Don Garrett

In the introduction to his Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology, John Bricke traces the remarkable lack of agreement among commentators concerning the nature of Hume’s moral philosophy to two main failings: insufficient attention to “the foundations, in his philosophy of mind, on which Hume builds when constructing his theory of morality” and “the practice of taking his theory of morality as a patchwork of severally brilliant and provocative, but essentially unintegrated parts.” Accordingly, he proposes to “fasten on Hume’s efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind” and to do so with an “approach to the textual evidence [that] is holistic, self-consciously seeking connections between what can seem to be isolated doctrines”. The set of interrelated topics that he is thus led to address includes motives and reasons for action ; desires, volitions, and affections ; moral motivation ; moral sentiments ; the artificiality of justice ; motives to justice ; and the nature of moral agents.

460 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 Graeme Hunter, editor. Spinoza: The Enduring Questions. Toronto: University of To- ronto Press, 1994. Pp. xi + 182. Cloth, $70.00. This volume of eight essays is dedicated to the memory of the late David Savan, and originated from a conference held in his honor prior to his untimely death. The lead essay is by Savan himself, and most of the other essays acknowledge the influence of his work. The first three essays address not only an "enduring question," but a question about enduring: namely, the nature of eternality and immortality in Spinoza's metaphysics. In a dense and detailed essay that amply rewards close analysis, Savan aims to clarify Spinoza's conception of eternity. That conception, Savan argues, cannot be identified with any of the three main conceptions dominant in previous philosophizing: eternity as sempiternity; eternity as Platonic timelessness; and eternity as neces- sary existence, following from a thing's own essence. Chief among his..

Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication 1 is a most useful and agreeable book. It contains a wealth of analysis, argument, and insight about many of the most central elements of the moral theory of one of the greatest moral philosophers in human history: David Hume. The book is well-conceived, well-argued, stimulating, informative, clear, precise, thorough, balanced, nuanced, and ingenious, while evincing—especially in its concluding chapter, when considering possible extensions of Hume's theory—a certain subtle but pleasing "warmth in the cause of virtue." As Hume would be the first to recognize, these traits of the book are indications of the personal merit of its author: Rachel Cohon. Indeed, if Cleanthes.

Henry Allison’s Benedict de Spinoza was a clear, concise, and reliable introduction to a broad range of topics in Spinoza’s philosophy. This revised and retitled edition preserves those virtues while reflecting important developments since 1974, including Edwin Curley’s superb translations of the Ethics and the earlier works, and important books on Spinoza by Martial, Gueroult, R. J. Delahunty, and Jonathan Bennett. Of the book’s seven chapters, it is primarily the three central ones—those dealing with the Ethics—that have been revised.

I argue that spinoza's ontological argument is successful when it is understood to have two premises: (i) it is possible for god to exist, (ii) it is necessary that, if god exists, he necessarily does. the argument is valid in s5. spinoza is in a position to establish the second premise of the argument on the basis of his definitions and axioms. the first premise was assumed to be true, but, as leibniz noted, it must be established for the conclusion of the argument to be forthcoming. this is one of the main problems with the argument, and it requires a solution to the problem of the attributes. certain alternate interpretations of spinoza are then argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds

ConclusionThe present paradox illustrates a deep interconnection between two superficially unrelated metaphysical problems: the nature of mental events and the analysis of causation. I have not tried to resolve the paradox, but only to explain it and to describe the available tactics for resolving it. Although I have also mentioned some of the various considerations that might be advanced in the pursuit of these tactics, I do not claim to have canvassed all such considerations. Since the list of tactics itself is exhaustive, however, and since the four propositions of the paradox are jointly inconsistent, it follows that at least one of these tactics must be correct.

In many ways, Benedict (Baruch) de Spinoza appears to be a contradictory figure in the history of philosophy. From the beginning, he has been notorious as an "atheist" who seeks to substitute Nature for a personal deity; yet he was also, in Novalis's famous description, "the God-intoxicated man." He was an uncompromising necessitarian and causal determinist; yet his ethical ideal was to become a "free man." He maintained that the human mind and the human body are identical; yet he also insisted that the human mind can achieve a kind of eternality that transcends the death of the body. He has been adopted by Marxists as a precursor of historical materialism, and by Hegelians as a precursor of absolute idealism. He was a psychological egoist, proclaiming that all individuals necessarily seek their own advantage and implying that other individuals were of value to him only insofar as they were useful to him; yet his writings aimed to promote human community based on love and friendship, he had many devoted friends, and even his critics were obliged to acknowledge that his personal conduct was above reproach. He held that the state has the right to do whatever it has the power to do, while at the same time he defended democracy and freedom of speech. He denied supernatural revelation and criticized popular religion as a grave danger to the peace and stability of the state; yet he devoted himself to the careful interpretation of scripture and argued for toleration and freedom of religion. Rarely employing figures of speech or rhetorical flourishes of any kind, his works are nevertheless among the most magisterial and uplifting of all philosophical writings, and they have inspired more poets and novelists than those of any other philosopher of the early modern period.

It is an honor to receive such extensive comments from Louis Loeb, whose work I admire and from whom I have learned much. In particular, his landmark 2002 book, Stability and Justification in Hume’s “Treatise” and his 2010 collection of essays, Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid are essential reading for anyone who wants to understand early modern epistemology. Some of what I have learned from him is reflected in the book on which he is now commenting which is not, of course, to say that he approves of all of the uses I make of his work, nor that I agree...

Beginning with an overview of Hume's life and work, Don Garrett introduces in clear and accessible style the central aspects of Hume's thought. These include Hume's lifelong exploration of the human mind; his theories of inductive inference and causation; skepticism and personal identity; moral and political philosophy; aesthetics; and philosophy of religion. The final chapter considers the influence and legacy of Hume's thought today. Throughout, Garrett draws on and explains many of Hume's central works, including his Treatise of Human Nature , Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding , and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Hume is essential reading not only for students of philosophy, but anyone in the humanities and social sciences and beyond seeking an introduction to Hume's thought.