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1165A Short Refutation of Strict Normative EvidentialismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5): 1-9. 2014.This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
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776Metaethics for EveryoneProblema 4 39-64. 2010.As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in th…Read more
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50Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2015.John Broome has made major contributions to, and radical innovations in, contemporary moral philosophy. His research combines the formal method of economics with the philosophical analysis. Broome's works stretch over formal axiology, decision theory, philosophy of economics, population axiology, the value of life, the ethics of climate change, the nature of rationality, and practical and theoretical reasoning. Weighing and Reasoning brings together fifteen original essays from leading philosoph…Read more
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361John BroomeIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 2015.A short encyclopaedia entry on John Broome
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332Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for beliefPhilosophical Studies 138 (1). 2008.In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
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1127Evidentialism and the Numbers GameTheoria 73 (4): 304-316. 2007.In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.
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213Prima Facie and Pro Tanto OughtsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.There are many uses in English of the word “ought” (see Ought). This essay concerns the normative uses and the concepts or properties denoted thereby. In particular, it concerns two nonfinal oughts commonly used in the philosophical literature: prima facie oughts and pro tanto oughts.
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630Book Review: The Domain of Reasons (review)Philosophical Review 122 (4): 661-664. 2013.A review of John Skorupski's The Domain of Reasons
Areas of Specialization
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Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normativity |
Epistemic Normativity |
Normativity, Misc |
Doxastic Voluntarism |
Epistemic Normativity, Misc |
Ethics of Belief |
Theories of Value |
Axiology |