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9Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferencesIn Adrian Kuźniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy, Brill | Rodopi. pp. 9-40. 2016.My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the n…Read more
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5The meaning of "darn it!"In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 129-139. 2015.
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20Democratic answers to complex questions: an epistemic perspectiveSynthese 10 223-251. 2010.This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue, or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself. The two procedures can lead to different results. We investigate which of these procedures is better as a t…Read more
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90A Simpler, More Compelling Money Pump with ForesightJournal of Philosophy 117 (10): 578-589. 2020.One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago by the discovery of a money pump with foresight, which works against agents who use backward induction. But backward induction implausibly assumes that the agent would act rationally and retain her trust in her future rationality even at choice nodes that could only be reached if she were to act irrationally. This worry does not apply to BI-terminating…Read more
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27Value taxonomyIn Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives From Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociolog, Oxford University Press. pp. 23-42. 2015.The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we mig…Read more
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5When in doubt, equalize: presumption of equality justifiedIn Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim & Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 164-177. 2013.
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8Democracy and argument: tracking truth in complex social decisionsIn Anne van Aaken, Christian List & Christoph Luetge (eds.), Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy, Ashgate. pp. 143-157. 2004.A committee has to address a complex question, the answer to which requires answering several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results then are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based procedure. On that procedure, the members directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member bein…Read more
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8Presumption of equalityIn Martin Jönsson (ed.), Proceedings of the Lund-Rutgers Conference, Lund University. pp. 109-155. 2008.Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The sug…Read more
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3Modeling parity and incomparabilityIn Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, Lund University Department of Philosophy. pp. 201-228. 2003.is not available.
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12Mechanisms of truth-directedness: comments on Pascal Engel’s "Truth and the aim of belief"In Donald Gillies (ed.), Laws and Models in Science, King's College Publications. pp. 101-106. 2004.
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62Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysisPhilosophical Studies (-). 2020.Orsi and Garcia argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admiration for admirability, etc. To explain the fittingness relation we therefor need to appeal to the features of the relevant…Read more
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5Remarks on the Absent minded DriverIn Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy, Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 192-207. 2000.
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23Money pump with foresightIn Mike Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, Springer. pp. 123-154. 2000.I describe in section 1 how cyclical preferences can arise. In section 2, I relate preference to judgments of choiceworthiness and distinguish between two kinds of preference cycles, vicious and benign. In section 3, I run through the standard money pump in order to show, in section 4, how this pump can be stopped by foresight, using backward induction. A new money pump that *cannot* be stopped by foresight is presented in section 5. This pump works even for agents with benign cyclical preferenc…Read more
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1Analyticity - An Unfinished Business in Possible World SemanticsIn Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53. pp. 345-358. 2006.The goal of this paper is to consider how the notion of analyticity can be dealt with in model-theoretical terms. The standard approach to possible-world semantics allows us to define logical truth and necessity, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for.
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11Does deliberation crowd out self-prediction?In Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy, Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 163-192. 2000.
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8Preference utilitarianism by way of preference change?In Till Grune (ed.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. pp. 185-206. 2008.This paper revisits Richard Hare's classical and much discussed argument for preference utilitarianism, which relies on the conception of moral deliberation as a process of thought experimentation, with concomitant preference change. The paper focuses on an apparent gap in Hare's reasoning, the so-called No-Conflict Problem. A solution to this difficulty which was proposed in is re-examined and shown to lead to a number of difficulties. The paper therefore also considers an alternative idea, due…Read more
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12Kripke on psychophysical identityIn Sten Lindström & Pär Sundström (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå University. pp. 1-15. 2002.This paper deals with Kripke’s influential criticism of the view that mental states are physical in nature, i.e. that such states are identical with certain physical states or processes.
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18Letters from long ago: on causal decision theory and centered chancesIn Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Rysiek Śliwiński (eds.), Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 247-273. 2009.This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights being the conditional chances of…Read more
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3Epistemic logic: questions and answersIn Vincent F. Hendricks & Olivier Roy (eds.), Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions, Automatic Press. pp. 121-128. 2010.
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2Presumption of equality as a requirement of fairnessIn Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov & Lacey Perry (eds.), Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior, World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. 203-224. 2011.in Undetermined Presumption of Equality enjoins that individuals be treated equally in the absence of discriminating information. My objective in this paper is to make this principle more precise, viewing it as a norm of fairness, in order to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification might come from the expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This outcome-oriented approach to fairness is pursued i…Read more
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15Better to be than not to be?In Hans Joas & Barbro Klein (eds.), The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science, Brill. pp. 399-421. 2010.
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240Millian superioritiesUtilitas 17 (2): 127-146. 2005.Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems …Read more
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3Democracy: two modelsIn Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday, Uppsala Philosophical Studies. pp. 219-241. 2011.The point of departure in my story is the contrast between two models of democratic voting process: popular democracy and what might be called committee democracy. On one interpretation, voting in popular democracy is a procedure whose function is to aggregate the individuals’ preferences to something like a collective preference, while in committee democracy what is being aggregated are committee members’ judgments. The relevant judgments on the agenda often address an evaluative question. It i…Read more
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9Pragmatic arguments for rationality constraintsIn Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, Csli Publications. pp. 139-163. 2008.My focus is on pragmatic arguments for various rationality constraints on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which she will act to her guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, she can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic Dutch Books, for the stand…Read more
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4Backward induction without full trust in rationalityIn Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy, Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 101-120. 2000.
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8Tropic of valueIn Jan Österberg, Erik Carlson & Rysiek Śliwiński (eds.), Omnium-gatherum: philosophical essays dedicated to Jan Österberg on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 263-277. 2001.In Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, we defended the following claims: Not only states of affairs, or facts, but also concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value ; The final value of a concrete object need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not be exclusively based on the internal properties of its bearer; The final value of a concrete object is not reducible to the value of some states of affairs that involve the object in question. Our arguments for – have been challenged. This…Read more
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5In this short summary, which is aimed to give a rough picture of the main lines of research in practical philosophy in Sweden during the last decade, I have decided to organize the presentation by universities rather than by particular research subjects. It is to be hoped that this will give the reader a better grasp of what is going on at various departments. The summary is to a large extent a collective work: It is based on the reports prepared by professors Erik Carlson, Uppsala University, S…Read more
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35Money pump with foresightIn Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy, Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 201-234. 2000.I describe in section 1 how cyclical preferences can arise. In section 2, I relate preference to judgments of choiceworthiness and distinguish between two kinds of preference cycles, vicious and benign. In section 3, I run through the standard money pump in order to show, in section 4, how this pump can be stopped by foresight, using backward induction. A new money pump that *cannot* be stopped by foresight is presented in section 5. This pump works even for agents with benign cyclical preferenc…Read more
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319Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and DecisionTheory and Decision 85 (1): 1-4. 2018.This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contributio…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |