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Richard Foley

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    72
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  •  Events
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
  • All publications (72)
  •  117
    What’s to Be Said for Simplicity?
    Philosophical Issues 3 209-224. 1993.
    Simplicity and ParsimonyTheoretical Virtues, Misc
  • Chapter 11. The Value of Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 65-69. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  120
    The epistemology of Sosa
    Philosophical Issues 5 1-14. 1994.
    Virtue EpistemologyEpistemic Virtues
  • Chapter 8. Knowledge Blocks
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 46-50. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  • Chapter 25. A Look Back
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 121-123. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  169
    Rationality, belief and commitment
    Synthese 89 (3). 1991.
    Rationality
  •  147
    Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress
    American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4). 1978.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examin…Read more
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine and criticize several seemingly plausible ways of showing that regresses of inferential justification are impossible and then propose two requirements of inferential justification which, I argue, Are sufficient to show the impossibility
    Epistemic Regress
  •  322
    ``Evidence and Reasons for Belief"
    Analysis 51 (2): 98-102. 1991.
    ReasonsEthics of Belief
  •  61
    The Thinking Self
    Review of Metaphysics 42 (2): 407-408. 1988.
    This book is the final installment of Rosenberg's Kantian trilogy. Each of the three books constitutes a rethinking of some aspect of the Kantian idea that the self and the world are correlative. The first book, Linguistic Representation, put forth an account of the activity of representation. The second, One World and Our Knowledge of It, contained an account of the notion of an objective world. This third book works out an account of the self as a self-conscious subject of experience.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyMental States and ProcessesPhilosophy of ConsciousnessThought and Thinki…Read more
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyMental States and ProcessesPhilosophy of ConsciousnessThought and ThinkingCritical Thinking
  •  115
    Can metaphysics solve the problem of skepticism?
    Philosophical Issues 2 131-147. 1992.
    Replies to Skepticism, Misc
  •  1
    Chapter 26. Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 124-133. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  53
    Realism with a Human Face
    Review of Metaphysics 45 (1): 143-143. 1991.
    This is a collection of recent essays by Hilary Putnam on value theory, metaphysics, and American philosophy. It is the first of two volumes. The forthcoming volume will contain Putnam's essays on the history of non-American philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyRealism and Anti-Realism
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