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104An anti-individualistic semantics for 'empty' natural kind termsGrazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1): 147-168. 2006.Several authors (Boghossian 1998; Segal 2000) allege that 'empty' would-be natural kind terms are a problem for anti-individualistic semantics. In this paper I rebut the charge by providing an anti-individualistic semantics for such terms.
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IntroductionIn Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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2The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial KnowledgeIn Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
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142Self‐ascription, Self‐knowledge, and the Memory ArgumentAnalysis 57 (3): 211-219. 1997.is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
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139Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based beliefPhilosophical Explorations 15 (2). 2012.In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argu…Read more
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3Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledgeIn Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44. 2006.
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202Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic InjusticeEpisteme 7 (2): 138-150. 2010.Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony…Read more
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1Work: The Case of TestimonyIn Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 175. 2011.
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136Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and JustificationCambridge University Press. 2007.Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge commun…Read more
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103Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreementSynthese 190 (7): 1189-1207. 2013.This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this w…Read more
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24Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2015.Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the p…Read more
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126Testimonially based knowledge from false testimonyPhilosophical Quarterly 51 (205): 512-526. 2001.Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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38Reported Speech and the Epistemology of TestimonyProtoSociology 17 59-77. 2002.Speech reports of the form ‘A said that p’ are sometimes used by a speaker S as a reason in support of S’s own claim to know that p – in particular, when S’s claim to know is made on the basis of A’s testimony. In this paper I appeal to intuitions regarding the epistemology of testimony to argue that such ‘testimonial’ uses of speech reports ought to be ascribed their strict de dicto truth conditions. This result is then used as the basis for the claim that, no matter how they are used, all spee…Read more
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Department of Philosophy 1427 Paterson Office Tower University of Kentucky Lexington, KY 40506-0027Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3/4): 249-286. 2000.
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172The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “the Meaning of ”Meaning’ ‘ (edited book)M. E. Sharpe. 1996.This volume will acquaint novice philosophers with one of the most important debates in twentieth-century philosophy, and will provide seasoned readers with a ...
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101Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authorityPhilosophical Psychology 1 (1): 65-76. 2002.In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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8Mentalistic explanation and mental causationManuscrito 25 (3): 199-216. 2002.In this paper I present an internal difficulty for the hypothesis that mentalistic explanation is causal explanation. My thesis is that intuitively acceptable mentalistic explanations appear to violate constraints imposed by the mental causation hypothesis
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95The social virtues: Two accounts (review)Acta Analytica 24 (4): 237-248. 2009.Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are…Read more
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126Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticismPhilosophical Studies 116 (1): 53-78. 2003.Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squ…Read more
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156Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2007.Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
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114Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisitedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1). 2008.Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowle…Read more
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14Searle vs. Searle on language, speech, and thoughtPragmatics and Cognition 22 (3): 352-372. 2014.Searle’s (1963/1991) account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice (1957), in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic (usage) rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his (1983) commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, …Read more
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71Epistemic Justification RevisitedJournal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 1-16. 2016.In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy (as well as the nature of and interconnections among the various epistemic good-making properties). In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a pr…Read more
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225Reliabilism in philosophyPhilosophical Studies 142 (1). 2009.The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predi…Read more
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47Comments on Pritchard’s Epistemological DisjunctivismJournal of Philosophical Research 41 183-191. 2016.Among the many virtues Duncan Pritchard ascribes to his disjunctivist position in Epistemic Disjunctivism, he claims it defeats the skeptic in an attractive fashion. In this paper I argue that his engagement with the skeptic is not entirely successful.
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98Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and knowledge of content: Reply to BruecknerAnalysis 59 (3): 212-217. 1999.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |