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13Causes and mixed probabilitiesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1). 1990.Abstract In Section 1 I examine the use of probabilistic data to establish causal conclusions in non?experimental research. In Section 2 I show that the probabilities involved in such research are inhomogeneous ?mixed? probabilities. Section 3 then argues that such mixed probabilities are responsible for the way common causes screen off correlations between their joint effects. Section 4 concludes that mixed probabilities are therefore crucial for the nature of the causal relation itself
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19Social learning and the Baldwin effectIn Antonio Zilhao (ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century, Routledge. 2005.Article
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8Response to Ehring’s ’Papineau on Causal Asymmetry’British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4): 521-525. 1988.
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290A thirder and an Everettian: A reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'Analysis 69 (1): 78-86. 2009.Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first att…Read more
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103Response to Ehring's 'papineau on causal asymmetry'British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4): 521-525. 1988.
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1Irreducibility and teleologyIn David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford University Press. 1992.
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208Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2): 169-83. 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
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241Many Minds are No Worse than OneBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2): 233-241. 1996.
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32X*—Is Epistemology Dead?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1): 129-142. 1982.David Papineau; X*—Is Epistemology Dead?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 129–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.
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36There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the BodyIn Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 369-376. 2015.This paper argues that all apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a few fundamental physical forces which conserve energy and operate throughout nature. Consequently, there are probably no special mental forces originating from souls and acting upon bodies and brains in addition to the basic, energy-conserving physical forces. Moreover, physiological and biochemical research have failed to uncover any evidence of forces over and above the basic physical forces acting on living bo…Read more
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8Normativity and JudgementAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 17-61. 1999.[David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativi…Read more
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Does the sociology of science discredit science?In Relativism and Realism in Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 37-57. 1988.
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1Review of T. W. HUTCHISON: Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (1): 98-103. 1980.
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4The Causal Closure of the Physical and NaturalismIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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60Mathematical fictionalismInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (2). 1988.No abstract
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10The Structure of Social Science. A Philosophical Introduction By Michael Lessnoff London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974, 173 pp., £3.60 cloth, £1.85 paperback (review)Philosophy 50 (193): 364-. 1975.
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350Causation is macroscopic but not irreducibleIn Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 126. 2013.In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible
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113The tyranny of common senseThe Philosophers' Magazine 34 (34): 19-25. 2006.Sometimes I despair of my philosophical colleagues. They are so conservative. I don’t mean this in a political sense. In conventional party-political terms, most professional philosophers are probably well to the left of centre. As a group, they have a strong sense of fairness and little commitment to the social status quo. But this political openmindedness doesn’t normally carry over to their day jobs. When it comes to philosophical ideas, they are congenitally suspicious of intellectual innova…Read more
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307There Are No Norms of BeliefIn Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief, Oxford University Press. 2013.This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
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