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1071Fragmentation and information accessIn Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind, Oxford University Press. 2021.In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-ho…Read more
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102Reply to CriticsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4): 498-534. 2014.Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies
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485Ontological commitmentPhilosophy Compass 2 (3). 2007.I propose a way of thinking aboout content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying In’ and ‘An Account of Possibility’.).
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17CompletudIn Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica, Editorial Trotta. pp. 100--102. 2011.
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121An Actualist's Guide to Quantifying InCritica 44 (132): 3-34. 2012.I develop a device for simulating quantification over merely possible objects from the perspective of a modal actualist ---someone who thinks that everything that exists actually exists
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144The seminar is intended as an introduction to vagueness. We'll survey some prominent accounts of vagueness, so that people get a sense of what `accounting for vagueness' is all about, and why it's hard.
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76Frege's unofficial arithmeticJournal of Symbolic Logic 67 (4): 1623-1638. 2002.I show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically, I set forth an enriched second-order language L, a sentence A of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have th…Read more
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116A Puzzle About Ineffable PropositionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2). 2011.I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White
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445Hierarchies Ontological and IdeologicalMind 121 (482). 2012.Gödel claimed that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is 'what becomes of the theory of types if certain superfluous restrictions are removed'. The aim of this paper is to develop a clearer understanding of Gödel's remark, and of the surrounding philosophical terrain. In connection with this, we discuss some technical issues concerning infinitary type theories and the programme of developing the semantics for higher-order languages in other higher-order languages
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65Replies to Greco and TurnerPhilosophical Studies 172 (10): 2617-2620. 2015.Dan Greco and Jason Turner wrote two fantastic critiques of my book, The Construction of Logical Space. Greco’s critique suggests that the book can be given a Kuhnian interpretation, with a Carnapian twist. Here I embrace that interpretation. Turner criticizes one of the views I develop in the book. Here I identify an avenue of resistance
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29Ontological Commitment1Philosophy Compass 2 (3): 428-444. 2007.I propose a way of thinking about content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment.
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243Essence Without FundamentalityTheoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3): 349-363. 2015.I argue for a conception of essence that does not rely on distinctions of metaphysical fundamentality.
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134I develop an account of the sorts of considerations that should go into determining where the limits of possibility lie. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘Ontological Commitment’ and ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying-In’.).
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |