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60Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusionNoûs 56 (4): 897-919. 2021.Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse-grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a potentially infinite set of degrees of approximatio…Read more
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59Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysisPhilosophical Studies (-). 2020.Orsi and Garcia argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admiration for admirability, etc. To explain the fittingness relation we therefor need to appeal to the features of the relevant…Read more
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59Remarks on the Absentminded DriverStudia Logica 73 (2): 241-256. 2003.Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an age…Read more
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56The negative Ramsey testIn André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change, Springer. 1991.The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other weak conditions, on pain of triviality incompatible with th…Read more
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55According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an anal…Read more
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49Value relations: old wine in new barrelsIn , . 2011.In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Un…Read more
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48Tropic of valueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of ethics and applied philosophy, Springer. pp. 213-228. 2005.The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet anot…Read more
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47How to model relational belief revisionIn Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994.This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to…Read more
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44To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility ViolationsJournal of Philosophy 92 (11): 586-620. 1995.
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43II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own SakeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1): 33-51. 2000.The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to redu…Read more
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42Are Institutions Rules in Equilibrium? Comments on Guala’s Understanding InstitutionsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6): 569-584. 2018.In this comment on Francesco Guala’s Understanding Institutions, I express my admiration for the book but I also raise some critical criticisms: His general account of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium seems to get their ontology wrong by disregarding their material side - their concrete realizations. It also diregards social institutions whose rules are not in equilibrium. Finally, his suggestion that institutional equilibria necessarily involve correlation devices appers to lack justificati…Read more
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42Letters From Long Ago: On Causal Decision Theory and Centered ChancesIn Johansson Lars-Göran (ed.), Logic, Ethics, and All That Jazz - Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, . 2009.This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights being the conditional chances of…Read more
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40This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights being the conditional chances of…Read more
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39McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey TestTheoria 83 (2): 154-168. 2017.Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p, then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample…Read more
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38Conditionals and the Ramsey testIn D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3, . 1998.
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38Preference utilitarianism by way of preference change?In Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology, . pp. 185-206. 2009.This paper revisits Richard Hare's classical and much discussed argument for preference utilitarianism, which relies on the conception of moral deliberation as a process of thought experimentation, with concomitant preference change. The paper focuses on an apparent gap in Hare's reasoning, the so-called No-Conflict Problem. A solution to this difficulty which was proposed in is re-examined and shown to lead to a number of difficulties. The paper therefore also considers an alternative idea, due…Read more
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38Millian superioritiesUtilitas 17 (2): 127-146. 2005.Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems …Read more
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38Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch-Book ArgumentsIn Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press. pp. 289--312. 2006.My focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic Dutch Books, for the stand…Read more
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37Kripke on psychophysical identityIn , . 2002.This paper deals with Kripke’s influential criticism of the view that mental states are physical in nature, i.e. that such states are identical with certain physical states or processes.
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35A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own SakeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1). 2000.The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-va…Read more
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34Discussion – Ryberg's doubts about higher and lower pleasures – put to rest?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2): 231-235. 2003.
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34Democratic answers to complex questions: an epistemic perspectiveIn Matti Sintonen (ed.), The Socratic Tradition: Questioning as Philosophy and as Method. Texts in philosophy, College Publications. pp. 223-251. 2006.This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue, or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself. The two procedures can lead to different results. We investigate which of these procedures is better as a t…Read more
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33Getting Personal: The Intuition of Neutrality ReinterpretedIn Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Vol. 2, Institute For Futures Studies. 2020.
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31Cooperating with cooperatorsErkenntnis 38 (1). 1993.Jan Österberg (Self and Others, 1988) argues that the most defensible form of egoism should not only tell each of us what to do but also tell us what we ought to do. He also claims that collective norms should take precedence over individual ones. An individual ought to do one's part in an action pattern that is prescribed for the group - provided that other members of the group do their part. question This paper questions Österberg's claim that Collective Egoism, unlike other forms of egoism…Read more
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30Democracy: two modelsIn , . 2011.The point of departure in my story is the contrast between two models of democratic voting process: popular democracy and what might be called committee democracy. On one interpretation, voting in popular democracy is a procedure whose function is to aggregate the individuals’ preferences to something like a collective preference, while in committee democracy what is being aggregated are committee members’ judgments. The relevant judgments on the agenda often address an evaluative question. It i…Read more
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27Analyticity - An Unfinished Business in Possible World SemanticsIn Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53. pp. 345--358. 2006.The goal of this paper is to consider how the notion of analyticity can be dealt with in model-theoretical terms. The standard approach to possible-world semantics allows us to define logical truth and necessity, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for.
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25Patterns of Value : Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, vol. 1Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2003.Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general conceptua…Read more
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