R Paul

Four currently widely used definitions of the term "probability" are examined. This paper then adopts the classical definition. Kolmogorov complexity, as developed by Martin-Lof, and the concept of chaos, as used in the theory of dynamical systems and in fractal theory, are used to define the terms "random" and "equally likely". The sampling apparatus is required to operate in an equally likely manner from a bounded subset of a space of initial conditions. It is shown that this definition successfully withstands the objections of von Mises and his followers. ;Under this definition probability is objective. In order to promote clarity in communication, following Carnap and others, a different term is chosen to denote the subjective quantities of interest in this paper. The term chosen is "confidence". Type I Confidence and Type II Confidence are defined and described. ;As examples, calculationally convenient formulas for Type II Confidence are derived for the reliability application. The distinction between Type II Confidence and Bayesian posterior probability is emphasized

Views of the self may be plotted on a set of coordinates. On the axis that runs from fragmentation to unity, Rorty and Rorty's Freud champion the decentered self while Wallwork, Taylor, and Ricoeur argue for a sovereign, unified self. On the other axis, which runs from the disengaged, inward-turning self to the engaged and "sedimented" self, Wallwork, would be positioned near Rorty, defending self-creation against the narrative identity affirmed by Taylor and Ricoeur. Despite his skepticism concerning the communitarian agenda of the narrativists, Flanagan grants that the self is social and relational--a position further explored by Oliver, Stendahl, Deutsch, and Mack in "Selves, People, and Persons"