or perform an action consciously without being conscious of thinking or acting as the motivated agent, author of that thought or of that action. This chapter examines several interesting accounts of this dissociation, and aims at showing how they can be generalized to thought insertion phenomena. It is argued that control theory allows such a generalization; three different comparators need to be distinguished: the sense of subjectivity relies on a comparator in which motivation and emotion play a structuring role. The sense of agency emerges in a system that delivers a rough categorization of self-generated – versus other- generated – actions and mental activities. A third system specializes in the social evaluation of the effects of an action, intention or other thought process, given certain goals in self or in others.

This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, which in turn presupposes a capacity to (re)calibrate perceptual inputs across modalities in a principled way

Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct

Le déterminisme implique que le libre arbitre n’existe pas, que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement ; réciproquement, avoir la possibilité de faire autrement implique que le déterminisme ne s’applique pas à l’instant, s’il existe, où on l’exerce. Cependant, la question de la responsabilité rend difficile d’accepter que les agents ne puissent pas faire autrement et motive fortement à rendre compatibles déterminisme et libre arbitre ou à soutenir, dans une veine « incompatibiliste », que le cerveau humain n’est pas soumis à la loi du déterminisme. Le libertarianisme, c’est-à-dire l’idée que, chez l’agent humain, il existe des exceptions au déterminisme causal lors de l’activité cérébrale, n’est pas défendable à la lumière des découvertes récentes sur la cognition humaine. Selon le compatibilisme, un agent n’ayant pas la possibilité de faire autrement jouit encore de son Libre Arbitre. La théorie de Harry Frankfurt d’une volonté à plusieurs niveaux est étudiée de manière critique. On présente la preuve neuroscientifique d’un modèle de volonté en cascade, dans l’esprit de Frankfurt. Ce modèle permet l’émergence d’une forme de comptabilisme dans lequel l’agent peut plus ou moins contrôler ce qu’elle fait, dépendre plus ou moins de son environnement et dispose donc plus ou moins de son libre arbitre

_Questions of Form _was first published in 1989. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. In _Questions on Form_, Joelle Proust traces the concept of the analytic proposition from Kant's development of the notion down to its place in the work of Rudolf Carnap, a founder of logical empiricism and a key figure in contemporary analytic philosophy. Using a method known in France as _topique comparative_,she provides a rigorous exposition of analyticity, situating it within four major philosophical systems—those of Kant, Bolzano, Frege, and Carnap—and clearly delineating its development from one system to the next. Proust takes as her point of departure Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Though she makes clear that Kant drew on Locke, Hume, and Leibniz, she argues that his notion of analyticity was innovative, not simply an elaboration of something already found in their work. She shows that the analytic proposition unexpectedly (given its modest status in Kant) came to play an important part in efforts to convert problems considered "transcendental" into questions of belonging to formal logic. Ultimately, her comparison of their systems reveals that the concept of the analytic, however specific its rile in each, remains linked to a foundationalist strategy—in effect, to the transcendentalist questions Kant used when he reinterpreted the findings of his empiricist predecessors. Hence, this book's provocative claim: today's so-called logical empiricism owes much more to Kant's notion of science than to Hume's.

Against the prior view that primate communication is based only on signal decoding, comparative evidence suggests that primates are able, no less than humans, to intentionally perform or understand impulsive or habitual communicational actions with a structured evaluative nonconceptual content. These signals convey an affordance-sensing that immediately motivates conspecifics to act. Although humans have access to a strategic form of propositional communication adapted to teaching and persuasion, they share with nonhuman primates the capacity to communicate in impulsive or habitual ways. They are also similarly able to monitor fluency, informativeness and relevance of messages or signals through nonconceptual cues.

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” . They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration