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5Some Approaches to Personal ValueIn Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Patterns of Value- Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 2, Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2004.is not available.
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23Hommage à Wlodek; 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz - published as web resource only (edited book)Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2007.
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10For Kevin's SakeIn Anne Reboul (ed.), Philosophical papers to Kevin Mulligan, . pp. 1-18. 2011.The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Se…Read more
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26Patterns of Value : Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 1Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2003.Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general conceptua…Read more
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14Patterns of Value- Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 2Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2004.Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general conceptua…Read more
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27Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis (edited book)Lund University Department of Philosophy. 2003.
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49Tropic of valueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 213-228. 2005.The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet anot…Read more
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86Instrumental Values â Strong and WeakEthical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1): 23-43. 2002.What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value
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264On-Conditionalism: On the verge of a new metaethical theoryLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3): 88-107. 2016.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen | : This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of the relevant cognit…Read more
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198Tropic of ValuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 389-403. 2003.The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attent…Read more
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51II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own SakeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1): 33-51. 2000.The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to redu…Read more
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76Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence ArgumentPhilosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 560-579. 2018.A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive sc…Read more
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102Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. 135 pp (review)SATS 5 (1): 171-180. 2004.
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156Normative reasons and the agent-neutral/relative dichotomyPhilosophia 37 (2): 227-243. 2008.The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative val…Read more
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17Ett problem för Hares supervenienstesSATS 5 (2): 47-58. 2004.The supervenience thesis about value customarily expresses two intuitions: (i) that there is some kind of dependence between the value and the natural properties of the value bearer; (ii) that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. R M Hare’s account of supervenience is problematic since it only expresses (ii) but not (i). A solution to this problem is outlined,…Read more
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340A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sakeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1). 2000.The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-v…Read more
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256Buck-passing and the right kind of reasonsPhilosophical Quarterly 56 (222). 2006.The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation does not inv…Read more
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199Intrinsic and Extrinsic ValueIn Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford University Press Usa. 2015.Section 2.1 identifies three notions of intrinsic value: the finality sense understands it as value for its own sake, the supervenience sense identifies it with value that depends exclusively on the bearer’s internal properties, and the nonderivative sense describes intrinsic value as value that provides justification for other values and is not justified by any other value. A distinction between final intrinsic and final extrinsic value in terms of supervenience is subsequently introduced. Sect…Read more
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82Dislodging Butterflies from the SupervenientThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 103-112. 2006.Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential ac…Read more
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24Introduction to Recent Work on Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. 2005.
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127On For Someone’s Sake AttitudesEthical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4): 397-411. 2008.Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so- called for-someone's-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone's-sake attitudes can be identified. Mo…Read more
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84Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited (review)Acta Analytica 28 (1): 1-17. 2013.Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should fa…Read more
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111A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its own sakeIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 115--129. 2005.The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is large…Read more
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99Recent work on intrinsic value (edited book)Springer. 2005.Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the fundamental questions concerning the natu…Read more