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2Chapter 14. Lucky KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 78-80. 2012.
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1Chapter 26. Epistemology within a General Theory of RationalityIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 124-133. 2012.
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199Justified belief as responsible beliefIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 313--26. 2013.
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44. epistemically rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism1In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 458. 2003.
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1Chapter 23. A Priori KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-112. 2012.
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28The Thinking Self (review)Review of Metaphysics 42 (2): 407-408. 1988.This book is the final installment of Rosenberg's Kantian trilogy. Each of the three books constitutes a rethinking of some aspect of the Kantian idea that the self and the world are correlative. The first book, Linguistic Representation, put forth an account of the activity of representation. The second, One World and Our Knowledge of It, contained an account of the notion of an objective world. This third book works out an account of the self as a self-conscious subject of experience.
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3Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 6-8. 2012.
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23Realism with a Human Face (review)Review of Metaphysics 45 (1): 143-144. 1991.This is a collection of recent essays by Hilary Putnam on value theory, metaphysics, and American philosophy. It is the first of two volumes. The forthcoming volume will contain Putnam's essays on the history of non-American philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.
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Chapter 21. Introspective KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 102-105. 2012.
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4Chapter 15. Closure and SkepticismIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 81-85. 2012.
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65How should future opinion affect current opinion?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
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57What’s Wrong With Reliabilism?The Monist 68 (2): 188-202. 1985.An increasing number of epistmeologists claim that having beliefs which are reliable is a prerequisite of having epistemically rational beliefs. Alvin Goldman, for instance, defends a view he calls “historical reliabilism.” According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition p only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. Goldman adds that a proposition p is epistemically rational for 5, whether or not it is believed by him, only if there is available to S a reliab…Read more
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75An epistemology that mattersIn Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame Press. 2008.The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter
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Chapter 10. The Value of True BeliefIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 59-64. 2012.
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246The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of BeliefAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2). 1992.
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Chapter 6. Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive BeliefsIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 32-40. 2012.
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Chapter 17. Fixedness and KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 88-90. 2012.
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135Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always invo…Read more
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Chapter 25. A Look BackIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 121-123. 2012.
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95In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justifie…Read more
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133Universal Intellectual TrustEpisteme 2 (1): 5-12. 2005.All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We acquire opinions from family …Read more
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2Chapter 22. Perceptual KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 106-109. 2012.