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99Précis of Thinking about ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 143-143. 2002.
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778NORMATIVITY AND JUDGEMENT I–David PapineauAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1): 17-43. 1999.It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548)
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1The vis viva controversyIn Roger Stuart Woolhouse (ed.), Leibniz, metaphysics and philosophy of science, Oxford University Press. 1981.
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2Russell’s place in the public eye was maintained by a steady stream of writing for the general reader. He no longer held any academic position, and needed to support himself and his family by his pen. While he continued to do some technical work in philosophy, more of his energies were devoted to journalism and other popular writings. He was in great demand. His distinctive prose and dry wit enabled him to puncture the fusty assumptions of contemporary thinking, and his rationalist alternatives …Read more
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85Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities?PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992 238-252. 1992.This paper defends the view that the asymmetry of causation can be explained in terms of probabilistic relationships between event types. Papineau first explores three different versions of the "fork asymmetry", namely David Lewis' asymmetry of overdetermination, the screening-off property of common causes, and Spirtes', Glymour's and Scheines' analysis of probabilistic graphs. He then argues that this fork asymmetry is both a genuine phenomenon and a satisfactory metaphysical reduction of causa…Read more
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175The philosophy of science (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1996.The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this collection contains the most important contributions to the recent debate on the philosophy of science. The contributors crystallize the often heated arguments of the last two decades, assessing the skeptical attitudes within philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific realists. Contributors include Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, Arthur Fine, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Alan Mus…Read more
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30Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of ScienceIn A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.Probab ility (probability; subjective and objective probability; the Principal Principle; independence and correlation; conditional probability; material, indicative and subjunctive conditionals; correlation and causation; screening off; Simpson’s paradox; Bayes’ theorem; Bayesian updating).
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146Can We Really See A Million ColoursIn Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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128Review of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4). 2007.
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377Teleosemantics and indeterminacyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 1-14. 1998.The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation
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27Introduction to Thinking About ConsciousnessIn Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press Uk. 2002.
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154What is x-phi good for?The Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52): 83-88. 2011.When philosophers study knowledge, consciousness, free will, moral value, and so on, their first concern is with these things themselves, rather than with what people think about them. So why exactly is it so important to philosophy to discover experimentally that people differ in their views on these matters? We wouldn’t expect physicists to throw up their hands in excitement just because somebody shows that different cultures have different views about the origin of the universe
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409Against representationalismInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3): 324-347. 2016.It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| General Philosophy of Science |
| Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphilosophy |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| General Philosophy of Science |