•  15
    Blind Reasoning
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1): 225-248. 2003.
  •  139
    Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith
    Analysis 76 (1): 41-54. 2016.
    Hilary Kornblith’s book is motivated by the conviction that philosophers have tended to overvalue and overemphasize reflection in their accounts of central philosophical phenomena. He seeks to pinpoint this tendency and to correct it. Kornblith’s claim is not without precedent. It is an oft-repeated theme of 20th-century philosophy that philosophers have tended to give ‘overly intellectualized’ accounts of important phenomena. One thinks here of Wittgenstein, Ryle and many others. One version of…Read more
  •  945
    What is inference?
    Philosophical Studies 169 (1): 1-18. 2014.
  •  1
    The Sokal Hoax
    In Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press. 1999.
  •  46
    I—Paul Boghossian
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 225-248. 2003.
  •  469
    Seeking The Real
    Philosophical Studies 108 (1): 223-238. 2002.
    A critical discussion of Barry Stroud's claim, in his book "The Quest for Reality", that we could never rationally arrive at the conclusion that, for example, the world is not really colored.
  •  1006
    Epistemic Rules
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (9): 472-500. 2008.
  •  32
  •  327
    What the externalist can know A Priori
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2): 161-75. 1997.
    Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not me…Read more
  •  168
    Précis of Fear of Knowledge
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3): 377-378. 2008.
    Fear of Knowledge was in many ways an exercise in foolhardiness. It was to be a short book, accessible to the general reader, that would treat some of the trickiest issues in the foundations theory of knowledge, but that would nevertheless not seriously shortchange the subtleties that they involve. Someone should have warned me
  •  392
    The transparency of mental content revisited (review)
    Philosophical Studies 155 (3): 457-465. 2011.
  •  13
    Knowledge of Logic
    In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, . 2000.
  •  126
    The Perception of Music: Comments on Peacocke: Articles
    British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1): 71-76. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  215
    Inference and insight (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.
    All of us are disposed to reason according to the rule of inference modus ponens : from.
  •  160
    Externalism and inference
    Philosophical Issues 2 11-28. 1992.
  •  46
    Reply to Schiffer
    Philosophical Issues 2 39-42. 1992.