Dietmar Heidemann

Prima facie, the concept of “drive” is not central or even relevant to the project of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Other than one might expect, Kant, especially in the teleology, is not engaging with this concept and its cognates in great detail. On the other hand, the concept of “drive” is pivotal in his philosophy of history and culture as spelled out in the “Doctrine of Method” of the third Critique. For it is nature that drives human nature to civilize, socialize, culturize, moralize and finally federalize. The chapter retraces this view in the third Critique on the backdrop of the “minor” writings on philosophy of history and related matters. The focus is on the question of whether Kant attributes to nature the function of the driving force of the development of the human mind as such and human culture and history in particular.

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical and transcendental realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

Ich argumentiere für die These, daß Kant seit der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft von der epistemischen Interdependenz des inneren und äußeren Sinnes ausgeht: innere Erfahrung oder empirisches Selbstbewußtsein ist nur möglich aufgrund von äußerer Erfahrung. Der von Kant bei der Explikation dieses nicht physiologisch-„organisch“ zu verstehenden Interdependenz-Verhältnisses neben den Begriffen der reinen und empirischen Apperzeption eingeführte Begriff des intellektuellen Bewußtseins, „daß ich bin“ (B157), wird sich hierbei als unhaltbar erweisen

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a conceptualist.

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of Pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

The paper argues that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant develops two anti-sceptical strategies. In the Fourth Paralogism (CPR A) he believes himself able to refute the sceptic by demonstrating that external perception is immediate. This strategy is rather unconvincing. In the Refutation of Idealism (CPR B) Kant promotes the material dependence of inner sense on outer sense. I show that Kant’s argument for material dependence has been widely overlooked, even though it is the strongest argument against external world scepticism he develops, since it anticipates mental content externalism while preserving transcendental idealism and empirical realism.