Dan Zahavi

Is it possible to investigate subjectivity reflectively? Can reflection give us access to the original experiential dimension, or is there on the contrary reason to suspect that the experiences are changed radically when reflected upon? This is a question that Natorp discusses in his Allgemeine Psychologie, and the conclusion he reaches is highly anti-phenomenological. The article presents Natorp's challenge and then goes on to account in detail for Heidegger 's subsequent response to it in his early Freiburg lectures, in particular Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks and Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Heidegger 's early views on reflection, selfhood, and pre-reflective self-awareness are expounded, and the article concludes with a discussion of the relationship between reflective phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology

This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone

The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.

This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions ought to accommodate: Reciprocal Other-awareness and Integration. Consideration of and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding.

The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and differentiated treatment than currently exists, distinguishing it from the idea of a ‘common ground’ and discerning multiple senses of ‘we-ness’. At an empirical level, beginning from the shared history of human evolution and prenatal existence, a simple sense of pre-reflective we-ness, we argue, emerges from second-person I-you engagement in earliest infancy. Developmentally, experientially and conceptually, engagement remains fundamental to the we throughout its many forms, characterized by reciprocal interaction and conditioned by the normative aspects of mutual addressing

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have— according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various think- ers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will con- trast Lipps’ account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in the hands of contemporary simulationists—with various accounts of empa- thy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times diver- gent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutz—a thinker whose contribution to the analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years.

Among the many accomplishments achieved by Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, the outline of an intentional account of perception counts among the most prominent. 1 One of the consequences of this account was a severe criticism of the traditional representative theory of perception, and my aim in the following paper is to present this criticism and some of its ontological implications. 2 Even though Husserl's critique was directed against the positions of thinkers like Locke, Kant, Brentano and Twardowski, it is my contention that his arguments are also valid against modem theories of perception, insofar as they belong to one of the two following versions of a repre- sentative theory:

_The Phenomenological Mind_ is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making _The Phenomenological Mind_ an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind

What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion, is it rather a distinct social emotion, or might this forced alternative be misguided? In the chapter, I contrast certain prevalent cognitivist accounts of shame with different proposals that can be found in the phenomenological tradition and ultimately argue that prototypical forms of shame provide vivid examples of other-mediated forms of self-experience.

In this response to Wiggins and Schwartz, Ratcliffe, and Stanghellini, we first wish to express our gratitude to Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology for providing us the space to clarify our views and to overcome certain misunderstandings. Ratcliffe notes that our critique is "harsh," whereas Wiggins and Schwartz lament the fact that the debate "has taken the form of sometimes acid formulations and rejoinders . . . that lack the tone of mutual appreciation" (2011, 31). We deplore the fact that this exchange was at all necessary, and we share Wiggins and Schwartz's concerns. However, we need to recall here and emphasize that our article originated as a response. It originated as a response to an article that was ..

When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action, but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others, which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we. In the present contribution, my primary aim will be to offer an answer to the following question: does the we-experience, the experience of being part of a we, presuppose, precede, preserve, or abolish the difference between self- and other-experience? In pursuing this task, I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current social ontology, namely insights found in classical phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition.

Max Ferdinand Scheler was born in Munich on August 22, 1874 and brought up in an orthodox Jewish household.1 Aft er completing high school in 1894, he started to study medicine, philosophy, and psychology. He studied with Th eodor Lipps in Munich, with Georg Simmel and Wilhelm Dilthey in Berlin, and with Rudolf Eucken in Jena,2 where he received his doctorate in 1897 with a thesis entitled Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien. Two years later this was followed by his habilitation thesis on Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode. In 1902, Scheler met Edmund Husserl for the fi rst time at a reception in Halle given by Hans Vaihinger, the editor of Kant-Studien. Th.

In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified?

Until recently, cognitive research in infantile autism primarily focussed on the ability of autistic subjects to understand and predict the actions of others. Currently, researchers are also considering the capacity of autists to understand their own minds. In this article we discuss selected recent contributions to the theory of mind debate and the study of infantile autism, and provide an analysis of intersubjectivity and self-awareness that is informed both by empirical research and by work in the phenomenological tradition. This analysis uncovers certain problems in the theory-theory account of autism, and at the same time illustrates the potential value of phenomenology for cognitive science