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5Introducing ConsciousnessTotem Books. 2000.This title is now available in a new format. Refer to Consciousness: A Graphic Guide 9781848311718.
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1Laws and AccidentsIn Crispin Wright & Graham Frank Macdonald (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, Blackwell. 1986.
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25A reduction of causation to probabilities would be a great achievement, if it were possible.  In this paper I want to defend this reductionist ambition against some recent criticisms from Gurol Irzik (1996) and Dan Hausman (1998). In particular, I want to show that the reductionist programme can be absolved of a vice which is widely thought to disable it--the vice of infidelity
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45Theory and meaningOxford University Press. 1979.This book is concerned with those aspects of the theory of meaning for scientific terms that are relevant to questions about the evaluation of scientific theories. The contemporary debate about theory choice in science is normally presented as a conflict between two sets of ideas. On the one hand are notions of objectivity, realism, rationality, and progress in science. On the other is the view that meanings depend on theory, with associated claims about the theory dependence of observation, the…Read more
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228Why you don’t want to get in the box with schrödinger's catAnalysis 63 (1). 2003.By way of an example, Lewis imagines your being invited to join Schrödinger’s cat in its box for an hour. This box will either fill up with deadly poison fumes or not, depending on whether or not some radioactive atom decays, the probability of decay within an hour being 50%. The invitation is accompanied with some further incentive to comply (Lewis sets it up so there is a significant chance of some pretty bad but not life-threatening punishment if you don’t get in the box). Lewis argues that t…Read more
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72Must a physicalist be a microphysicalist?In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press. 2008.This chapter challenges the entailment from physicalism to microphysicalism — the view that all facts metaphysically supervene on the microphysical facts. It observes that physicalists can avoid microphysicalism by rejecting physical microscopism. Humean supervenience is a strong version of microphysicalism, and it is false if a non-Humean view of laws is true. But such a view is consistent with physicalism. A weaker form of microphysicalism adds microphysical non-Humean laws to get a broader mi…Read more
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37Scientific realism without referenceIn Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism, Ashgate. pp. 174--189. 2002.
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8Response to Ehring’s ’Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4): 521-525. 1988.
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13Causes and mixed probabilitiesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1). 1990.Abstract In Section 1 I examine the use of probabilistic data to establish causal conclusions in non?experimental research. In Section 2 I show that the probabilities involved in such research are inhomogeneous ?mixed? probabilities. Section 3 then argues that such mixed probabilities are responsible for the way common causes screen off correlations between their joint effects. Section 4 concludes that mixed probabilities are therefore crucial for the nature of the causal relation itself
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19Social learning and the Baldwin effectIn Antonio Zilhao (ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century, Routledge. 2005.Article
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107Uncertain Decisions and the Many-Minds Interpretation of Quantum MechanicsThe Monist 80 (1): 97-117. 1997.Imagine you are faced with a quantum mechanical device which will display either H or T when it is operated. You know that the single-case probability, or chance, of H is 0.8, and the chance of T is 0.2.
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1Irreducibility and teleologyIn David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford University Press. 1992.
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212Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2): 169-83. 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
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291A thirder and an Everettian: A reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'Analysis 69 (1): 78-86. 2009.Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first att…Read more
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104Response to Ehring's 'papineau on causal asymmetry'British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4): 521-525. 1988.
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207Theory-dependent termsPhilosophy of Science 63 (1): 1-20. 1996.The main puzzle about theoretical definitions is that nothing seems to decide which assumptions contribute to such definitions and which do not. I argue that theoretical definitions are indeed imprecise, but that this does not normally matter, since the definitional imprecision does not normally produce indeterminacy of referential value. Sometimes, however, the definitional imprecision is less benign, and does generate referential indeterminacy. In these special cases, but not otherwise, it is …Read more
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37There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the BodyIn Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 369-376. 2015.This paper argues that all apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a few fundamental physical forces which conserve energy and operate throughout nature. Consequently, there are probably no special mental forces originating from souls and acting upon bodies and brains in addition to the basic, energy-conserving physical forces. Moreover, physiological and biochemical research have failed to uncover any evidence of forces over and above the basic physical forces acting on living bo…Read more
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8Normativity and JudgementAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 17-61. 1999.[David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativi…Read more
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241Many Minds are No Worse than OneBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2): 233-241. 1996.
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4The Causal Closure of the Physical and NaturalismIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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