Dan Zahavi

Résumé — Dans sa contribution, Dan Zahavi discute de la relation entre la phénoménologie et la métaphysique. La phénoménologie est-elle métaphysiquement neutre ou est-elle sans rapport métaphysique ? Est-elle une sorte de propédeutique vis-à-vis de la métaphysique ou la phénoménologie est-elle au contraire une forme de métaphysique, peut-être même le sommet d’une sorte particulière de métaphysique ? Alors que la position de Husserl dans les Logische Untersuchungen peut être décrite comme métaphysiquement neutre, Zahavi argumente que la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl ne reste pas neutre ou indifférente à la question de la relation entre phénomène et réalité, et que par conséquent cela a nécessairement des implications métaphysiques.— In his contribution, Dan Zahavi discusses the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics. Is phenomenology metaphysically neutral, or is it without metaphysical bearings ? Is it a kind of propaedeutics to metaphysics, or is phenomenology, on the contrary, a form of metaphysics, perhaps even the culmination of a particular kind of metaphysics ? Whereas Husserl’s position in Logische Untersuchungen can be described as metaphysically neutral, Zahavi argues that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology does not remain neutral or indifferent to the question of the relation between phenomena and reality, and that it therefore necessarily has metaphysical implications

Until recently, cognitive research in infantile autism primarily focussed on the ability of autistic subjects to understand and predict the actions of others. Currently, researchers are also considering the capacity of autists to understand their own minds. In this article we discuss selected recent contributions to the theory of mind debate and the study of infantile autism, and provide an analysis of intersubjectivity and self-awareness that is informed both by empirical research and by work in the phenomenological tradition. This analysis uncovers certain problems in the theory-theory account of autism, and at the same time illustrates the potential value of phenomenology for cognitive science

In the introduction to Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that “we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions” (Hua X, 4) the moment we seek to account for time-consciousness. I think most scholars of Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo. Let us consequently start with some of the basic questions that motivated Husserl’s inquiry

Among the many accomplishments achieved by Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, the outline of an intentional account of perception counts among the most prominent. 1 One of the consequences of this account was a severe criticism of the traditional representative theory of perception, and my aim in the following paper is to present this criticism and some of its ontological implications. 2 Even though Husserl's critique was directed against the positions of thinkers like Locke, Kant, Brentano and Twardowski, it is my contention that his arguments are also valid against modem theories of perception, insofar as they belong to one of the two following versions of a repre- sentative theory:

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both Husserl’s published works and posthumous material, Husserl’s Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl’s thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.

The past decade has witnessed a notable turn in philosophical orientation in the Nordic countries. For the first time, the North has a generation of philosophers who are oriented to phenomenology. This means a vital rediscovery of the phenomenological tradition as a partly hidden conceptual and methodological resource for taking on contemporary philosophical problems. The essays collected in the present volume introduce the reader to the phenomenological work done in the Nordic countries today. The material is organized under three general headings: metaphysics, facticity, and interpretation. The first part, "Metaphysics", asks if phenomenology is, or could be taken as, a metaphysical inquiry. It studies this possibility in a systematic as well as in a historical perspective. The second part, "Facticity", focuses on the double character of the philosophizing subject, on the one hand, as a worldly being bound by a cultural and historical situation, and on the other hand, as the one who thinks this condition and gives it an interpretation. It studies four aspects of facticity in particular: language, dwelling, alterity, and generation. The third part, "Interpretation", clarifies the different notions of interpretation central to phenomenology, understood as hermeneutics.

The phenomenological approach to schizophrenia has undergone something of a renaissance in Anglophone psychiatry in recent years. There has been a proliferation of works that focus on the nature of subjectivity in schizophrenia and related disorders, and that take inspiration from the work of such German and French philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and such classical psychiatrists as Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Binswanger (Rulf 2003; Sass 2001a, 2001b). This trend includes predominantly theoretical articles, which typically incorporate clinical material as well as reviews of empirical and experimental findings in psychopathology. Some very recent examples (since 2000) are studies of ..

_The Phenomenological Mind_ is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making _The Phenomenological Mind_ an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the state of phenomenology today. The essays explore a diverse range of topics, including intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.

Seit der Veröffentlichung von Chalmers einflussreichem Werk The Conscious Mind war es üblich, die philosophischen Probleme des Bewusstseins in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. Während sich das sogenannte „schwere Problem des Bewusstseins“ auf die Natur des phänomenalen Bewusstseins und die Perspektive der ersten Person bezieht, befasst sich das „leichte Problem des Bewusstseins“ vor allem mit dem Begriff der Intentionalität. Doch es stellt sich die Frage, ob es tatsächlich möglich ist, Intentionalität eingehend zu erforschen, ohne dabei die erfahrungsbezogenen Dimensionen zu berücksichtigen? Und vice versa, ist es möglich, die Natur der Subjektivität und der Erfahrung zu verstehen, wenn man die Intentionalität ignoriert, ohne sich dem Risiko auszusetzen, den cartesianischen Dualismus von „Subjekt“ und „Welt“ wieder ins Leben zu rufen, das alles ignoriert, was mit dem „In-der-Welt-sein“-Syntagma umschrieben ist? In meinem Artikel untersuche ich, ob das phänomenale Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität nicht zwei Seiten einer und derselben Medaille sind, die nicht zertrennt werden können, ohne dass bei der Teilung ein Fehler begangen wird