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David Papineau

King's College London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    265
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    42
  •  News and Updates
    70
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • King's College London
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (265)
  •  74
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 304-310. 1982.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  19
    Social learning and the Baldwin effect
    In Antonio Zilhao (ed.), Evolution, Rationality and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century, Routledge. 2010.
    Article
    Social Epistemology
  •  91
    Human Minds
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 159-183. 2003.
    Humans are part of the animal kingdom, but their minds differ from those of other animals. They are capable of many things that lie beyond the intellectual powers ofthe rest of the animal realm. In this paper, I want to ask what makes human minds distinctive. What accounts for the special powers that set humans aside from other animals?
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  27
    The Teleological Theory of Representation
    Book chapter (revised)
    Teleology and FunctionNaturalizing Mental Content
  •  86
    Pure, mixed, and spurious probabilities and their significance for a reductionist theory of causation
    Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 307-348. 1989.
    Metaphysics of MindProbabilistic Causation
  •  215
    The new nativism: a commentary on Gary Marcus’s The birth of the mind (review)
    with Matteo Mameli
    Biology and Philosophy 21 (4): 559-573. 2006.
    Gary Marcus has written a very interesting book about mental development from a nativist perspective. For the general readership at which the book is largely aimed, it will be interesting because of its many informative examples of the development of cognitive structures and because of its illuminating explanations of ways in which genes can contribute to these developmental processes. However, the book is also interesting from a theoretical point of view. Marcus tries to make nativism compatibl…Read more
    Gary Marcus has written a very interesting book about mental development from a nativist perspective. For the general readership at which the book is largely aimed, it will be interesting because of its many informative examples of the development of cognitive structures and because of its illuminating explanations of ways in which genes can contribute to these developmental processes. However, the book is also interesting from a theoretical point of view. Marcus tries to make nativism compatible with the central arguments that anti-nativists use to attack nativism and with many recent discoveries about genetic activity and brain development. In so doing, he reconfigures the nativist position to a considerable extent.
    Nativism in Cognitive Science
  •  280
    Response to Ehring's 'papineau on causal asymmetry'
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4): 521-525. 1988.
    The Direction of CausationThe Direction of Time
  •  73
    Editorial
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4): 531-531. 1998.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  88
    The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    David Papineau presents a controversial view of human reason, portraying it as a normal part of the natural world, and drawing on the empirical sciences to illuminate its workings. In these six interconnected essays he discusses both theoretical and practical rationality, and shows how evolutionary theory, decision theory, and quantum mechanics offer fresh approaches to some long-standing problems
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceEvolutionary BiologyPratical Reason, MiscCausal Decision TheoryPhil…Read more
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceEvolutionary BiologyPratical Reason, MiscCausal Decision TheoryPhilosophy of Mind
  •  81
    Probability and normativity
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3): 484-485. 1989.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  77
    Causal Powers By R. Harré and E. Madden Basil Blackwell, 1975, viii + 191 pp., £4.75 (review)
    Philosophy 52 (199): 113. 1977.
  •  176
    Ramsey-Lewis Is Better than Mackie
    Analysis 48 (2). 1988.
  •  48
    Content, reasons and knowledge
    Philosophical Books 28 (1): 1-9. 1987.
    Externalism and Self-Knowledge
  • Theories of
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 175. 2005.
  •  2
    Mind, health, and biological purpose
    In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry, Cambridge University Press. 1994.
    Mental IllnessPsychopathology
  •  98
    Causes and mixed probabilities
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 79-88. 1990.
    In Section 1 I examine the use of probabilistic data to establish causal conclusions in non‐experimental research. In Section 2 I show that the probabilities involved in such research are inhomogeneous ‘mixed’ probabilities. Section 3 then argues that such mixed probabilities are responsible for the way common causes screen off correlations between their joint effects. Section 4 concludes that mixed probabilities are therefore crucial for the nature of the causal relation itself.
    Applications of ProbabilityCausal Modeling
  •  268
    The Case for Materialism
    In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind, Routledge. pp. 4--125. 2007.
    Formulating PhysicalismNonreductive MaterialismFunctionalismCausal Closure of the Physical
  •  174
    Kim Sterelny, thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition , oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. XI 262, £50 (cloth), £16.95 (paper). Friendly thoughts on the evolution of cognition (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  91
    X*—Is Epistemology Dead?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1): 129-142. 1982.
    David Papineau; X*—Is Epistemology Dead?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 129–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  404
    Representation and explanation
    Philosophy of Science 51 (December): 550-72. 1984.
    Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition th…Read more
    Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the cognitive mechanism's parts
    Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
  •  1
    Arguments for supervenience and physical realization
    In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
    Psychophysical Supervenience
  • Thinking about Consciousness
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215): 333-335. 2002.
  • Introduction to Philosophical Naturalism
    Blackwell. 1993.
  •  199
    Uncertain Decisions and the Many-Minds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
    The Monist 80 (1): 97-117. 1997.
    Imagine you are faced with a quantum mechanical device which will display either H or T when it is operated. You know that the single-case probability, or chance, of H is 0.8, and the chance of T is 0.2.
    Everett Interpretation
  •  2
    Quassim Cassam The Possibility of Knowledge 234pp. Clarendon Press, Oxford. £00.00
    Philosophers like asking questions about knowledge. What is it exactly? Why do we value it so much? And do we have any? Ideally they would like an account of the nature of knowledge that shows sceptical doubts about its existence to be unmotivated. Unfortunately two millenia of effort have not produced much in the way of agreed results.
    Skepticism, Misc
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