George Di Giovanni

Heinz Kimmerle’s dating in 1967 of the Jena writings [“Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften”, Hegel-Studien, 4, 125–176.] which definitely places at 1804–05 the fragment of a Reinschrift on Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature previously thought to belong, on the authority of Rosenkranz, to the earlier Frankfurt period, throws a new light on the development of Hegel’s thought during the crucial Jena years. The fact that, throughout that period, Hegel was so much concerned with the Logic is significant both for an understanding of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and retrospectively, for a proper estimate of the meaning that the Logic must have had for him as early as 1801. Many studies have recently appeared that re-examine both the Phenomenology and the early Logic. Dusing’s latest book follows on their wake. Its main concern is the Logic; it differs greatly, however, from the other recent works on the same subject both in historical and philosophical scope. Rather than concentrating exclusively on the Jena writings, it follows the vicissitudes of Hegel’s conception of the Logic from its pre-history in the Frankfurt period all the way down to the form it finally assumed in 1812–1816. Düsing also makes a definite proposal as to what value the Logic might still have. I shall first give a sketch of the development of the Logic as it appears from Düsing’s reconstruction.

This volume collects for the first time in a single volume all of Kant's writings on religion and rational theology. These works were written during a period of conflict between Kant and the Prussian authorities over his religious teachings. His final statement of religion was made after the death of King Frederick William II in 1797. The historical context and progression of this conflict are charted in the general introduction to the volume and in the translators' introductions to particular texts. All the translations are new with the exception of The Conflict of the Faculties, where the translation has been revised and re-edited to conform to the guidelines of the Cambridge Edition. As is standard with all the volumes in this edition, there are copious linguistic and explanatory notes, and a glossary of key terms.

This translation of The Science of Logic includes the revised Book I, Book II and Book III. Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it entailed a return to Fichte and Kant. In the introduction to the volume, George Di Giovanni presents in synoptic form the results of recent scholarship on the subject, and, while recognizing the fault lines in Hegel's System that allow opposite interpretations, argues that the Logic marks the end of classical metaphysics. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes.

This is an excellent little book. As the title of the series to which it belongs indicates, it is intended as an account of the results of past and present research on Schleiermacher. The book opens with a brief statement of the contemporary relevance of this Romantic philosopher-theologian and of the difficulties of interpretation that his work presents. It then goes on with a detailed history of its reception, from early in the eighteenth century to the present. The history falls, roughly, into three periods. The first, which goes to the middle of the eighteenth century, is characterized by the fact that Idealism is still a living force in Europe. Schleiermacher’s work is then caught up in the general discussion between Hegelians and non-Hegelians—between those who considered his attempt at keeping faith and reason strictly separate as the product of an intellectual standpoint already superseded by history, and those others who thought instead that on the basis of Schleiermacher’s dichotomy, one could build a new and much more vital unity of tension. The second period is marked by a more historically detached attitude. Dilthey is the one who now set the tone. The life and the work of Schleiermacher are studied developmentally, and as examples of the spirit of an age. Dilthey called him the father of “Hermeneutics,” and it is precisely as a practitioner of this new discipline that in the third period he has finally acquired new relevance.

The second biennial meeting of the North American Fichte Society was held at the University of Denver on March 19-23, 1993. Conveners were Daniel Breazeale of the University of Kentucky and Tom Rockmore of Duquesne University. Twenty-one members attended from the United States, Canada, and Switzerland. Sixteen papers were read over four sessions on all aspects of Fichte’s thought and its reception. The local arrangements by Jere Surber were excellent. It was decided to meet again in two years at Lexington, Kentucky, where the topic of discussion will be the 1794-95 Grundlage.

Whether transcendental arguments are possible or not is a question that has received wide attention in the analytical literature of recent years. It is important to distinguish carefully, however, between Kant’s own Transcendental Deduction and the kind of reasoning which has lately been dubbed “transcendental.” Eva Schaper has accurately defined the difference some years ago. The “transcendental arguments” to which we have recently been accustomed are arguments that seek to establish the logical preconditions of empirical enquiry. They all start from the fact that we conceptualize experience in a certain way, and then proceed to uncover the conditions necessary to our process of conceptualization. Kant’s own Transcendental Deduction, on the other hand, is concerned with “the wider task of showing the conditions of what is to count as experience at all.” While it is always possible to render a “transcendental argument” of the contemporary type pointless simply by refusing to accept the peculiar manner of conceptualizing experience from which it starts, the conclusion of Kant’s Deduction would be irrefutable. To deny it would be tantamount to denying the possibility of experience itself. The notorious difficulties that accompany the Deduction are to be seen precisely in the light of the strong claim to proof that it makes.