Marguerite Deslauriers

One of the most influential works in the history of political theory, Aristotle's Politics is a treatise in practical philosophy, intended to inform legislators and to create the conditions for virtuous and self-sufficient lives for the citizens of a state. In this Companion, distinguished scholars offer new perspectives on the work and its themes. After an opening exploration of the relation between Aristotle's ethics and his politics, the central chapters follow the sequence of the eight books of the Politics, taking up questions such as the role of reason in legitimizing rule, the common good, justice, slavery, private property, citizenship, democracy and deliberation, unity, conflict, law and authority, and education. The closing chapters discuss the interaction between Aristotle's political thought and contemporary democratic theory. The volume will provide a valuable resource for those studying ancient philosophy, classics, and the history of political thought.

This paper considers the distinctions Aristotle draws (1) between the intellectual virtue of "phronêsis" and the moral virtues and (2) among the moral virtues, in light of his commitment to the reciprocity of the virtues. I argue that Aristotle takes the intellectual virtues to be numerically distinct hexeis from the moral virtues. By contrast, I argue, he treats the moral virtues as numerically one hexis, although he allows that they are many hexeis 'in being'. The paper has three parts. In the first, I set out Aristotle's account of the structure of the faculties of the soul, and determine that desire is a distinct faculty. The rationality of a desire is not then a question of whether or not the faculty that produces that desire is rational, but rather a question of whether or not the object of the desire is good. In the second section I show that the reciprocity of "phronêsis" and the moral virtues requires this structure of the faculties. In the third section I show that the way in which Aristotle distinguishes the faculties requires that we individuate moral virtues according to the objects of the desires that enter into a given virtue, and with reference to the circumstances in which these desires are generated. I then explore what it might mean for the moral virtues to be different in being but not in number, given the way in which the moral virtues are individuated. I argue that Aristotle takes "phronêsis" and the political art to be a numerical unity in a particular way, and that he suggests that the moral virtues are, by analogy, the same kind of unity.

Aristotle discusses character in four contexts: ethics, poetic theory, the study of rhetoric and zoology. What he means by character is different in each of these cases, but not radically different. He always uses it as a device to explain actions or behavioural patterns: in animals, in people, and in fictional people. The similarities between the character exhibited by different species, moral character, and tragic character have gone unexamined. As a result, the notion of character as explanatory, and the possibilities and limitations of explanation by means of character are still undetermined.

Aristotle is presented, in this introduction to his work, as a scientist and a philosopher of science. This view is developed through the structure of the book, which emphasizes Aristotle's methodological concerns as a scientist, and through the no-nonsense interpretation of Aristotle's thought that it offers. Barnes particularly wants to impress on the reader the range of Aristotle's interests. He stresses that it is the empirical foundation of almost all the treatises that gives unity to their diversity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 126.3 (2005) 458-460 [Access article in PDF] Robert Mayhew. The Female in Aristotle's Biology: Reason or Rationalization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. xii + 136 pp. Cloth, $28. Aristotle says quite a lot about sexual difference and the characteristics of male and female in his biological works, especially the Generation of Animals. He is interested in the purpose of sexual difference in those animal species that display it, because he knows that many plants and some animals are not sexually differentiated and hence that sexual difference is not necessary for generation. He distinguishes between the principles that are male and female and the animals that have these principles. He defines male and female according to whether they generate in themselves or in another and explains that this ability depends on whether they are able to concoct semen from the ultimate nutriment (), which depends in turn on an ability to heat the blood. He discusses the generative organs of male and female, the contributions each makes to the process of generation, and the factors that determine whether a given animal offspring will be male or female. In all of this, he considers the views of his predecessors and tries both to salvage what he believes to be correct and explain his rejection of many claims. At the same time, Aristotle is working out his views on the relation between matter, form, and final causation, and on natural substances and the transmission of form. There is a lot going on in the discussions of sex and its operations in the biological works, but relatively little attention has been paid to it in the philosophical literature. For these reasons a book on the subject of the female in Aristotle's biology is a welcome contribution.Mayhew treats a range of issues in separate chapters: sexual difference in bees and wasps, the contributions of male and female parents to conception, the analogy drawn between eunuchs and females, Aristotle's scattered comments about anatomical differences (other than in generative organs) between male and female, and differences in character that might be based on biological differences. The discussion of these issues might be interesting, particularly if they could be connected, but Mayhew often fails to bring out what is at stake philosophically in, for example, Aristotle's discussion of the sexes of wasps and bees or in his references to the similarities of eunuchs to women.The argument of the book is directed not so much to the content of what Aristotle says as to the motivation behind his various claims about the female. Mayhew wants to argue that while Aristotle's conception of the female is, in general and in many details, false, it is the product of honest (if mistaken) science and not of misogynist ideological bias (1–2). Each chapter is intended to address two questions. First, what exactly does Aristotle claim? Second, is there any evidence that Aristotle's claim, and the arguments in support of it, are the product of rationalization? (6). Mayhew's answers to the first of these questions are generally accurate and helpful; he cites the important passages, sets them in context, and often says something sensible about how we should interpret them. The second question, about rationalization, is much more problematic.On the one hand, Mayhew sometimes uses it to untangle the complex of [End Page 458] commitments that Aristotle certainly brought to questions of sexual difference: a commitment to observational accuracy, but also to undivided form, to the priority of form over matter, and, doubtless (in my view, although not in Mayhew's), a more or less unreflective commitment to the priority of male over female. In the chapters on entomology and on the contribution of male and female to generation, Mayhew succeeds in distinguishing various scientific and philosophical concerns that lead Aristotle to say what he does, and which are probably sufficient to explain his views without supposing that we have to assume a bias against the female to explain those views.On the other hand, Mayhew construes the question...