•  8
    In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are requ…Read more
  •  15
    Unification and explanation
    Synthese 131 (1). 2002.
    In this article we criticize two recent articles that examinethe relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand,claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanationis unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem:explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation(e.g., causal explanation) are required;…Read more
  •  27
    The Structure of Causal Explanations in Population Biology
    with Roxan Degeyter
    Acta Biotheoretica 69 (3): 449-476. 2021.
    The scope of this paper can be clarified by means of a well-known phenomenon that is usually called ‘industrial melanism’: the fact that the melanic form of the peppered moth became dominant in industrial areas in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such changes in relative phenotype frequencies are important explananda for population biologists. Apart from trying to explain such changes over time, population biologists also often try to explain differences between populations,…Read more
  •  2
    The Indirect Practical Functions of Explanations
    Philosophica 51 (n/a). 1993.
  •  1
    In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
  •  7
    Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3): 348-359. 2007.
    The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare. Key Words: social mechanisms • causal inference • social pol…Read more
  •  11
    Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social f…Read more
  •  4
    Reply to Daniel steel's "with or without mechanisms"
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2): 267-270. 2008.
    In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper "Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science." I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it. Key Words: social mechanisms • causal inference • social policy.
  •  4
    Rationality in the discovery of empirical laws
    Foundations of Science 4 (3): 357-370. 1999.
    In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.
  •  10
    Redactioneel
    with Inge De Bal
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113 (1): 1-1. 2021.
    Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
  •  27
    The periodic table is one of the best-known systems of classification in science. Because of the information it contains, it raises explanation-seeking questions. Quantum mechanical models of the behaviour of electrons may be seen as providing explanations in response to these questions. In this paper we first address the question ‘Do quantum mechanical models of atoms provide legitimate explanations?’ Because our answer is positive, our next question is ‘Are the explanations provided by quantum…Read more
  •  6
    Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories
    with Maarten van Dyck
    Philosophica 86 (3). 2012.
  •  1
    Preface
    Philosophica 64 (2). 1999.
  •  6
    Patterns of scientific reasoning: An introduction
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 14 (1): 3-5. 2005.
    From December 2001 till December 2004, the Science, Innovation and Media Department of the Ministry of the Flemish Community (Belgium) and the State Committee for Scientific Research of the Republic of Poland funded a cooperation project (Bilateral Scientific and Technological Cooperation Project BIL01/80) between two Flemish and two Polish research centres. The Flemish partners were the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science of Ghent University and the centre with the same name of the Free …Read more
  •  9
    Preface
    with Petri Ylikoski
    Foundations of Science 10 (4): 349-351. 2005.
  •  26
    Investigating the Unity and Disunity of Scientific Explanation
    with Henk W. de Regt and Dingmar van Eck
    Foundations of Science 26 (4): 1021-1024. 2020.
  •  47
    How do we Have to Investigate Scientific Explanation?
    with Leen De Vreese and Jeroen Van Bouwel
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 78 (3): 489-524. 2016.
    This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher, and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make descriptive and normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to, but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsib…Read more
  •  23
    Forms of causal explanation
    with Jeroen Van Bouwel and Robrecht Vanderbeeken
    Foundations of Science 10 (4): 437-454. 2005.
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we clai…Read more
  •  17
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  6
    Alfred Wegeners theorie van continentendrift en haar rivalen
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113 (1): 25-53. 2021.
    Alfred Wegener’s Theory of Continental Drift and its Rivals. Rational Disagreement and Rational Consensus in the Earth Sciences Alfred Wegener launched the idea of continental drift (lateral motion of continents on the earth) early in the 20th century. In the period 1915-1930 he did not succeed to convince his fellow earth scientist to leave behind their old permanentist or contractionist theories and adopt his new theory. In the second half of the 20th century – between 1960 and 1975 – continen…Read more
  •  76
    Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (1): 125-142. 2017.
    In this paper we discuss three interrelated questions. First: is explanation in mathematics a topic that philosophers of mathematics can legitimately investigate? Second: are the specific aims that philosophers of mathematical explanation set themselves legitimate? Finally: are the models of explanation developed by philosophers of science useful tools for philosophers of mathematical explanation? We argue that the answer to all these questions is positive. Our views are completely opposite to t…Read more
  •  10
    Introduction
    with Dietlinde Wouters and Joke Meheus
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4): 319-322. 2012.
    This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoningand Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected.These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy. We also give an overview of the papers in this issue.
  •  1
    Introduction
    Philosophica 51 (n/a): 1-3. 1993.
  •  7
    Introduction
    with Dietlinde Wouters and Joke Meheus
    Foundations of Science 18 (4): 595-597. 2013.
  •  16
    How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3): 277-295. 2009.
    In a recent article in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere's theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences—on which Russo and Williamson focus—and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation …Read more
  •  34
    Forms of Causal Explanation
    with Jeroen Van Bouwel and Robrecht Vanderbeeken
    Foundations of Science 10 (4): 437-454. 2005.
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we clai…Read more