Béatrice Longuenesse

In the 82/2 (2000) issue of this journal, Michael Friedman has offered a stimulating discussion of my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. His conclusion is that on the whole I fail to do justice to what is most revolutionary about Kant's natural philosophy, and instead end up attributing to Kant a pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian philosophy of nature. This is because, according to Friedman, I put excessive weight on Kant's claim to have derived his categories from a set of logical forms of judgment which he inherits from a traditional Aristotelian logic. In taking Kant at his word on this point, I fail to give their full import to Kant's insights into the newly discovered applications of mathematical concepts and methods to the science of nature.

Kant déclare avoir établi sa table des catégories selon le 'fil conducteur' que fourniraient les 'simples formes logiques' du jugement. Contrairement à une tradition solidement établie, on est parti ici de l'hypothèse que ce 'fil conducteur' était autre chose qu'une simple manie architectonique. En l'admettant pour guide, on a engagé une lecture inédite de l'Analytique transcendantale, conduisant de l'analyse des formes logiques du jugement à l'élucidation de leur rapport aux synthèses perceptives, l'une et l'autre se conjuguant dans une étonnante réinvention du sens des catégories et de l'entreprise métaphysique dans son entier.

There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper.

In response to Henry Allison's and Sally Sedwick's comments on my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, I explain Kant's description of the understanding as being essentially a "capacity to judge", and his view of the relationship between the categories and the logical functions of judgment. I defend my interpretation of Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B edition. I conclude that, in my interpretation, Kant's notions of the "a priori" and the "given" are more complex and flexible than is generally perceived. Nevertheless, Kant maintains a strict distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, the "passive" and the "active" aspects of our representational capacities. This separates him from his German idealist successors, most notably Fichte and Hegel. Contrary to Sedgwick's and Allison's suggestions, I do not think that my interpretation tends to blur this distinction.

Hegel's Science of Logic has received less attention than his Phenomenology of Spirit, but Hegel himself took it to be his highest philosophical achievement and the backbone of his system. The present book focuses on this most difficult of Hegel’s published works. Béatrice Longuenesse offers a close analysis of core issues, including discussions of what Hegel means by ‘dialectical logic’, the role and meaning of ‘contradiction’ in Hegel’s philosophy, and Hegel’s justification for the provocative statement that ‘what is actual is rational, what is rational is actual’. She examines both Hegel's debt and his polemical reaction to Kant, and shows in great detail how his project of a ‘dialectical’ logic can be understood only in light of its relation to Kant’s ‘transcendental’ logic. This book will appeal to anyone interested in Hegel's philosophy and its influence on contemporary philosophical discussion

Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Subjekt” und Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Objekt” ist in jüngster Zeit lebendig diskutiert worden. Der Artikel bietet eine Diskussion des üblichen Vorwurfs, dem zufolge Kant ignoriert, dass ich, als Subjekt, meiner selbst als eines physischen Objektes beziehungsweise eines lebendigen Körpers bewusst bin. Gegen Quassim Cassams Argument zu dieser These argumentiert der Artikel, dass Kants Begriff des Ichs eher im Lichte seiner Rolle bei der Einigung unserer Vorstellungen zu verstehen ist als im Lichte zeitgenössischer Überlegungen dazu, in welchen Arten das „Ich” auf den eigenen Körper bezogen werden kann.

In this collection of essays Béatrice Longuenesse considers the three aspects of Kant's philosophy, his epistemology and metaphysics of nature, his moral philosophy and his aesthetic theory, under one unifying standpoint: Kant's conception of our capacity to form judgements. She argues that the elements which make up our cognitive access to the world - what Kant calls the 'human point of view' - have an equally important role to play in our moral evaluations and our aesthetic judgements. Her discussion ranges over Kant's account of our representations of space and time, his conception of the logical forms of judgements, sufficient reason, causality, community, God, freedom, morality, and beauty in nature and art. Her book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant and his thought.