Don Garrett

Featuring more than 150 articles by more than 70 leading scholars, this is the first encyclopedia devoted to empiricism. The _Encyclopedia of Empiricism_ serves four main purposes. First, it provides a convenient source for scholars and students seeking information on particular figures, topics, or doctrines, specifically in their relation to empiricism as an historical movement or to empiricism as a broader tendency of thought. Because each entry contains a brief bibliography of primary and secondary sources, it can usefully serve as a point of first reference. Second, the _Encyclopedia_ illustrates the continuity and logical development of the Empiricist movement by examining, within topical articles, the contributions of a number of different philosophers related to the statement and solution of particular issues. Third, it explicates the relations, both logical and historical, between empiricism as a movement of the 17th and 18th centuries and the various species of empiricism that preceded and succeeded it. Finally, the _Encyclopedia_ explores some of the most important intellectual influences on empiricism as a methodology of thought. Outstanding Academic Book.

Berkeley and Hume share a commitment to the existence of extended ideas or perceptions. This essay first examines how Berkeley and Hume differ from such predecessors as Descartes and Locke in this respect and then focuses on the nature and consequences of one problem that their distinctive shared view raises: namely, how one mind can include both extended and unextended beings. Hume does not ultimately solve this problem to his own satisfaction. Berkeley’s original and distinctive theory of immaterial substantial souls addresses the problem in a way that Hume might well have rejected upon examination but never, it seems, directly addressed.

This chapter seeks to establish that Spinoza accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations; that in two important respects, Leibniz's view of teleology is not more, and perhaps even less, Aristotleian than Descartes's; and that among Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, it is Spinoza who holds the view of teleology closest to that of Aristotle. The arguments for derive from examinations of Spinoza's doctrine of conatus, critical analysis of Jonathan Bennett's proposed grounds for interpreting Spinoza as denying all teleology, and the application of Spinoza's distinction of three kinds of knowledge to the distinction between mechanistic and teleological explanation. The arguments for and are based on an examination of the answers given by Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza to four basic questions about the nature and range of teleology and teleological explanation. These questions concern the dependence of teleology on thought, the relation of teleology to divine will or purpose, the existence of “sub‐human” teleology, and the role of teleological explanation in natural philosophy.

This essay contends that Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine does not commit any of the five fallacies of equivocation. The key to a better understanding of his argument lies in a Spinoza’s “theory of inherence” — that is, his theory of what it is to be “in” something. Spinoza’s conatus argument is a valid demonstration from Spinozistic premises about inherence, conception, causation, and related matters. These premises reflect his deep commitment to a rigorous Principle of Sufficient Reason, to a conception of things as causing their own properties through their essences, and to a closely-related conception of causation as identical with or parallel to logical consequence.

David Hume’s “Title Principle,” as it has come to be called, is a specification of the normative scope of reason: “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us.” This chapter seeks to answer four central questions about the principle. First, what does Hume mean by “reason” in it? Second, what particular kinds of beliefs does it mandate or disallow? Third, what kind of normativity is expressed by its use of “ought”? Fourth, can it permit Hume properly to overcome—if only to some extent—the “doubts,” “contradictions and imperfections,” and “objections” concerning the use of reason that he describes prior to stating the principle? The chapter concludes with brief reflections on the significance for contemporary epistemology of Hume’s use of the Title Principle.

It is an honor to receive such extensive comments from Louis Loeb, whose work I admire and from whom I have learned much. In particular, his landmark 2002 book, Stability and Justification in Hume’s “Treatise” and his 2010 collection of essays, Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid are essential reading for anyone who wants to understand early modern epistemology. Some of what I have learned from him is reflected in the book on which he is now commenting which is not, of course, to say that he approves of all of the uses I make of his work, nor that I agree...

Beginning with an overview of Hume's life and work, Don Garrett introduces in clear and accessible style the central aspects of Hume's thought. These include Hume's lifelong exploration of the human mind; his theories of inductive inference and causation; skepticism and personal identity; moral and political philosophy; aesthetics; and philosophy of religion. The final chapter considers the influence and legacy of Hume's thought today. Throughout, Garrett draws on and explains many of Hume's central works, including his Treatise of Human Nature , Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding , and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Hume is essential reading not only for students of philosophy, but anyone in the humanities and social sciences and beyond seeking an introduction to Hume's thought.

Michael Della Rocca’s marvelous book is devoted to Spinoza’s treatment of two topics—mental representation and the relation of mind to body—that are central to much of Spinoza’s philosophy. Della Rocca has clearly read Spinoza with extraordinary care, sensitivity, and insight. His writing is remarkably lucid, his argumentation is almost always compelling, and his care in spelling out exactly what he thinks does and does not follow—both from Spinoza’s philosophical arguments and from his own interpretive ones—is exemplary. The result is a book that does not merely add one more “new interpretation” of Spinoza to those already in existence on various issues in the philosophy of mind. Rather, it is a book that definitely establishes an impressive number of the interpretive theses for which it argues, thereby illuminating a wide range of previously murky areas in Spinoza’s philosophy—including many that extend far beyond his philosophy of mind. In doing so, it genuinely advances our understanding of Spinoza to an extent matched by only a very few previous works on this great but difficult philosopher. For this reason, it deserves to be counted among the most important and valuable books ever written on Spinoza.

P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting—like Hume's Treatise itself—of three excellent parts. I will comment on one central aspect of its second part: its explanation of the source of the second thoughts that Hume famously expressed, with a frustrating lack of specificity, about his own initial discussion of personal identity in the Treatise.As is well known, Hume holds in the section "Of personal identity" (T 1.4.6) that a self, mind, or person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252) and, more specifically, a "system of different perceptions or different existences link'd together by the relation of cause and ..

In this appendix to "a treatise of human nature", Hume expresses dissatisfaction with his own account of personal identity, Claiming that it is "inconsistent." in spite of much recent discussion of the appendix, There has been little agreement either about the reasons for hume's second thoughts or about the philosophical moral to be drawn from them. The present article argues, First, That none of the explanations for his misgivings which have been offered has succeeded in describing a problem which would or should have led hume to question his own account or to regard it as inconsistent; and second, That there is nonetheless a serious inconsistency in his account of personal identity-An inconsistency which hume apparently noticed, Even if his critics did not. This inconsistency is ultimately the result of his attempt to combine reductionistic theories of personal identity and causation with a non-Reductionistic theory of mind

Hume argues that respect for property (“justice”) is a convention-dependent (“artificial”) virtue. He does so by appeal to a principle, derived from his virtue-based approach to ethics, which requires that, for any kind of virtuous action, there be a “first virtuous motive” that is other than a sense of moral duty. It has been objected, however, that in the case of justice (and also in a parallel argument concerning promise-keeping) Hume (i) does not, (ii) should not, and (iii) cannot recognize such a motive. This paper defends Hume’s argument against these three objections.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume's Defence of Causal InferenceDon GarrettFred Wilson. Hume's Defence of Causal Inference. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Pp. xii + 439. Cloth, $80.00.According to its introduction, this book "deals solely with the problem of induction [and] solely with the issue of whether Hume is a sceptic with regard to causation and scientific reason" (p. 6). Wilson concludes that although Hume rejects "objective" necessary connections, he is not a sceptic—or at least, no more than a fallibilist "academic" sceptic—about induction. In contrast to several relatively recent commentators, he accepts the traditional view that Hume did pose a general sceptical problem about induction. One of Wilson's many formulations of that problem (111) is this: "How can [inductive] inference habits be justified, shown to be reasonable?" According to Wilson, Hume raised this problem and offered a solution to it. In fact, he holds, Hume provided at least the outlines of the correct solution.The book consists of just three chapters, but each chapter is over one hundred pages long. Not surprisingly, then, it is not really devoted solely to the question of whether Hume was or was not a sceptic about induction. In fact, the book takes up a wide variety of other related topics, incorporating considerable amounts of material [End Page 126] from no fewer than thirteen of Wilson's previously-published articles. It helpfully formalizes arguments wherever possible.The first chapter is a series of set-pieces intended to prepare the way for more tightly focused discussion of Hume's treatment of inductive scepticism. Topics include Hume's two definitions of 'cause,' necessary connections, dispositions, mental activity, the epistemology of scientific instruments, and Hume's treatment of "scepticism with regard to the senses." One recurring theme is that Hume is no proto-Kantian about mental activity or the universality of causation; another is the importance to Hume of his "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects."The second chapter is the centerpiece of the book, for it is here that Wilson tries to show how Hume justifies inductive scientific reasoning. The justification, as Wilson reconstructs it, has two steps. The first step is to argue that we ought to make inductive inferences on the grounds that (as a matter of psychological necessity) we must make such inferences. But this is only half the battle, since there are various ways to make inductive inferences and various strategies and influences that might or might not be allowed to affect the outcome. Hume's chosen way of making inductive inferences, Wilson argues, is the scientific method of "eliminative induction," as embodied in the "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." Hume's strategy for justifying this method, according to Wilson, is to show that it is "reasonable" by showing that it is the method best suited for a particular practical purpose—namely, the purpose of satisfying our passion of "curiosity." This passion aims not only at the pleasure of exercising our faculties, but also at the achievement of truth, or at least (what seems rather different) of a system of beliefs that will prove "satisfactory to the mind." Accordingly, Wilson takes Hume to argue that using the method of eliminative induction embodied in the "Rules" constitutes "the best we can do" by way of discovering the truth of generalizations and that experience shows other methods to be less satisfactory in attaining the truth. Of course, a method's being the best we can do does not in itself entail that it is good enough to warrant adoption; and to treat the past successes or failures of a particular method as indicative of its future success or failure is to rely on induction itself. Presumably, then, Wilson's Hume is meant to regard the inductive arguments showing the "reasonableness" of the "Rules" as themselves among the inductions that any human being ultimately must accept, regardless of specific methods, strategies, or influences.The book's third and final chapter takes up the challenge posed by the section of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Of scepticism with regard to reason," in which Hume argues that "all the rules of logic...

BOOK REVIEWS ~99 edge of Hebrew and Hebrew texts, from encounters with Iberian Jews, and from polemical Christian concerns. The changing situation within German Christendom greatly influenced the way Jews, their history, and their customs were seen. Arthur Williamson, an expert in Scottish intellectual history, treats a somewhat amazing phenomenon: the Scots from the Reformation onward saw themselves as Jews, and developed a Judaized political history. From sometime in the late Middle Ages, the Scots were notorious with their southern neighbors for not eating pork. They were even accused of being the descendants of the Jews expelled from England in 129 o. During the Reformation some of their leaders saw themselves as recreating the Hebrew Commonwealth and the Jewish Covenant with God. This Judaized politics played a very significant role in the emergence first of Great Britain, and then of the United Kingdom. In the closing essay James E. Force develops his Judaized interpretation of Isaac Newton's theology, stressing the role of Jewish monotheism in Newton's anti-Trinitarian Christianity and in his science. Most Newton commentators have been content to exile Newton's theology to his infancy or his senility, and to insist, no matter what the great man believed about the Book of Revelation, that it had nothing to do with his scientific theories. Force both expounds a crucial center of the religious views, and shows how they explain what Newton thought he..

In a 1998 Hume Studies book symposium, Peter Millican provided excellent critical comments on my Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, and I am grateful that he has done the same for Hume. Many of the new or revised interpretations in the latter book result, directly or indirectly, from his extraordinary stimulus, both in his writings and in person, as a philosophical scholar and interlocutor. His comments range over much of the book, but the majority of them concern chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, and chapter 8 (“Morality...

Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary terms to ‘true religion’; in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, his character Philo goes so far as to express ‘veneration for’ it. This paper addresses three questions. First, did Hume himself really approve of something that he called ‘true religion’? Second, what did he mean by calling it ‘true’? Third, what did he take it to be? By appeal to some of his key doctrines about causation and probability, and to some key features of the characters and content of the Dialogues, I argue, contrary to important recent interpretations by Immerwahr and Falkenstein, that Hume's ‘true religion’ is a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that he regarded as true in an epistemic sense

Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms and to understand the character-especially the normative character-of Hume's philosophical project. This paper argues that Hume is a naturalist-and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist-in quite robust ways; and that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as "rationally justified" in several different senses of that term.

This article is a critical discussion of David Owen's book, _Hume's Reason. Owen rightly emphasizes (i) that an understanding of Hume's theory of reasoning is essential to understanding his philosophy and (ii) that an understanding of early modern antiformalism in logic is crucial to understanding Hume's theory of reasoning. Against most commentators, Owen and I agree that Hume's famous conclusion about inductive inferences, i.e., that they are "not determin'd by reason"--is a causal rather a normative claim; however, I dispute Owen's particular interpretation of this conclusion, arguing instead for an interpretation that allows Hume to use the term 'reason' univocally to mean "the inferential faculty." While agreeing with Owen that Hume regards the "wise" use of reason as a moral virtue, I argue that Hume's _endorsement of the use of reason is not entirely dependent on this fact