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28The Thinking Self (review)Review of Metaphysics 42 (2): 407-408. 1988.This book is the final installment of Rosenberg's Kantian trilogy. Each of the three books constitutes a rethinking of some aspect of the Kantian idea that the self and the world are correlative. The first book, Linguistic Representation, put forth an account of the activity of representation. The second, One World and Our Knowledge of It, contained an account of the notion of an objective world. This third book works out an account of the self as a self-conscious subject of experience.
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23Realism with a Human Face (review)Review of Metaphysics 45 (1): 143-144. 1991.This is a collection of recent essays by Hilary Putnam on value theory, metaphysics, and American philosophy. It is the first of two volumes. The forthcoming volume will contain Putnam's essays on the history of non-American philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and language.
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2Chapter 22. Perceptual KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 106-109. 2012.
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Chapter 3. Knowledge StoriesIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 9-11. 2012.
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63How should future opinion affect current opinion?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 747-766. 1994.
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5Chapter 24. Collective KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 113-118. 2012.
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168What’s Wrong With Reliabilism?The Monist 68 (2): 188-202. 1985.An increasing number of epistmeologists claim that having beliefs which are reliable is a prerequisite of having epistemically rational beliefs. Alvin Goldman, for instance, defends a view he calls “historical reliabilism.” According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition p only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. Goldman adds that a proposition p is epistemically rational for 5, whether or not it is believed by him, only if there is available to S a reliab…Read more
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302In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was on for a…Read more
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Chapter 10. The Value of True BeliefIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 59-64. 2012.
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245The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of BeliefAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2). 1992.
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3Chapter 19. Misleading DefeatersIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 95-98. 2012.
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4Chapter 4. Intuitions about KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 12-18. 2012.
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132Part of the appeal of classical foundationalism was that it purported to provide a definitive refutation of skepticism. With the fall of foundationalism, we can no longer pretend that such a refutation is possible. We must instead acknowledge that skeptical worries cannot be completely banished and that, thus, inquiry always involves an element of risk which cannot be eliminated by further inquiry, whether it be scientific or philosophical. The flip side of this point is that inquiry always invo…Read more
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22Chisholm and coherencePhilosophical Studies 38 (1). 1980.It is generally conceded that a principle of coherence is needed to give a complete account of justification. Even the most prominent foundationalists of this century have included coherence principles among those epistemic principles which they defend. Against this prevailing view, I suggest that a principle of coherence is not needed in order to give an adequate account of justification. However, Instead of arguing directly for this claim, I defend the only slightly less controversial claim th…Read more
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95In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justifie…Read more
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129Universal Intellectual TrustEpisteme 2 (1): 5-12. 2005.All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We acquire opinions from family …Read more
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2Chapter 13. Reverse Lottery StoriesIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 73-77. 2012.
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3Rationality and intellectual self-trustIn William Ramsey & Michael R. DePaul (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56. 1998.
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Chapter 8. Knowledge BlocksIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 46-50. 2012.
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87Inferential Justification and the Infinite RegressAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4). 1978.It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examin…Read more
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107Conceptual diversity in epistemologyIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 177--203. 2002.In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction…Read more
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77Is it Possible to have Contradictory Beliefs?Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 327-355. 1986.
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423Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean ThesisIn Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief, Springer. pp. 37-47. 2009.What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.