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16How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic EvidenceInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3): 277-295. 2009.In a recent article in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere's theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences—on which Russo and Williamson focus—and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation …Read more
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34Forms of Causal ExplanationFoundations of Science 10 (4): 437-454. 2005.In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we clai…Read more
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40Causation, Unification, and the Adequacy of Explanations of FactsTheoria 24 (3): 301-320. 2010.Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact re-lation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
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27Coping with inconsistencies: Examples form the social sciences.Logic and Logical Philosophy 14 (1): 89-101. 2005.In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory
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26Comparative Causation at Multiple Levels and Across Scientific DisciplinesAxiomathes 27 (6): 667-683. 2017.In this paper, we analyse the fruitfulness of Ronald Giere’s comparative model for causation in populations. While the original model was primarily developed to capture the meaning of causal claims in the biomedical and health sciences, we want to show that the model is not only useful in these domains, but can also fruitfully be applied to other scientific domains. Specifically, we demonstrate that the model is fruitful for characterizing the meaning of causal claims found in classical genetics…Read more
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5Comment construit‐on une explication déductive‐nomologique?Dialectica 50 (3): 183-204. 1996.RésuméComment devons‐nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique pour qu'il contribue à mieux comprendre les phénomènes que nous observons? Le modèle déductif‐nomologique d'explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d'explication déductive‐nomologique, ne procure pas une réponse complète à cette question. Un des problèmes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un phéomène , mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce ty…Read more
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4The living apart together relationship of causation and explanation: A comment on Jean LachapellePhilosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4): 560-569. 2002.
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15Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations.Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1): 33-46. 2011.Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic inter…Read more
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18Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical FunctionsErkenntnis 79 (6): 1367-1389. 2014.Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: why was artif…Read more
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10De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: A pragmatic approach based on epistemic interestsHuman Studies 31 (4): 423-442. 2008.In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning ex…Read more
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16A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social scienceHistory and Theory 47 (2). 2008.Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We de…Read more
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4Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (eds.)Philosophica 49 (n/a). 1992.
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14The structure of analogical reasoning in bioethicsMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (1): 69-84. 2023.Casuistry, which involves analogical reasoning, is a popular methodological approach in bioethics. The method has its advantages and challenges, which are widely acknowledged. Meta-philosophical reflection on exactly how bioethical casuistry works and how the challenges can be addressed is limited. In this paper we propose a framework for structuring casuistry and analogical reasoning in bioethics. The framework is developed by incorporating theories and insights from the philosophy of science: …Read more
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39Scientific ExplanationSpringer. 2013.When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wron…Read more
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12The role of unification in explanations of factsIn Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, Springer. 2011.In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
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16Unification: What is it, how do we reach and why do we want it?Synthese 118 (3): 479-499. 1999.This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual har…Read more
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5Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation ProblemsLogique Et Analyse 129 (29): 175-189. 1990.
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1Inleidend overzicht van het wetenschapsfilosofische denken van vijftien hedendaagse filosofen.