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David Papineau

King's College London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    265
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    42
  •  News and Updates
    70
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • King's College London
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (265)
  •  50
    Introduction: Prospects and problems for teleosemantics
    with Graham Macdonald
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1--22. 2006.
    Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
  •  43
    Social Facts and Psychological Facts
    In Gregory Currie & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the human sciences, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 43-52. 1985.
    Psychophysical Reduction, Misc
  • HARRISON, B. "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language" (review)
    Mind 91 (n/a): 610. 1982.
  •  2
    10 The rise of physicalism
    In M. W. F. Stone & Jonathan Wolff (eds.), Proper Ambition of Science, Routledge. pp. 2--174. 2004.
    Causal Closure of the Physical
  •  134
    Naturalist Theories of Meaning
    In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 175-188. 2005.
    To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. The English sentence ‘ Santiago is east of Sacramento’ represents the world as being a certain way. So does my belief that Santiago is east of Sacramento. In these examples, one item—a sentence or a belief—lays claim to something else, a state of affairs, which may be far removed in space and time. This is the phenomenon that naturalist theories of meaning aim to explain. How is it possible for one thing to stand for some…Read more
    To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. The English sentence ‘ Santiago is east of Sacramento’ represents the world as being a certain way. So does my belief that Santiago is east of Sacramento. In these examples, one item—a sentence or a belief—lays claim to something else, a state of affairs, which may be far removed in space and time. This is the phenomenon that naturalist theories of meaning aim to explain. How is it possible for one thing to stand for something else in this way?
    Meaning
  •  148
    Teleology and Mental States
    with William Charlton
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 65 (1): 17-54. 1991.
    Intentionality
  •  91
    Replies to commentators (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.
    OntologyAspects of Consciousness
  •  101
    Editorial
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3): 787-788. 1994.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  100
    The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 145-178. 2001.
    When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight awa…Read more
    When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight away, and then set out for Camden.’
    Rationality
  •  107
    Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37 73-82. 1994.
    This paper will be about the relationship between mental disorder and physical disorder. I shall also be concerned with the connection between these notions and the notion of ‘illness’.
    PsychopathologyMedical EthicsPhilosophy of Psychiatry
  •  94
    Review: Conditionals (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157). 1989.
    Conditionals
  •  94
    Comments on François Recanati’s Mental Files: Doubts about Indexicality
    Disputatio 5 (36): 159-175. 2013.
    Papineau-David_Doubts-about-indexicality
    SemanticsSemantic TheoriesMental Files
  •  338
    Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
    Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.
    Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
  •  95
    Why supervenience?
    Analysis 50 (2): 66-71. 1990.
    Supervenience and Physicalism
  •  68
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 444-448. 1982.
    Metaphysical NaturalismVarieties of Scientific Realism, MiscTranscendental ArgumentsGeneral Philosop…Read more
    Metaphysical NaturalismVarieties of Scientific Realism, MiscTranscendental ArgumentsGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  325
    Causal asymmetry
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3): 273-289. 1985.
    TimeThe Direction of Causation
  •  17
    The Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilation
    In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 2--102. 2008.
    Philosophy of BiologyGenetics and Molecular Biology
  •  778
    NORMATIVITY AND JUDGEMENT I–David Papineau
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1): 17-43. 1999.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548)
    Normativity and NaturalismMoral JudgmentNaturalizing Mental ContentEpistemic NormativityNormativity …Read more
    Normativity and NaturalismMoral JudgmentNaturalizing Mental ContentEpistemic NormativityNormativity of Meaning and ContentNormativity, Misc
  •  1
    The vis viva controversy
    In Roger Stuart Woolhouse (ed.), Leibniz, metaphysics and philosophy of science, Oxford University Press. 1981.
    Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
  •  1
    Philosophical Naturalism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 523-526. 1997.
  • 7
    In Laws and Accidents, Blackwell. pp. 189-218. 1986.
  •  99
    Précis of Thinking about Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 143-143. 2002.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  121
    Three scenes and a moral
    The Philosophers' Magazine 38 (38): 63-64. 2007.
    Ethics
  •  2
    Preface By
    Russell’s place in the public eye was maintained by a steady stream of writing for the general reader. He no longer held any academic position, and needed to support himself and his family by his pen. While he continued to do some technical work in philosophy, more of his energies were devoted to journalism and other popular writings. He was in great demand. His distinctive prose and dry wit enabled him to puncture the fusty assumptions of contemporary thinking, and his rationalist alternatives …Read more
    Russell’s place in the public eye was maintained by a steady stream of writing for the general reader. He no longer held any academic position, and needed to support himself and his family by his pen. While he continued to do some technical work in philosophy, more of his energies were devoted to journalism and other popular writings. He was in great demand. His distinctive prose and dry wit enabled him to puncture the fusty assumptions of contemporary thinking, and his rationalist alternatives struck many readers as a liberating antidote to conventional morality.
    Bertrand Russell
  •  105
    The Structure of Social Science. A Philosophical Introduction By Michael Lessnoff London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974, 173 pp., £3.60 cloth, £1.85 paperback (review)
    with Michael Lessnoff and Frank Cunningham
    Philosophy 50 (193): 364. 1975.
    Philosophy of Social Science, General Works
  •  35
    Reply to Robert Kirk's and Andrew Melnyk's comments on my "Thinking about Consciousness"
    Reply to critics
    Consciousness and MaterialismPhysicalism about the Mind, Misc
  •  193
    Evidentialism reconsidered
    Noûs 35 (2). 2001.
    EvidentialismCausal Decision Theory
  •  175
    The philosophy of science (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1996.
    The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this collection contains the most important contributions to the recent debate on the philosophy of science. The contributors crystallize the often heated arguments of the last two decades, assessing the skeptical attitudes within philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific realists. Contributors include Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, Arthur Fine, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Alan Mus…Read more
    The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this collection contains the most important contributions to the recent debate on the philosophy of science. The contributors crystallize the often heated arguments of the last two decades, assessing the skeptical attitudes within philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific realists. Contributors include Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, Arthur Fine, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Alan Musgrave, Wesely C. Salmon, Lawrence Sklar, Bas C. van Fraassen, and John Worrall.
    General Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  30
    Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science
    In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
    Probab ility (probability; subjective and objective probability; the Principal Principle; independence and correlation; conditional probability; material, indicative and subjunctive conditionals; correlation and causation; screening off; Simpson’s paradox; Bayes’ theorem; Bayesian updating).
    General Philosophy of Science, MiscChance-Credence PrinciplesUpdating PrinciplesBayesian Reasoning, …Read more
    General Philosophy of Science, MiscChance-Credence PrinciplesUpdating PrinciplesBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  146
    Can We Really See A Million Colours
    In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
    ColorScience of Perception, MiscSorites ParadoxColor Experience
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