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302In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was on for a…Read more
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168What’s Wrong With Reliabilism?The Monist 68 (2): 188-202. 1985.An increasing number of epistmeologists claim that having beliefs which are reliable is a prerequisite of having epistemically rational beliefs. Alvin Goldman, for instance, defends a view he calls “historical reliabilism.” According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition p only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. Goldman adds that a proposition p is epistemically rational for 5, whether or not it is believed by him, only if there is available to S a reliab…Read more
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Chapter 10. The Value of True BeliefIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 59-64. 2012.
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244The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of BeliefAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2). 1992.
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3Chapter 19. Misleading DefeatersIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-98. 2012.
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4Chapter 4. Intuitions about KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 12-18. 2012.
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22Chisholm and coherencePhilosophical Studies 38 (1). 1980.It is generally conceded that a principle of coherence is needed to give a complete account of justification. Even the most prominent foundationalists of this century have included coherence principles among those epistemic principles which they defend. Against this prevailing view, I suggest that a principle of coherence is not needed in order to give an adequate account of justification. However, Instead of arguing directly for this claim, I defend the only slightly less controversial claim th…Read more
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132Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always invo…Read more
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95In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justifie…Read more
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129Universal Intellectual TrustEpisteme 2 (1): 5-12. 2005.All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We acquire opinions from family …Read more
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2Chapter 13. Reverse Lottery StoriesIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 73-77. 2012.
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Chapter 8. Knowledge BlocksIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 46-50. 2012.
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3Rationality and intellectual self-trustIn William Ramsey & Michael R. DePaul (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56. 1998.
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107Conceptual diversity in epistemologyIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 177--203. 2002.In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction…Read more
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87Inferential Justification and the Infinite RegressAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4). 1978.It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examin…Read more
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421Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean ThesisIn Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief, Springer. pp. 37-47. 2009.What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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77Is it Possible to have Contradictory Beliefs?Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 327-355. 1986.
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Chapter 11. The Value of KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 65-69. 2012.
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132A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments o…Read more
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Chapter 18. Instability and KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 91-94. 2012.
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Chapter 20. Believing That I Don’t KnowIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-101. 2012.
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115Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible BeliefThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 181-188. 2000.Descartes, and many of the other great epistemologists of the modern period, looked to epistemology to put science and intellectual inquiry generally on a secure foundation. Epistemology’s role was to provide assurances of the reliability of properly conducted inquiry. Indeed, its role was nothing less than to be czar of the sciences and of intellectual inquiry in general. This conception of epistemology is now almost universally regarded as overly grandiose. Nonetheless, Descartes and the other…Read more