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62``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic"American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2): 113-124. 1984.
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2Chapter 12. The Lottery and PrefaceIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 70-72. 2012.
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91Reply to Van InwagenAnalysis 40 (March): 101-103. 1980.I reply to professor vaninwagen's comment on an earlier paper of mine ("analysis", March 1979), In which I argue that compatibilists are not committed to accepting the claim that people might have control over the past
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Chapter 18. Instability and KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 91-94. 2012.
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Chapter 20. Believing That I Don’t KnowIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-101. 2012.
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97Fumerton’s PuzzleJournal of Philosophical Research 15 109-113. 1990.There is a puzzle that is faced by every philosophical account of rational belief, rational strategy, rational planning or whatever. I describe this puzzle, examine Richard Fumerton’s proposed solution to it and then go on to sketch my own preferred solution.
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2Chapter 9. The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified BeliefIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 51-56. 2012.
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2Chapter 14. Lucky KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 78-80. 2012.
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1Chapter 26. Epistemology within a General Theory of RationalityIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 124-133. 2012.
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199Justified belief as responsible beliefIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 313--26. 2013.
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1Chapter 23. A Priori KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-112. 2012.
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44. epistemically rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism1In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 458. 2003.
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28The Thinking Self (review)Review of Metaphysics 42 (2): 407-408. 1988.This book is the final installment of Rosenberg's Kantian trilogy. Each of the three books constitutes a rethinking of some aspect of the Kantian idea that the self and the world are correlative. The first book, Linguistic Representation, put forth an account of the activity of representation. The second, One World and Our Knowledge of It, contained an account of the notion of an objective world. This third book works out an account of the self as a self-conscious subject of experience.
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23Realism with a Human Face (review)Review of Metaphysics 45 (1): 143-144. 1991.This is a collection of recent essays by Hilary Putnam on value theory, metaphysics, and American philosophy. It is the first of two volumes. The forthcoming volume will contain Putnam's essays on the history of non-American philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.
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3Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 6-8. 2012.
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Chapter 21. Introspective KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 102-105. 2012.
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4Chapter 15. Closure and SkepticismIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 81-85. 2012.
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65How should future opinion affect current opinion?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
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57What’s Wrong With Reliabilism?The Monist 68 (2): 188-202. 1985.An increasing number of epistmeologists claim that having beliefs which are reliable is a prerequisite of having epistemically rational beliefs. Alvin Goldman, for instance, defends a view he calls “historical reliabilism.” According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition p only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. Goldman adds that a proposition p is epistemically rational for 5, whether or not it is believed by him, only if there is available to S a reliab…Read more
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75An epistemology that mattersIn Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame Press. 2008.The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter