•  4
    Conditionals
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157): 493-498. 1989.
  •  104
    David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 153-169. 2004.
    In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
  •  1146
    Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association (3): 1-19. 2020.
    This paper aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research, the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have “essences”. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be…Read more
  •  43
    Correction to: The disvalue of knowledge
    Synthese 198 (6): 5333-5333. 2019.
    The original article has been corrected.
  •  176
    The disvalue of knowledge
    Synthese 198 (6): 5311-5332. 2019.
    I argue that the concept of knowledge is a relic of a bygone age, erroneously supposed to do no harm. I illustrate this claim by showing how a concern with knowledge distorts the use of statistical evidence in criminal courts, and then generalize the point to show that this concern hampers our enterprises across the board and not only in legal contexts.
  •  106
    Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 173-181. 2019.
    I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the view that explaining the 'problem intuitions' about consciousness is the key to a satisfactory philosophical account of the topic. I find it surprising, however, given his previous writings, that Chalmers does not simply attribute these intuitions to the conceptual gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, it is good that he doesn't, given that this was always a highly implausible account of the problem intuitions. Unfortunately, la…Read more
  •  537
    Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal Explanation
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 97-136. 1986.
  •  26
    A probreza da análise
    Dissertatio 47 287-313. 2018.
    Muitas ideias diferentes desfilam sob a bandeira do naturalismo filosófico. Entre elas, uma tese sobre método filosófico. A filosofia investiga a realidade do mesmo modo que a ciência. Seus métodos são semelhantes aos métodos científicos, e o conhecimento que ela produz é semelhante ao conhecimento científico. Este “naturalismo metodológico” deve ser distinguido do “naturalismo ontológico”, entendido como uma visão geral sobre os conteúdos da realidade. O naturalismo ontológico sustenta que a re…Read more
  •  40
    Ruth Millikan’s On Clear and Confused Ideas (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 453-466. 2002.
    Those who know Millikan only for her teleosemantics will find the themes in this book new. And those who think of Millikan as primarily concerned with empirical questions of biology and psychology may be surprised by her range of influences. The book features figures like Wilfred Sellars, P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans as prominently as any more recent naturalist thinkers.
  • The Impossibility of Zombies
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    Saul Kripke challenges materialists to explain why zombies should seem possible, if they are in fact impossible; and he points out that it is not plausible that this is because terms for conscious states such as “pain” refer by invoking some contingent property of their referents. In response, Papineau argues that the conceivability of zombies is no guide to any kind of possibility, and that those who suppose that it is are committed to the archaic view that direct reference involves some kind o…Read more
  • The Intuition of Distinctness
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “…Read more
  • The Explanatory Gap
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    Joseph Levine argues that there is an “explanatory gap” between the brain and the conscious mind. Papineau agrees that there is such a gap, but points out that similar gaps are found with all identity claims involving directly referring terms, and so the gap does nothing to discredit materialism. The gap does not present any epistemological barrier to materialism.
  • The Case for Materialism
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    The basic causal argument for materialism is that since physics is causally complete, conscious states must either be physical, or they must be epiphenomenal “danglers” with no causal influence on the physical world. Papineau explores this argument in detail, paying particular attention to the concept of causation, the meaning of “physical”, the relevance of functionalism and other versions of nonreductive physicalism, and the status of the claim that physics is causally closed.
  •  15
    The British difference
    The Philosophers' Magazine 18 37-38. 2002.
  •  50
    The British difference
    with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Ted Honderich, and Richard Norman
    The Philosophers' Magazine 18 (18): 37-38. 2002.
  • Many scientists hope that brain research will identify the material nature of conscious states. Papineau argues that when it comes to the “hard problem” of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts, scientific research can only take us so far. This is because phenomenal concepts are vague and do not point determinately to specific material states. This chapter also looks at Higher‐Order Thought and representational accounts of consciousness.
  • Phenomenal Concepts
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
  • Introduction
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
  •  58
    Discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 425. 1996.
    Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts is a dense and rewarding work. Each chapter raises many issues for discussion. I know three different people who are writing reviews of the volume. It testifies to the depth of Peacocke’s book that each reviewer is focusing on a quite different set of topics.
  •  18
    Debate on Consciousness
    Philosophy Now 29 36-39. 2000.
  • Conceptual Dualism
    In Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
    The best argument for the existence of phenomenal concepts is Frank Jackson's “knowledge argument”. Contra Jackson, this does not establish ontological dualism, but it does establish conceptual dualism in the sense that it shows that we have phenomenal concepts distinct from any material concepts. This analysis goes beyond the normal “ability hypothesis” response to Jackson's argument, but it appeals to the same powers of subjective imagination and introspection.
  •  68
    Round Table: Science vs Philosophy?
    with Mary Midgley, Raymond Tallis, Lewis Wolpert, and Anja Steinbauer
    Philosophy Now 27 34-38. 2000.
  •  22
    Scientific Realism
    with Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, Stathis Psillos, and Howard Sankey
    In Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 35-54. 2006.
  •  315
    El libro "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real, y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
  •  353
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
  •  22
    Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 657. 1996.
    This precis explains that _Philosophical naturalism contains three parts. Part I examines arguments for physicalism and maintains I) that all causally relevant special science properties must be realized by physical ones, and II) that all special science laws must reduce to physical ones, apart from the significant category of special laws that result from selection processes. Part II defends a teleological theory of representation and an identity theory of consciousness. Part III defends reliab…Read more
  •  20
    Sporting Teams, Space-Time Worms and Israeli Football
    The Philosophers' Magazine 78 24-31. 2017.
  •  68
    I—The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1): 1-33. 2014.
    This paper is about the nature of conscious sensory properties. My initial thesis is that these properties should not be equated with representational properties. I argue that any such representationalist view is in danger of implying that conscious sensory properties are constituted by relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time; and I add that, even if this implication can be avoided, the broadness of representational properties in any case renders them unsuitabl…Read more
  •  13
    Is Representation Rife?
    Ratio 16 (2): 107-123. 2003.
    This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief‐desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than beliefs and desires can also have representational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in…Read more
  • Philosophical Naturalism
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4): 1070-1077. 1994.