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86On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic RationalityThe Theory of Epistemic RationalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1): 159. 1989.
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77Is it Possible to have Contradictory Beliefs?Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 327-355. 1986.
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76When is True Belief Knowledge?Princeton University Press. 2012.Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
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75An epistemology that mattersIn Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame Press. 2008.The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter
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66Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo's Reversal in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume Studies 32 (1): 83-112. 2006.Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skeptic…Read more
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63How should future opinion affect current opinion?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
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62``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic"American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2): 113-124. 1984.
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57Epistemic rationality and scientific rationalityInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (2). 1987.No abstract
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28The Thinking Self (review)Review of Metaphysics 42 (2): 407-408. 1988.This book is the final installment of Rosenberg's Kantian trilogy. Each of the three books constitutes a rethinking of some aspect of the Kantian idea that the self and the world are correlative. The first book, Linguistic Representation, put forth an account of the activity of representation. The second, One World and Our Knowledge of It, contained an account of the notion of an objective world. This third book works out an account of the self as a self-conscious subject of experience.
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23Realism with a Human Face (review)Review of Metaphysics 45 (1): 143-144. 1991.This is a collection of recent essays by Hilary Putnam on value theory, metaphysics, and American philosophy. It is the first of two volumes. The forthcoming volume will contain Putnam's essays on the history of non-American philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.
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22Chisholm and coherencePhilosophical Studies 38 (1). 1980.It is generally conceded that a principle of coherence is needed to give a complete account of justification. Even the most prominent foundationalists of this century have included coherence principles among those epistemic principles which they defend. Against this prevailing view, I suggest that a principle of coherence is not needed in order to give an adequate account of justification. However, Instead of arguing directly for this claim, I defend the only slightly less controversial claim th…Read more
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21Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyPhilosophical Review 104 (1): 141. 1995.
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5Chapter 24. Collective KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 113-118. 2012.