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Während der siebten Ausgabe der documenta (1982), der Kasseler Weltausstellung für zeitgenössische Kunst, treten die Wissensdomänen Kunst und Politik sowohl miteinander als auch mit der Öffentlichkeit in einen Dialog über Nachhaltigkeit: Joseph Beuys plant die Anpflanzung von 7000 neuen Bäumen im Stadtgebiet als künstlerische Aktion, was auf ein breites Spektrum der Resonanz zwischen Akzeptanz und Ablehnung stößt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeichnet den in Kassel etwa zwischen den Jahren 1981 und 1987 geführten gesellschaftlichen Dialog mithilfe von Textmaterial aus dem documenta archiv nach (darunter Zeitungsartikel, Leser*innenbriefe, Kommunikate von Beuys und seinem Team). Die zu belegende Hypothese ist, dass sich in diesem Austausch kommunikative Muster zeigen, von denen erstens umweltpolitische Diskurse auch gegenwärtig geprägt sind, die aber auch zweitens vor Augen führen können, inwiefern durch die Interaktion zwischen den Domänen Kunst und Politik interdiskursive Möglichkeiten entstehen, umweltpolitisch verantwortliches Handeln nachhaltig in der Gesellschaft zu verankern.

_Time and Narrative_ builds on Paul Ricoeur's earlier analysis, in _The Rule of Metaphor_, of semantic innovation at the level of the sentence. Ricoeur here examines the creation of meaning at the textual level, with narrative rather than metaphor as the ruling concern. Ricoeur finds a "healthy circle" between time and narrative: time is humanized to the extent that it portrays temporal experience. Ricoeur proposes a theoretical model of this circle using Augustine's theory of time and Aristotle's theory of plot and, further, develops an original thesis of the mimetic function of narrative. He concludes with a comprehensive survey and critique of modern discussions of historical knowledge, understanding, and writing from Aron and Mandelbaum in the late 1930s to the work of the Annales school and that of Anglophone philosophers of history of the 1960s and 1970s. "This work, in my view, puts the whole problem of narrative, not to mention philosophy of history, on a new and higher plane of discussion."—Hayden White, _History and Theory _ "Superb.... A fine point of entrance into the work of one of the eminent thinkers of the present intellectual age."—Joseph R. Gusfield, _Contemporary Sociology _.

But is not the word "metaphor" itself a metaphor, the metaphor of a displacement and therefore of a transfer in a kind of space? What is at stake is precisely the necessity of these spatial metaphors about metaphor included in our talk about "figures" of speech. . . . But in order to understand correctly the work of resemblance in metaphor and to introduce the pictorial or ironic moment at the right place, it is necessary briefly to recall the mutation undergone by the theory of metaphor at the level of semantics by contrast with the tradition of classical rhetoric. In this tradition, metaphor was correctly described in terms of deviance, but this deviance was mistakenly ascribed to denomination only. Instead of giving a thing its usual common name, one designates it by means of a borrowed name, a "foreign" name in Aristotle's terminology. The rationale of this transfer of name was understood as the objective similarity between the things themselves or the subjective similarity between the attitudes linked to the grasping of these things. As concerns the goal of this transfer, it was supposed either to fill up a lexical lacuna, and therefore to serve the principle of economy which rules the endeavor of giving appropriate names to new things, new ideas, or new experiences, or to decorate discourse, and therefore to serve the main purpose of rhetorical discourse, which is to persuade and to please. Paul Ricoeur is professor of philosophy at the Université de Paris and John Nuveen Professor at the University of Chicago. He is editor of Revue de métaphysique et de morale and the author of many influential works on phenomenology, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of language. His most recent work to appear in English is The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language. He has also contributed "Narrative Time" to Critical Inquiry

This article presents an edited version of lectures given by Paul Ricœur at Johns Hopkins University in April 1966. Ricœur offers a comparative analysis of Wittgenstein’s and Husserl’s late works, taking the problem of language as the common ground of investigation for these two central figures of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Ricœur develops his study in two parts. The first part considers Husserl’s approach to language after the Logical Investigations and concentrates on Formal and Transcendental Logic ; leaving a transcendental reflection on language behind it re-examines a phenomenological conception, according to which the sphere of logic is not separable from that of experience. The main focus of the second part is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as it moved on from the conception of an isomorphic relation between language and the world, as set out in the picture theory in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , to the more pragmatic notion of a language-game in the Philosophical Investigations . In order to get beyond the irrevocable differences between the two philosophies and the unresolved theoretical issues on both sides, Ricœur suggests turning to a semiological paradigm based on the Saussurean distinction between “language” and “speaking.” Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Husserl, Phenomenology, Semiology, Wittgenstein. Résumé Cet article est une version éditée de conférences données par Paul Ricœur à la Johns Hopkins University en avril 1966. Ricœur propose une analyse comparée des dernières œuvres de Wittgenstein et Husserl, avec le problème du langage comme sol commun d’investigations pour ces deux figures centrales de la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique. Cette analyse de Ricœur se joue à travers deux parties. La première partie revient sur l'approche du langage chez Husserl depuis Recherches logiques avec une attention particulière aux développements de Logique formelle et logique transcendantale ; dans le cadre d’une réflexion transcendantale sur le langage il revient sur une conception phénoménologique selon laquelle, le domaine du logique n’est pas séparable de celui de l'expérience. La deuxième partie se concentre principalement sur la dernière philosophie de Wittgenstein alors qu’il s'est départi de l’idée d’une relation isomorphique entre le langage et le monde telle que posée par la théorie du tableau dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus , pour s’engager vers la notion plus pragmatique de jeu de langage dans les Investigations philosophiques . Afin de surmonter les différences irrémédiables entre les deux philosophies et, dans une certaine mesure, certains des problèmes théoriques non résolus depuis les deux bords, Ricœur fait finalement référence à un paradigme sémiologique et à la distinction saussurienne entre “langue” et “parole.” Mots-clés: Husserl, phénoménologie, sémiologie, philosophie analytique, Wittgenstein

Why does one say today that the hermeneutic problem begins with Schleiermacher? Is there not a Christian hermeneutic which from the time of the early church has sought to place the figures of the New Testament in an interpretative relation with the figures of the Old Testament? Is hermeneutical reflection also not in evidence in the Church Fathers? What of the theory of the “Four Senses of Scripture” from the medieval period, as has been so magnificently reconstructed by Henri de Lubac? And was there not an ongoing hermeneutical debate at the time of the Reformation, the Protestant Reformation linking together the theological axiom “sola fide” and the hermeneutical axiom “sola scriptura,” the Counter-Reformation opposing this with the correlating of exegesis, tradition, and the magisterium?