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Richard Foley

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    72
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
  • All publications (72)
  •  298
    Justified belief as responsible belief
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 313--26. 2013.
    Justification, Misc
  •  115
    ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic"
    American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2): 113-124. 1984.
    Epistemic LuckEpistemic Normativity
  •  123
    When is True Belief Knowledge?
    Princeton University Press. 2012.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  • Chapter 10. The Value of True Belief
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 59-64. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  203
    Three attempts to refute skepticism and why they fail
    In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. 2003.
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and …Read more
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and other sensory inputs that you have in this world. As a result, your opinions about your immediate environment are the same as they are in this world. You have the same beliefs about your recent activities, your current physical appearance, your present job, and so on, but in fact you are a brain in a vat tucked away in a corner of a laboratory. Thus, in the brain-in-a-vat world, your beliefs about these everyday matters are mistaken, and mistaken not just in detail, but deeply mistaken.
    Brains in Vats
  •  4
    Chapter 4. Intuitions about Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 12-18. 2012.
    Epistemology of Intuition
  •  1
    Chapter 23. A Priori Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-112. 2012.
    The A Priori
  •  3
    Rationality and intellectual self-trust
    In Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56. 1998.
    Social EpistemologyMoral States and Processes
  •  187
    How should future opinion affect current opinion?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
    Formal EpistemologySocial Epistemology
  • Evidence as a Tracking Relation,'
    In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 119. 1987.
    Epistemological States and PropertiesSafety and Sensitivity
  •  73
    The Purely Epistemic
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (11): 718-718. 1982.
    RationalityEpistemic Normativity
  •  3
    Chapter 19. Misleading Defeaters
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-98. 2012.
    Defeat
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