•  24
    Chisholm and coherence
    Philosophical Studies 38 (1). 1980.
    It is generally conceded that a principle of coherence is needed to give a complete account of justification. Even the most prominent foundationalists of this century have included coherence principles among those epistemic principles which they defend. Against this prevailing view, I suggest that a principle of coherence is not needed in order to give an adequate account of justification. However, Instead of arguing directly for this claim, I defend the only slightly less controversial claim th…Read more
  •  135
    Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always invo…Read more
  •  133
    Universal Intellectual Trust
    Episteme 2 (1): 5-12. 2005.
    All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We acquire opinions from family …Read more
  •  95
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justifie…Read more
  •  2
    Chapter 13. Reverse Lottery Stories
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 73-77. 2012.
  • Sosa's Epistemology
    Philosophical Issues 5 42-58. 1994.
  •  107
    Conceptual diversity in epistemology
    In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 177--203. 2002.
    In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction…Read more
  •  88
    Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress
    American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4). 1978.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examin…Read more
  •  77
    Is it Possible to have Contradictory Beliefs?
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 327-355. 1986.
  •  426
    Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
    In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief, Springer. pp. 37-47. 2009.
    What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
  •  79
    Epistemic indolence
    Mind 91 (361): 38-56. 1982.
  •  132
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments o…Read more
  •  8
    Reply to Alston, Feldman and Swain
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1). 1989.
  •  6
  • Chapter 20. Believing That I Don’t Know
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 99-101. 2012.
  •  119
    Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 181-188. 2000.
    Descartes, and many of the other great epistemologists of the modern period, looked to epistemology to put science and intellectual inquiry generally on a secure foundation. Epistemology’s role was to provide assurances of the reliability of properly conducted inquiry. Indeed, its role was nothing less than to be czar of the sciences and of intellectual inquiry in general. This conception of epistemology is now almost universally regarded as overly grandiose. Nonetheless, Descartes and the other…Read more
  •  76
    When is True Belief Knowledge?
    Princeton University Press. 2012.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
  •  116
    One of the advantages of classical foundationalism was that it was thought to provide a refutation of skeptical worries, which raise the specter that our beliefs might be extensively mistaken. The most extreme versions of these worries are expressed in familiar thought experiments such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, which imagines a world in which, unbeknownst to you, your brain is in a vat hooked up to equipment programmed to provide it with precisely the same visual, auditory, tactile, and …Read more
  •  1
    Chapter 7. The Beetle in the Box
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 41-45. 2012.
  •  2
    Chapter 14. Lucky Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 78-80. 2012.
  •  34
  •  117
    Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
    Cambridge University Press. 2001.
    To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the ques…Read more
  •  1
    Chapter 23. A Priori Knowledge
    In When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-112. 2012.