•  1
    Philosophical Naturalism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 523-526. 1997.
  •  3
    REVIEW ARTICLE1: Correlations and Causes (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3): 397-412. 1991.
  •  30
    Human Minds
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 159-183. 2003.
    Humans are part of the animal kingdom, but their minds differ from those of other animals. They are capable of many things that lie beyond the intellectual powers ofthe rest of the animal realm. In this paper, I want to ask what makes human minds distinctive. What accounts for the special powers that set humans aside from other animals?
  •  2
    10 The rise of physicalism
    In M. W. F. Stone & Jonathan Wolff (eds.), The Proper Ambition of Science, Routledge. pp. 2--174. 2000.
  •  2
    Russell’s place in the public eye was maintained by a steady stream of writing for the general reader. He no longer held any academic position, and needed to support himself and his family by his pen. While he continued to do some technical work in philosophy, more of his energies were devoted to journalism and other popular writings. He was in great demand. His distinctive prose and dry wit enabled him to puncture the fusty assumptions of contemporary thinking, and his rationalist alternatives …Read more
  •  2
    A Scandal of Probability Theory
    In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory & Reality, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  5
    Replies to Commentators
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 171-171. 2007.
  •  16
    Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 21-43. 1990.
    A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of suc…Read more
  •  31
    The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 145-178. 2001.
    When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight awa…Read more
  •  345
    I_– _David Papineau
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1): 17-43. 1999.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548)
  •  132
    The new nativism: a commentary on Gary Marcus’s The birth of the mind (review)
    Biology and Philosophy 21 (4): 559-573. 2006.
    Gary Marcus has written a very interesting book about mental development from a nativist perspective. For the general readership at which the book is largely aimed, it will be interesting because of its many informative examples of the development of cognitive structures and because of its illuminating explanations of ways in which genes can contribute to these developmental processes. However, the book is also interesting from a theoretical point of view. Marcus tries to make nativism compatibl…Read more
  •  85
    Ramsey-Lewis Is Better than Mackie
    Analysis 48 (2). 1988.
  •  64
    Western philosophy: an illustrated guide (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    What does it mean for someone to exist? What is truth? Are we free to choose to think or act? What is consciousness? Is human cloning justifiable? These are just some of the questions philosophers have attempted to answer, striking right at the heart of what it means to be human. This important new books shows that philosophy need not be dry or intimidating. Its highly original treatment, combining philosophical analysis, historical and biographical background and thought-provoking illustrations…Read more
  •  4
    The Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilation
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 2--102. 2005.
  • The Papineau Discussion
    Philosophy International. 1997.
  •  27
    Realism and epistemology
    Mind 94 (375): 367-388. 1985.
  •  82
    Doubtful intuitions
    Mind and Language 11 (1): 130-32. 1996.
  •  96
    The virtues of randomization
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2): 437-450. 1994.
    Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypothesis. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an essential role in our route to causal conclusions.
  •  331
    Thinking About Consciousness
    Oxford University Press UK. 2002.
    The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. David Papineau argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. Papineau exposes the confusion, and dispels the mystery: we see consciousness in its place in the material world, and we are on the way to a proper understanding of the mind.
  •  12
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3): 304-310. 1978.
  •  64
    Choking and The Yips
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2): 295-308. 2015.
    IntroductionSporting skills divide contemporary theorists into two camps. Let us call them the habitualists and the intellectualists. The habitualists hold that thought is the enemy of sporting excellence. In their view, skilled performers need to let their bodies take over; cognitive effort only interferes with skill. The intellectualists retort that sporting performance depends crucially on mental control. As they see it, the exercise of skill is a matter of agency, not brute reflex; the tailo…Read more