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Richard Foley

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    72
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  •  Events
    2
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    8

 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
  • All publications (72)
  •  3
    Rationality and intellectual self-trust
    In Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56. 1998.
    Social EpistemologyMoral States and Processes
  •  187
    How should future opinion affect current opinion?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
    Formal EpistemologySocial Epistemology
  • Evidence as a Tracking Relation,'
    In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 119. 1987.
    Epistemological States and PropertiesSafety and Sensitivity
  •  3
    Chapter 19. Misleading Defeaters
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-98. 2012.
    Defeat
  •  73
    The Purely Epistemic
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (11): 718-718. 1982.
    RationalityEpistemic Normativity
  •  217
    Conceptual diversity in epistemology
    In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oup Usa. pp. 177--203. 2002.
    In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction…Read more
    In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction between “rationality” and “rationality all things considered.” Foley proposes how these concepts can work together in a system that “provides the necessary materials for an approach to epistemology that is clarifying, theoretically respectable, and relevant to our actual lives.”
    Rationality
  •  193
    Reply to Van Inwagen
    Analysis 40 (March): 101-103. 1980.
    I reply to professor vaninwagen's comment on an earlier paper of mine ("analysis", March 1979), In which I argue that compatibilists are not committed to accepting the claim that people might have control over the past
    IncompatibilismCompatibilism
  •  132
    An epistemology that matters
    In Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame Press. 2008.
    The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter
    Epistemic ValueRationality
  •  151
    ``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs"
    American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4): 247-257. 1979.
    Epistemic ParadoxesJustification
  • 44. epistemically rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism1
    In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 458. 2003.
    Epistemological States and PropertiesBelief
  • Chapter 11. The Value of Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 65-69. 2012.
    Epistemological States and Properties
  •  117
    What’s to Be Said for Simplicity?
    Philosophical Issues 3 209-224. 1993.
    Simplicity and ParsimonyTheoretical Virtues, Misc
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