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107Uncertain Decisions and the Many-Minds Interpretation of Quantum MechanicsThe Monist 80 (1): 97-117. 1997.Imagine you are faced with a quantum mechanical device which will display either H or T when it is operated. You know that the single-case probability, or chance, of H is 0.8, and the chance of T is 0.2.
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2Philosophers like asking questions about knowledge. What is it exactly? Why do we value it so much? And do we have any? Ideally they would like an account of the nature of knowledge that shows sceptical doubts about its existence to be unmotivated. Unfortunately two millenia of effort have not produced much in the way of agreed results.
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47Précis of Thinking about ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 143-143. 2002.
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48In this paper I want to explore the nature of phenomenal concepts by comparing them with perceptual concepts. Phenomenal concepts have been drawn to the attention of philosophers by recent debates in the philosophy of mind. Most obviously, their existence is demonstrated by Frank Jackson’s thought-experiment about Mary, the expert on the science of colour vision who has never had any colour experiences herself. It is widely agreed that, when Mary does first see something red, she acquires a new …Read more
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2Review of Roy Bhaskar: The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 444-448. 1982.
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86Ideal types and empirical theoriesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2): 137-146. 1976.
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204Theory-dependent termsPhilosophy of Science 63 (1): 1-20. 1996.The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy. In these special cases, but not otherwise, it is …Read more
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13It is widely supposed that the Everettian account of quantum mechanics has difficulties with probability. In this paper I shall argue that those who argue against the Everettian interpretation on this basis are employing a double standard. It is certainly true that there are philosophical puzzles about probability within the Everettian theory. But I shall show that orthodox metaphysics has even worse problems with probability than Everettianism. From this perspective, orthodox metaphysicians who…Read more
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124Realism, Ramsey sentences and the pessimistic meta-inductionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4): 375-385. 2010.This paper defends scientific realism from the pessimistic meta-induction from past reference failure. It allows that a descriptive theory of reference implies that scientific terms characteristically fail of determinate reference. But it argues that a descriptive theory of reference also implies an equivalence between scientific theories and quantificational claims in the style of Ramsey. Since these quantificational claims do not use any of the referentially suspect scientific terms, they can …Read more
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69The Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori KnowledgeIn Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori?, Open Court. pp. 61. 2011.
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74Naturalist Theories of MeaningIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oup. pp. 175-188. 2006.To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. The English sentence ‘ Santiago is east of Sacramento’ represents the world as being a certain way. So does my belief that Santiago is east of Sacramento. In these examples, one item—a sentence or a belief—lays claim to something else, a state of affairs, which may be far removed in space and time. This is the phenomenon that naturalist theories of meaning aim to explain. How is it possible for one thing to stand for some…Read more
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93The Cultural Origins of Cognitive AdaptationsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 56 24-25. 2005.According to an influential view in contemporary cognitive science, many human cognitive capacities are innate. The primary support for this view comes from ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments. In general outline, such arguments contrast the meagre informational input to cognitive development with its rich informational output. Consider the ease with which humans acquire languages, become facile at attributing psychological states (‘folk psychology’), gain knowledge of biological kinds (‘folk biolog…Read more
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4Review of J. Manninen and R. Tuomela: Essays on Explanation and Understanding (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3): 304-310. 1978.
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64Western philosophy: an illustrated guide (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2004.What does it mean for someone to exist? What is truth? Are we free to choose to think or act? What is consciousness? Is human cloning justifiable? These are just some of the questions philosophers have attempted to answer, striking right at the heart of what it means to be human. This important new books shows that philosophy need not be dry or intimidating. Its highly original treatment, combining philosophical analysis, historical and biographical background and thought-provoking illustrations…Read more
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261Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails PanpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 100-109. 2006.Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary intuitions are misbegotten. …Read more
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262Teleosemantics and indeterminacyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 1-14. 1998.The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation
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96The virtues of randomizationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2): 437-450. 1994.Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an essential role in our route to causal conclusions.
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3REVIEW ARTICLE1: Correlations and Causes (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3): 397-412. 1991.
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29My first university was in my home town, Durban, in the mid-1960s. I was doing a mathematics degree but most of my friends were doing arts subjects. Sartre and Marx were the thinkers of the moment and my friends would press their (mostly illegal) writings on me. Ideologically I was entirely sympathetic, but intellectually they didn’t do much for me—too obscure, too difficult, too dogmatic. In my final year I chanced on Ayer’s The Problem of Knowledge. It wasn’t exactly relevant to apartheid Sout…Read more
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |