•  1071
    Fragmentation and information access
    with Adam Elga
    In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind, Oxford University Press. 2021.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses.  Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes.  Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-ho…Read more
  •  102
    Reply to Critics
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4): 498-534. 2014.
    Cameron, Eklund, Hofweber, Linnebo, Russell and Sider have written critical essays on my book, The Construction of Logical Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Here I offer some replies
  •  485
    Ontological commitment
    Philosophy Compass 2 (3). 2007.
    I propose a way of thinking aboout content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying In’ and ‘An Account of Possibility’.).
  •  17
    Completud
    In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica, Editorial Trotta. pp. 100--102. 2011.
  •  121
    An Actualist's Guide to Quantifying In
    Critica 44 (132): 3-34. 2012.
    I develop a device for simulating quantification over merely possible objects from the perspective of a modal actualist ---someone who thinks that everything that exists actually exists
  •  144
    The seminar is intended as an introduction to vagueness. We'll survey some prominent accounts of vagueness, so that people get a sense of what `accounting for vagueness' is all about, and why it's hard.
  •  76
    Frege's unofficial arithmetic
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (4): 1623-1638. 2002.
    I show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically, I set forth an enriched second-order language L, a sentence A of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have th…Read more
  •  116
    A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2). 2011.
    I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White
  •  445
    Gödel claimed that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is 'what becomes of the theory of types if certain superfluous restrictions are removed'. The aim of this paper is to develop a clearer understanding of Gödel's remark, and of the surrounding philosophical terrain. In connection with this, we discuss some technical issues concerning infinitary type theories and the programme of developing the semantics for higher-order languages in other higher-order languages
  •  65
    Replies to Greco and Turner
    Philosophical Studies 172 (10): 2617-2620. 2015.
    Dan Greco and Jason Turner wrote two fantastic critiques of my book, The Construction of Logical Space. Greco’s critique suggests that the book can be given a Kuhnian interpretation, with a Carnapian twist. Here I embrace that interpretation. Turner criticizes one of the views I develop in the book. Here I identify an avenue of resistance
  •  29
    Ontological Commitment1
    Philosophy Compass 2 (3): 428-444. 2007.
    I propose a way of thinking about content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment.
  •  243
    Essence Without Fundamentality
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3): 349-363. 2015.
    I argue for a conception of essence that does not rely on distinctions of metaphysical fundamentality.
  •  134
    I develop an account of the sorts of considerations that should go into determining where the limits of possibility lie. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘Ontological Commitment’ and ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying-In’.).